University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

5-29-2014

Measuring the Adaptation of Military Response
During the Second Seminole War Florida
(1835-1842): KOCOA and The Role of a West
Point Military Academy Education
Michelle Diane Sivilich
University of South Florida, msivilic@mail.usf.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the History of Art, Architecture, and Archaeology Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Sivilich, Michelle Diane, "Measuring the Adaptation of Military Response During the Second Seminole War Florida (1835-1842):
KOCOA and The Role of a West Point Military Academy Education" (2014). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5309

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Measuring the Adaptation of Military Response During the Second Seminole War
Florida (1835-1842): KOCOA and The Role of a West Point Military Academy Education

by

Michelle D. Sivilich

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Anthropology
College of Arts and Science
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Brent R. Weisman, Ph.D.
Karla L. Davis-Salazar, Ph.D.
E. Christian Wells, Ph.D.
Phillip Levy, Ph.D.
Uzi Baram, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
May 29, 2014

Keywords: conflict archaeology, interaction theory,
landscape archaeology, military education
Copyright © 2014, Michelle D. Sivilich

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I owe so much gratitude to my parents, Dan and Lea Sivilich, and brother, Eric Sivilich,
for all of their love and support. I couldn’t have made it this far without them. I love you all so
very much. I would like to thank everyone at Gulf Archaeology Research Institute, especially
Gary Ellis and Ken Nash. They graciously allowed me to work with them on the Fort Dade and
Fort King excavations and provided me with invaluable experiences and guidance in Florida
archaeology. I also would like to thank Dr. Brent Weisman, my advisor for igniting my interest
in Seminole War archaeology; as well as my committee: Dr. Karla L. Davis-Salazar, Dr. E.
Christian Wells, Dr. Phillip Levy and Dr. Uzi Baram for all of their guidance and support along
the way. I also owe much gratitude for all of the terrific support and guidance I received from
participants of the Fields of Conflict conferences, especially Doug Scott, Larry Babits and
Adrian Mandzy. I am also so very grateful for everyone who has become my Charlottesville
family, especially the Bon-Harpers and Ron. There are too many wonderful people to thank
individually, but you know who you are. You’ve all helped me more than you can ever know and
for that I am thankful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................................... v
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1
Hypotheses.......................................................................................................................... 9
Lines of Evidence ............................................................................................................. 10
Conclusions & Goals: ....................................................................................................... 13
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................. 15
The Origin of Hostilities in Florida and The First Seminole War .................................... 15
Who are the Seminoles?.................................................................................................... 20
Leading up to the Second Seminole War.......................................................................... 23
Second Seminole War: Background ................................................................................. 25
The Third Seminole War .................................................................................................. 32
The Seminole Perspective................................................................................................. 34
The Bigger Picture ............................................................................................................ 36
The Cultural and Historical Impact of the Indian Wars.................................................... 38
Public Perception of the Florida Wars .............................................................................. 41
Studying Conflict .............................................................................................................. 43
CHAPTER 3: ................................................................................................................................ 46
Introduction....................................................................................................................... 46
Officer Training and the French Legacy........................................................................... 48
Dennis Hart Mahan – Educator and Accomplished Strategist.......................................... 51
Other Notable Military Theorists...................................................................................... 52
The Board of Visitors and West Point’s Curriculum........................................................ 54
West Point Graduates and the Second Seminole War ...................................................... 55
Conclusions....................................................................................................................... 56
CHAPTER 4: ................................................................................................................................ 58
Modern Military Theory Meets Conflict Archaeology..................................................... 58
Military Sciences Applied to a Historical Conflict Setting .............................................. 59
Modern Military Terminology.......................................................................................... 61
Levels of Warfare ................................................................................................. 61
Principles of War, Tenets, and Elements of Combat Power................................. 62
Area of Operation and Landscape Visualizations................................................. 65
Terrain................................................................................................................... 66
Centers of Gravity................................................................................................. 68
i

Linear vs. Nonlinear Operations ........................................................................... 69
Types of War......................................................................................................... 70
Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare .......................................................................... 70
Insurgency............................................................................................................. 71
Conclusions....................................................................................................................... 73
CHAPTER 5: ................................................................................................................................ 74
Introduction....................................................................................................................... 74
The Military as a Cultural Entity ...................................................................................... 76
Why Use Interaction Theories When Studying the Landscape? ...................................... 77
Interaction and Identity ..................................................................................................... 78
Understanding Landscapes ............................................................................................... 82
Interaction Theories .......................................................................................................... 82
How Interregional Interaction Has Been Investigated...................................................... 86
Exchange of Content............................................................................................. 86
The Process of Change.......................................................................................... 88
How Culture Contact Analyses Can Benefit Fortified Landscape Studies....................... 90
Fortified Landscapes......................................................................................................... 91
Key Features of a Fortified Landscape ............................................................................. 92
Frontiers vs. Fortified Landscapes.................................................................................... 93
How a Landscape is Modified Will Reflect the Types of Interactions Taking Place....... 93
Knowledge Can Be Passed Between Groups Despite Hostile Interactions...................... 95
The Perception of Future Interactions Will Shape How a Landscape is Modified .......... 96
Physical Features Can Change the Way Cultures Access Resources ............................... 97
Fortified Landscapes Can Modify Culture and Identity ................................................... 99
A Fortified Landscape is a Symbolic Landscape............................................................ 100
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 102
CHAPTER 6: .............................................................................................................................. 104
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 104
Symbols of Power: Roads............................................................................................... 105
Understanding Roads ...................................................................................................... 106
Importance of Roads ....................................................................................................... 107
Physical Function of Roads ............................................................................................ 108
Travel and Transport........................................................................................... 109
Alteration of the Physical Landscape ................................................................. 110
Social Function of Roads .................................................................................... 110
Communication................................................................................................... 110
Power .................................................................................................................. 111
Symbolism .......................................................................................................... 111
Road Components............................................................................................... 112
Destination .......................................................................................................... 112
Way Stations ....................................................................................................... 113
Structural Components........................................................................................ 113
Knowledge or Information.................................................................................. 114
Roads of Conquest or Military Roads............................................................................. 115
United States History of Roads of Conquest .................................................................. 116
ii

The Fort King Road as a Case Study of Military Roads of Conquest ............................ 117
Brief History of Florida’s Roads..................................................................................... 118
History of The Fort King Road....................................................................................... 120
Components of the Fort King Road ................................................................................ 124
Perception of Landscape ................................................................................................. 128
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 130
CHAPTER 7: .............................................................................................................................. 132
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 132
Understanding Florida’s Fortified Landscape ................................................................ 135
KOCOA’s Current Function ........................................................................................... 136
Examples of KOCOA and Archaeology......................................................................... 137
Maps as Environmental Knowledge ............................................................................... 141
KOCOA of Florida ......................................................................................................... 142
Historical KOCOA Analysis and Difficulties................................................................. 149
Combining Perspectives.................................................................................................. 149
KOCOA as a Predictive Model....................................................................................... 155
Study Area ...................................................................................................................... 156
Different Groups, Different Strategies............................................................................ 159
KOCOA Analysis Simplified ......................................................................................... 161
Assessing Training.......................................................................................................... 165
The United States Military’s Way of War ...................................................................... 170
Drill and Parade .................................................................................................. 171
Transportation ..................................................................................................... 171
Fortifications ....................................................................................................... 173
Adaptations ......................................................................................................... 174
The Seminole Way of War ............................................................................................. 175
Conclusions..................................................................................................................... 177
CHAPTER 8: .............................................................................................................................. 179
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 179
Fort Brooke ..................................................................................................................... 180
Fort Foster....................................................................................................................... 182
Archaeology of Fort Foster................................................................................. 183
Fort Dade ........................................................................................................................ 185
Archaeology of Fort Dade .................................................................................. 186
Fort King......................................................................................................................... 192
Archaeology of Fort King................................................................................... 198
Fort Comparisons: Creating Comfort on the Frontier..................................................... 200
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 204
CHAPTER 9: .............................................................................................................................. 206
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 206
19th-Century Military Culture in a Globalized Context ................................................. 207
Modern Military Science in Historic Contexts ............................................................... 208
The Military Mindset ...................................................................................................... 209
Psychology of Living in the Wilderness......................................................................... 210
iii

Understanding Interactions ............................................................................................. 212
Conclusions..................................................................................................................... 213
Future Directions ............................................................................................................ 215
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 216
APPENDIX A: West Point graduates that fought in the Seminole Wars................................... 236

iv

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1.

Elements of a full spectrum operation as applied to Florida. ............................... 64

TABLE 4.

Seminole Wars examples of KOCOA ................................................................ 160

TABLE 3.

Number of excavation units and their size.......................................................... 190

TABLE 4:

List of Relevant Artifacts from Forts Dade and King......................................... 203

v

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1.

Map of Florida with the study area circled. ............................................................ 8

FIGURE 2.

Map of Florida, 1765. ........................................................................................... 16

FIGURE 3.

Location of Fort Gadsden, circled in red, which was built over the Negro Fort. . 18

FIGURE 4.

1831 map of the Seminole reservation.................................................................. 24

FIGURE 5.

“Massacre of Major Dade and his Command,” .................................................... 26

FIGURE 6.

Theater of military operations in Florida 1837. .................................................... 29

FIGURE 7.

Newspaper image depicting the Dade Massacre. ................................................. 42

FIGURE 8.

Excerpt from Vauban's treatise. ............................................................................ 53

FIGURE 9.

List of courses and text books used at West Point, 1824...................................... 55

FIGURE 10. Levels of warfare. ................................................................................................. 62
FIGURE 11. Elements of a full spectrum operation. ................................................................. 63
FIGURE 12. Left image is from FM 3-0 Area of Operations, Right image is
adapted to a Florida example. ............................................................................... 66
FIGURE 13. The Congressional Act authorizing the building of roads in Florida, approved
February 28, 1824................................................................................................. 120
FIGURE 14. 1838 map of Florida showing the major roads..................................................... 122
FIGURE 15. 1838 map with roads and trails highlighted within the study area. .................... 123
FIGURE 16. GIS map of the components of the Fort King Road ........................................... 125
FIGURE 17. Number of forts as of 1868 ................................................................................. 134
FIGURE 18. Image of Fort Brooke.......................................................................................... 135
FIGURE 19. KOCOA elements from the Battle of Buckland Mills........................................ 138
FIGURE 20. An example KOCOA map for Key Terrain from Buckland Mills. .................... 139
vi

FIGURE 21. KOCOA map of Fort King. ................................................................................ 144
FIGURE 22. KOCOA map of Gettysburg. .............................................................................. 145
FIGURE 23. Map of Florida 1838. .......................................................................................... 146
FIGURE 24. KOCOA features on an 1838 map. ..................................................................... 148
FIGURE 25. Historic maps used for GIS analysis................................................................... 150
FIGURE 26. Map showing an overlay of the digitized Withlacoochee River......................... 151
FIGURE 27. Features digitized from the 1838 map. ............................................................... 153
FIGURE 28. Digitized features from four maps. ..................................................................... 154
FIGURE 29. Features from the 1836 map compared to those from the 1845 map.................. 155
FIGURE 30. Map of Florida showing the study area, 1838 map............................................. 157
FIGURE 31. Map showing areas classified as either safe or dangerous
for the U.S. Military............................................................................................ 163
FIGURE 32. Map showing areas classified as either safe or dangerous for the Seminoles. ... 164
FIGURE 33. Actual vs. hypothetical elevations of fort locations............................................ 166
FIGURE 34. Map showing buffers with a 15-mile radius around the four forts. .................... 169
FIGURE 35. Map of Fort Foster. ............................................................................................. 184
FIGURE 36. The Withlacoochee River at Fort Dade. ............................................................. 186
FIGURE 37. View of Fort Dade as it is today ......................................................................... 187
FIGURE 38.

Looting of an excavation unit. ........................................................................... 188

FIGURE 39. Map of Excavations in 2003. (Bell 2004)........................................................... 189
FIGURE 40. Evidence of Burned Timbers in Excavation Unit N457-E490. .......................... 190
FIGURE 41. Map of excavation units...................................................................................... 191
FIGURE 42. Map of Fort King. ............................................................................................... 195
FIGURE 43. Layout of Fort King ............................................................................................ 196
FIGURE 44. Fort King as it appears today .............................................................................. 198
vii

FIGURE 45. Transect of STPs at Fort King ............................................................................ 199
FIGURE 46. Distribution of all artifacts found at Fort King. .................................................. 200
FIGURE 47. Example of ceramics decorations from Fort King.............................................. 202

viii

ABSTRACT
Conflict archaeology is a fairly new discipline and is in the process of defining its
methods and theories. Recently, the American Battlefield Protection Program has started
requiring that grant applicants perform a KOCOA analysis. KOCOA is a modern military
technique and stands for Key terrain, Obstacle, Cover and Concealment, Observation, and
Avenues of Approach. However, this method was developed for modern warfare, and its
adoption by the archaeological community has not yet been analyzed. I argue that this method
needs a few modifications to make it more applicable to historical research and that it can be
broadened to investigate more complex questions regarding decision-making processes. In its
current form, KOCOA only looks at how a landscape was used during conflict based on the
results of what happened. I contend we can use this method to analyze the landscape and look at
the decisions that went into selecting it. Employing KOCOA in this manner will allow us to
understand how militaries adapted, or failed to adapt, to a given landscape.
The Second Seminole War in Florida (1835-1842) can serve as an ideal case study. For
one thing, the military had never experienced the Florida environment, and therefore adaptations
to landscape utilization will be readily apparent. Also, in the early 19th-century, the military as a
cultural institution indoctrinated its members through extensive training at the United States
Military Academy in West Point, NY, and I propose this standardized education had a significant
negative effect on the shape, direction, and outcome of the Second Seminole War due to the gap
between the knowledge gained through training and the knowledge needed in the field when
fighting a war with Indians in the swamps and hammocks of Florida. Using modern military
ix

theory, the purpose of this research is to develop tools to measure how traditional European
educational methods, which officers received while at the Military Academy, hindered their
ability to adapt to the unique and challenging environment they encountered while trying to
remove the Seminole Indians from the Florida territory.
Conflict archaeology is also well suited to investigate the more human side, such as the
decision-making processes and adaptations required, moving beyond the “what” and “how”
aspects of conflict to the “why.” One traditional approach to conflict archaeology is KOCOA.
As used archaeologically, KOCOA employs modern cartographic information. Those
participating in the conflict, however, would not have had access to this level of detail.
Therefore, I propose that KOCOA be revised to incorporate the knowledge that would have been
available to the decision makers at the time of the conflict. The aim of this research is to expand
the methodologies of conflict archaeology to include indirect expressions of warfare and to
incorporate them into a meaningful discussion of their role in the outcome of conflict. To
accomplish this, I have developed a model against which hypotheses about the decision-making
processes and their effectiveness can be compared.

x

CHAPTER 1
BEYOND KOCOA: INVESTIGATING ADAPTATION
WITHIN A MILITARIZED LANDSCAPE
To wage war, become an anthropologist. Lose the fascination with Clausewitz,
and embrace culture as the way to understand conflict. Or so argue a number of
strategists, historians, and officers on both sides of the Atlantic. From the
academy to the Pentagon, fresh attention is being focused on the value of knowing
the enemy. Those who take this view assume that different ways of life produce
different ways of war (Porter 2007).

Introduction
In the last three decades, there has been a rapid increase in the study of conflict
archaeology, battlefield archaeology, military sites archaeology, and the many other iterations of
this field (Scott and McFeaters 2011). Equally important has been the advancement in the tools
and technology available to more fully understand these unique types of landscapes. Tools such
as GIS and high-resolution aerial maps easily available from the Internet, a surge in the use and
sophistication of metal detectors, the use of current military theories, and many other techniques
have greatly enhanced analysis. However, Doyle and Bennet (2002) contend that “despite the
widespread recognition of the importance of terrain within military action, it has rarely been used
as an historical tool to help deconstruct events, actions and outcomes of military engagements,
yet clearly its potential to impact on our understanding of such actions is considerable.” This has
begun to change in the field of archaeology. With the use of a military terrain analysis called
KOCOA, a more terrain-centric analysis of past conflicts has emerged. New theory, coupled with
1

great advances in technology, has allowed more complex research questions to be tackled, such
as my investigation of the role of education.
Since 2004, the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP), the leading
organization for protecting and researching battlefields in the United States, has required what is
known as a KOCOA analysis. KOCOA—an acronym for Key Terrain, Observations and fields
of fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach—is a modern military
concept. This method is used as a quick visual assessment for classifying the tactical advantages
and disadvantages of a specific location (Department of Defense 2001). While KOCOA offers
significant advantages for studying and preserving critically important battlefields and their
associated supporting features, little scholarly attention has been given to this mandatory new
methodology.
As used by the ABPP, KOCOA is to be used only where weapons fire has been
exchanged (McMasters 2011). It has served mainly as an organizational tool where a variety of
data sources can be collated into a set of meaningful maps, which are then used to define the core
area of battlefields. Yet this method offers the potential to begin asking a broader set of questions
about military sites and provide a framework upon which a more anthropological theoretical
approach to conflict can be built. KOCOA can serve as a method for providing a quantifiable and
unified language that allows for inter-site comparisons. The example used in this research
focuses on how the military was trained and how this training could have affected the outcomes
of conflict. KOCOA has the potential to shed light on is landscape adaptation and learning, by
comparing how officers were trained to respond and how they actually responded. To
demonstrate that KOCOA can be expanded into a more flexible research tool for testing
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hypotheses about training and adaptation, I will use a case study of the Second Seminole War in
Florida (1835-1842).
The ABPP was founded in 1991 by Manuel Lujan, Jr., then–Secretary of the Interior, and
the American Battlefield Protection Act was signed into law in 1996. This legislation has
allowed for the documentation and preservation of a significant number of historic battlefields
across the country. The ABPP also provides annual grant funds to help institutions locate,
document, research, interpret or protect local sites of conflict. The ABPP’s website defines its
mission as follows:
The American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) promotes the preservation
of significant historic battlefields associated with wars on American soil. The
goals of the program are 1) to protect battlefields and sites associated with armed
conflicts that influenced the course of our history, 2) to encourage and assist all
Americans in planning for the preservation, management, and interpretation of
these sites, and 3) to raise awareness of the importance of preserving battlefields
and related sites for future generations. The ABPP focuses primarily on land use,
cultural resource and site management planning, and public education (American
Battlefield Protection Program).
The ABPP’s requirement for a KOCOA analysis is clearly demonstrated by the workshop
on the method that all new grant recipients are required to take. (A copy of this training packet is
available from the website.) The creation of the ABPP and the funding sources it provides has
greatly benefited the field of conflict archaeology.
Battlefield or conflict archaeology is a new field of historical archaeology (Scott and
McFeaters 2011, Sutherland 2005) and will provide the main theoretical foundation for my
analysis. Conflict archaeology emerged from an expanded understanding of battlefields, which
required a more specialized skill set and new theories to fully investigate these ephemeral
features of conflict (Fox and Scott 1991, Scott and McFeaters 2011, Scott and Bleed 2011,
Starbuck 2011). While the field has rapidly become a scientific discipline of its own, several
3

areas of study still have great potential for advancement, especially by using anthropological
methods to broaden the scope of research and ask more complex research questions. For
example, understanding how and why a landscape becomes militarized and the effect
militarization has on that landscape, and those who occupy it, warrants further development.
“Militarization is a process that occurs through, and leaves its mark on societies, economies,
cultures and political structures. It also operates through landscape, which it changes or
maintains, in both a physical and cultural sense” (Pearson et al. 2010:3). A militarized landscape
implies an antagonistic relationship between two or more groups. A methodology for fully
understanding the nuanced causes and effects of this interaction has yet to be formulated.
Archaeological consideration of the organization and management of war is
beginning to be investigated at sites other than battlefields that played important
roles in military events, including military support facilities, camps, bases,
arsenals, logistic support processes and even prisoner of war, internment and
concentration camps. However, employing archaeology to assess the contextual
aspects of conflict and warfare is challenging, and there is still not a fully refined
archaeological vocabulary or conceptual inventory for this topic (Scott and
McFeaters 2011:104).
My research focuses on (1) understanding some of the contextual aspects of conflict not
explained by previous research and (2) building the framework for this new vocabulary
suggested by Scott and McFeaters in the above quote. In this study, I will draw from the body of
literature on interaction theories to set the stage for understanding the dynamics of war, then
combine this with modern military theories that have been adapted to the specific task at hand.
While the burgeoning field of conflict archaeology has greatly advanced our ability to
understand and contextualize historic conflicts, there is more to be understood beyond the
battlefield. Sites of conflict do not happen in isolation, and conflict archaeology is now
beginning to acknowledge this by investigating the kinds of supporting features mentioned
4

above. However, military sites still tend to be investigated as single sites in isolation when, in
reality, many relevant landscape features can influence the outcome of conflict and these features
function as a complex network. Studying them individually can overlook these complex
interactions. To gain a truly synthetic analysis of conflict, we will require a better understanding
of war as a network rather than as a chronological list of events. Therefore, it is the broader
concept of landscape that is the unit of my analysis, rather than a site-specific approach.
Landscapes in this case are, as Rockman (2003) defines them, “spaces in which a group of
humans actively interact with a natural environment.” This encompasses both the natural and
built environments. As Thomas and David (2008:20) point out, there are three broad themes in
the study of landscape: “landscapes as fields of human engagement,” “landscapes as physical
environmental contexts of human behavior,” and “reflections on representations of landscape”
(emphasis original). Acknowledging that landscapes are more than just physical space is a key
foundation for this research.
My research aim is to expand the methodologies of KOCOA and conflict archaeology to
include indirect expressions of warfare and incorporate them into a meaningful discussion of
their role in the outcome of conflict. To accomplish this, I developed a model to broaden the
scope of KOCOA that allows for investigation of hypotheses about decision-making processes
and their effectiveness. This means that traditional archaeological “sites” and their oftenoverlooked support features have to be viewed as part of an interconnected landscape. Conflict
archaeology as a discipline has been around long enough that it is ripe for developing into the
next phase of analysis: moving beyond documenting sites of conflict into investigation of the
more human side, such as decision-making processes and adaptation, and beyond the “what” and
“how” aspects of conflict and to the “why.” Why did these conflicts carry on the way they did?
5

Why were forts built where they were? Why did the Seminole Wars continue for almost 50 years
with no clear outcome?
The three Seminole Wars were largely unsuccessful in removing the entire population of
Florida’s native inhabitants. The First Seminole War was approximately 1814-1819, the Second
Seminole War was 1835-1842, and the Third Seminole War was from 1855-1858. There are
many historical accounts of the events, but few have broached the subject of why the military
was unsuccessful for so long. One aspect of my research is to demonstrate that the standardized
training and education the officers received at the United States Military Academy (USMA), at
West Point, New York, significantly reduced their ability to operate in Florida’s difficult terrain.
Quantifying the effects of education archaeologically has not received much, if any, attention in
the literature. I propose that an expanded use of KOCOA will allow some of these questions to
be investigated.
While the focus of this research is the role of the military’s education in the successes and
failures of how they operated, it should be acknowledged that the perspective of the Seminole
warriors is quite different. The Seminoles were highly adapted to the Florida environment and
used it to their advantage. The fact that traditional officer education was not suitable to Florida
should not denigrate the successes of the Seminoles. The Seminole Wars where highly disruptive
to their way of life, yet they adapted to the best of their ability. The fact that the military was not
successful in removing the Seminoles sheds light on the ingenuity and bravery of the Seminole
warriors (Lawres 2008). Expanding the discussion of successes of the Seminoles is beyond the
scope of this research but a much more complete discussion can be found in the theses of Butler
(2001) and Lawres (2008).

6

In the early 19th-century, the military as a cultural institution indoctrinated its members
through extensive training at the USMA, and I contend that this standardized education had a
significant negative effect on the shape, direction, and outcome of the Second Seminole War due
to the gap between the knowledge gained through training and the knowledge needed in the field
when fighting a war against Indians in the swamps and hammocks of Florida. The Second
Seminole War was chosen because it was the longest of the three conflicts and saw the most
concentrated conflict. Fully capturing all of the complex processes at work in during the
Seminole Wars will require a shift away from descriptive, site-based archaeologies (for example,
the excavations conducted at Fort Foster, with the sole objective of reconstructing the fort; see
Baker 1996). These early studies, while relying on a variety of documentary and archaeological
information, focused on the interpretation and chronology of a particular event or location and
did not fully explore the social aspects of the behaviors that produced the artifact distributions
(South 1978a) and modified the Florida landscape. Using a modern military theory such as
KOCOA, the purpose of my research is to develop tools to measure how traditional European
educational methods, which officers studied while at West Point, hindered their ability to adapt
to the unique and challenging environment of Florida.
At that time, Florida was an unknown frontier to the majority of U.S. citizens, having
only come under American control in 1819 due to the Adams-Onis Treaty (Mahon 1985). The
Second Seminole War dragged on for seven years without ever coming to a decisive end, aside
from a declaration by the U.S. government that the war was over and despite continuing smallscale hostilities between native groups, the military, and citizenry. While it will be demonstrated
that the military was less successful in its approach to the Seminoles, the Seminoles were highly
successful in repelling military advancements and defending their homes (Lawres 2008). It was
7

estimated to have cost 40 million dollars, and more than 1,400 troops lost their lives (Adams
1970:368). A large portion of the military was stationed in Florida throughout much of the early
1800s and built one of the largest fortification networks in the U.S. Even so, most studies of
Florida have investigated this war from a single subject focus—for example, investigating a
single archaeological site or a single fort, town, event, or person.

FIGURE 1. Map of Florida with the study area circled.
(http://davidrumsey.com)

In this study, I link previous research to create a more comprehensive analysis of how the war
functioned as a whole. Each part of the conflict landscape is connected, and to isolate one section
8

for analysis would ultimately change how that part is viewed. Due to time constraints, however,
only a section of Central Florida along one of the only formal roads (the Fort King Road) will be
analyzed (Figure 1). The Second Seminole War is an ideal test ground for broadening the use of
KOCOA to include determining how the social aspects of landscape fortification during the war
were shaped by (1) cultural interactions between the military and the Seminoles, (2) standardized
military education, (3) landscape knowledge or lack thereof and its effect, and (4) adaptability or
lack thereof and its effect. A corollary is to investigate the process of fortification and how the
features of a militarized landscape function as a larger system.

Hypotheses
Investigating how the military adapted or failed to adapt during the Second Seminole
War has several potential outcomes. The first is that the military adapted to the environment of
Florida with a fairly rapid change in tactics for how they approached both the Seminoles and the
environment. With successful adaptation, we would expect to see an evolution of methods.
Since this analysis focuses on the Second Seminole War and there had been a military presence
in the area for many years prior to the start of that conflict, it could be proposed that the military
would have adapted by then. In that case, the types of forts built for the Second Seminole War
should look different from the earlier forts. At the other extreme, perhaps the military failed to
adapt. In this scenario, we would expect to see the same tactics applied over and over regardless
of their success or failure. A third possibility is that the military only partially adapted. Evidence
for this would be engagements and tactics similar to those employed early in the war that, over
the course of seven years, had been adapted to accommodate the difficult terrain of Florida.
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One factor that needs to be determined is how failure is defined. Is it a tactical defeat
during conflict? Is it occupying a swamp where a large portion of the soldiers end up
incapacitated by disease? Is it not relocating the Seminoles? For the purposes of my analysis,
failure will be defined as any instance where the army did not meet its objective, whether it
concerned a specific skirmish or, overall, the successful relocation of the Seminoles. Cohen and
Gooch (1991:26) discuss three forms of failure: “failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure
to adapt.” As will be shown, all three types figured heavily into the ultimate outcome of the
Seminole Wars.

Lines of Evidence
Multiple lines of evidence will be utilized in this study. One primary source, maps, have
long played a central role in archaeology, both as sources of information and as a means of
presenting archaeological data. However, maps have a tendency to be taken at face value as a
“visual representation of the ‘truth’” (Smith 2007:81). Maps are assumed to be based on science
and use a standardized language of codes and symbols to accurately represent reality. The use of
maps as representations of the truth can lead to some false assumptions. In reality, “it is
important to recognize that visual (as well as linguistic) representations are culturally
determined” (Smith 2007:81). Surveyors and mapmakers often make subjective decisions about
what to include or exclude on the final map (Smith 2007). In this analysis, I approach maps
critically as a subjective representation of the mapmaker’s interpretation. Mapmakers usually
produce sketches based on line-of-site data. Therefore, the distances shown on the maps are often
inaccurate. As a result, some maps of Florida are especially problematic because they are grossly
inaccurate. Surveyors measure actual distances and elevations—but very few official survey
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maps exist for the Florida of 1835-1842, as much of the territory at that time was unexplored
wilderness. Attempts to send out survey parties often met with limited success, because they
were harassed and attacked by the Seminoles (Sprague 1848). More detail about which maps are
used here will be presented in Chapter 7.
Maps are also important because, as Smith (2007:82) points out, they serve as a symbol
of “power controlling the visual representation of space and landscape . . . [and they] are thus
regarded as tools of the state and of the powerful, as a means to dominate and control the (most
often colonial) landscape.” These themes of power and the symbolism of landscapes will be
discussed in Chapter 5.
Other key sources for my analysis include diaries and memoirs published by soldiers who
served on the Florida frontier. These provide as close to an emic perspective as possible, one
hundred and seventy-five years after the fact, of what life was like then. These documents,
ideally, will shed light on decision-making processes and help elucidate whether the army was
able to adapt to Florida or not. The main diaries used in this study are The Florida War (Sprague
1848), the letters and journals of William S. Foster published in This Miserable Pride of a
Soldier (Missal and Missal 2005), and Lt. Henry Prince’s diary, which was published as Amidst a
Storm of Bullets (Laumer 1998).
In addition to maps and archival sources, I conducted preliminary archaeology at two of
the four forts in the study area. Data collected include fort locations, information about what
types of forts were built (shape, plan, size), and what items were imported to make the forts
“livable” (i.e., comforts of home). Luxury items may shed light on whether the military adapted
to Florida or, alternatively, tried to create some semblance of a “civilized” home life on the
frontier. Due to Florida’s remote location at that time, along with hostile natives, difficult terrain,
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and lack of easy transport, getting such goods to Florida would be costly and difficult. The
quantities of materials that were imported will shed light on how important these items were in
making Florida “livable” by Western standards.
Additionally, modern military theory will contribute significantly to this research
paradigm, because it provides a unifying framework for investigating past military engagements.
This standardized language and approach can be hugely beneficial to studies of the past. Having
a common language allows studies to be comparable across times, places, and conflict types.
Since conflict archaeology is a fairly new field of research, a unified language has not yet been
settled on. Rather than invent new terminology specific to archaeology, a corpus of information
exists that can be readily adapted to investigate past conflicts. However, several key differences
must be recognized, the biggest being the level of technology available to the past groups being
studied. Modern military science, for example, focuses heavily on the precise measurement of
space and spatial awareness, but in the 19th-century, concepts of space were different. It is,
therefore, crucial to be aware that when applying modern concepts to the past, those concepts
must be relative to the information available at the time. It is false to assume that the same level
of spatial awareness and instant communication would have been available for decision making
in a different time period.
The final key piece of information for this study is the reference material that cadets at
West Point in the early 1800s would have had access to. The best way to understand the role of
education in the outcome of a military engagement is to understand how officers were trained to
think in that era. Thanks to the rigid doctrine of military education, I should be able to predict
what kinds of decisions should be made for a given situation. Education can be a valuable
resource, since—at least theoretically—the education of officers was uniform and evolved
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gradually over time. It may, therefore, serve as a point of comparison when studying different
wars and determining why they were successful or not. Leone argues that it is possible to
investigate ideology archaeologically (Leone 1982, 2010). In the case of this research I argue
that institutionalized education is a form of ideology in that it follows Leone’s definition that
“ideology is a set of masks, or illusions, which disguise the operations of daily, explicative life in
capitalism that serve to reproduce society intact” (Leone 2010:65). Education, like ideology, it is
something that is learned and is reproducible which means that archaeological patters should be
discernable because an entire group that has been educated in a certain way and will behave in
similar fashion. Thereby making standardized education something to be investigated
archaeologically.

Conclusions & Goals:
Although the use of KOCOA is now required by the ABPP, the primary granting agency
in the U.S., and has become a new standard in the field of conflict archaeology, it has never been
critically assessed by the academic community. I argue that the way KOCOA has been deployed
by archaeologists is limiting and can often lead to false assumptions. Modern military theory and
KOCOA can be expanded to serve more as predictive models than as individual analytical tools.
The goal of this research is to provide a new approach to analysis that will allow questions of
adaptation and failure to be addressed by developing a novel method that incorporates the role of
officer education. These three wars dragged on with no decisive victory; I aim to provide a
synthetic analysis that will elucidate some of the causes for this.
In Chapter Two I provide a brief history of Florida and the Seminole Wars. In Chapter
Three, I discuss relevant current military theory and science to provide a unified vocabulary for
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investigating historical examples of conflict. In Chapter Four, I demonstrate how the
standardized education that many officers of the Seminole Wars received may have hindered
their effectiveness in Florida. Chapter Five delves into several anthropological theories that are
important for understanding how various aspects of the landscape affected and were affected by
conflict. Chapter Six explains the importance of roads in understanding a militarized landscape.
Chapter Seven provides a brief overview of the archaeological examples of how these methods
can be applied to specific forts and features of the Florida Wars, while Chapter Eight
demonstrates that even preliminary excavation data can be incorporated in a KOCOA analysis.
Chapter Eight will also demonstrate how KOCOA can be broadened to be more anthropological
and theoretical in nature rather than just providing locational data. Finally, in Chapter Nine, I
summarize how this new framework can provide a more applied and anthropological approach to
battlefield archaeology.
Understanding and interpreting past behaviors from archaeological materials—even when
supplemented by historical accounts—can be difficult. By having a model such as KOCOA
against which hypothesized and actual behaviors can be tested, a more complete understanding
of the effectiveness of standardized education had on the ability to adapt to a unique and
challenging environment. KOCOA can be expanded beyond mapping what has happened to
utilizing it to ask questions such as why did these events happen, will broaden the ability of
conflict archaeologists to investigate more anthropological research questions.
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CHAPTER 2
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF FLORIDA
AND THE SEMINOLE WARS
But Florida, with its many advantages for Indian warfare, and its many
disadvantages for the operation of our troops, I fear will make the total
subjugation of the Seminoles, a work of more time and effort than persons
generally suppose. There is the climate with its miasmata, which in all
probability, will limit the offensive operations of our troops to the end of May.
The dense hammocks, scarcely penetrable but by those who know their
thoroughfares; forming secure retreats to the Indians, but almost insuperable
obstacles to our troops; the unexplored state of the Southern part of the territory,
making the obstacles to be encountered doubtful, and therefore the provision
against them uncertain; the great abundance of the Indian’s ailment, the cocuntie
root, and the ease with which it may be gathered by the women; the great
difficulty of provisioning our troops, particularly in the southern part of Florida.
When all these things are considered, I can scarcely believe the subjugation of the
Seminoles, headed as they are by their warlike and resolute chiefs, Jumper and
Oceola, will be the business of but a month or two. I have no doubt, when the
Indians find they cannot withstand the troops sent against them, they will retreat
to their fastness in the south; and, if they once determine to conceal themselves, it
will be no ordinary search that will ferret them out. The southern part of Florida,
is as yet an unexplored country; but, so far as a reconnaissance has gone, it is
believed to be one unbroken extent of water, morass, and thick hammock. You
will perceive, then, this is no ordinary country to operate in. Indeed, the only way,
it seems to me, in which our troops, in case of the theatre of their operations being
in the southern part of Florida, can be provisioned, will be, to have vessels
coasting on either side, whose movements will correspond with the movements of
the troops, and from which a constant supply of provisions can be had….(Hoskin
and Keith 1988:198).

The Origin of Hostilities in Florida and The First Seminole War
Florida has a very long and storied past that is often neglected by the history books. In
order to critically examine KOCOA using the Second Seminole War as a case study, a brief
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background is necessary. For the purposes of this very brief narrative I will begin in 1565, with
the settlement of St. Augustine by the Spanish. St. Augustine was located at the northeast end of
the territory. Florida at that time extended westward to the Mississippi River and was two
territories: East and West Florida (Figure 2). At that time, Florida was inhabited by many native
peoples, including the Apalachee, Calusa and Timucua, among many others (Milanich 1995).
However, soon after the Spanish arrival, disease eliminated a large percentage of the indigenous
population. It was not long before tribes from the northern states had begun moving into the
sparsely populated Florida (Knetsch 2003).

FIGURE 2. Map of Florida, 1765.
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Spain transferred ownership of Florida to England in 1763 at the end of the Seven Years
War—or, as it was known in the colonies, the French and Indian War. However, English
ownership was short lived, and by the time of the American Revolution, Spain had retaken West
Florida. Spain regained the rest of the territory in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris (Fairbanks 1974).
Foreign ownership of Florida was a constant worry for the United States. Alabama and
Georgia had rivers that drained into the Gulf of Mexico. This meant that goods could not easily
be shipped through the gulf without traversing international boundaries, which required that
taxes be paid. Aside from shipping logistics for some states, having a foreign power based so
close to the newly formed United States was worrisome for other reasons; perhaps the largest
and most pressing issue was slavery. For instance, escaped slaves were finding refuge behind the
lines of foreign ownership. Along with the idea of western expansion fueled by the 1803
Louisiana Purchase, this intensified the desire for U.S. ownership (Mahon 1985).
In 1812, hostilities increased and the political situation became more complicated over
the next few years, involving not only the U.S. and the Seminoles but the Spanish and British as
well. During the Patriot War, the Spanish encouraged the Seminoles to attack the patriots
(Mahon 1985). Georgia volunteers unsuccessfully retaliated and attacked the Seminoles in the
Alachua Prairie. Five months later, they returned and destroyed hundreds of Seminole homes
(Motte 1963). While the War of 1812 slowed American advances against the Seminoles, the
Creeks were on the verge of civil war, and General Andrew Jackson was sent in amid fears of
spreading Indian hostilities. On March 27, 1814, five thousand of Jackson’s men fought the
Creeks at Tallapoosa River (Horseshoe Bend, Georgia) (Dickens 1977). The Treaty of Fort
Jackson and the surrender of all Creek land was declared the official end of the Creek Civil
War—but, in truth, it just moved farther south to Florida (Sprague 1848). Jackson used the
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opportunity to invade and took Pensacola, despite having received orders not to invade.
Eventually he was forced to give Florida back to Spain (Cusick 2003).
Also around this time, the British occupied several Spanish installations. Not only was
the British presence troublesome to the U.S. government, but the fact that they built a fort at
Prospect Bluff in the Florida Panhandle region and distributed arms to the local Indians and
escaped slaves was alarming. Additionally, the British led a failed attack on Mobile, Alabama.
The defeat of the British caused their eventual departure from the area (Mahon 1985). Soon after,
escaped slaves began to occupy the now-vacant fort, which was later dubbed Negro Fort. The
U.S., ever fearful of a slave uprising, devised a clever way of attacking the fort without invading
another country and sparking another war. Jackson had Generals Gaines and Clinch build Fort
Scott upriver from Negro Fort (Figure 3) (Mahon 1985).

FIGURE 3. Location of Fort Gadsden, circled in red, which was built over the Negro Fort.
(David Rumsey Collection Image #5860001)
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To stock this new fort, supplies would have to be shipped past the slave-controlled fort. As
expected, it was only a matter of time before the supply ships were attacked, giving the U.S. just
cause to eradicate Negro Fort without inciting an international war (Mahon 1985).
Despite previous hostilities, the attack on Fowltown in Georgia by the U.S. is often cited
as the start of the First Seminole War (Mahon 1985). General Gaines and a unit of 250 men were
sent to capture Nemathla, the leader of the Mikasukis, who claimed Mikasuki ownership of the
land around Fort Scott despite the treaty with the Creeks that was supposed to have ceded the
land to the U.S. The Mikasuki did not recognize themselves as part of the Creeks, and did not
believe that the Creeks were authorized to give away their land. Therefore, they disregarded the
treaty. General Gaines was defeated on the first day of the attack, but the second day he was able
to drive the Mikasukis from their land. A week later, Nemathla retaliated and attacked a boat
carrying women, children, and the sick, killing nearly everyone. This caused the U.S. to invade
Florida again, and Jackson was sent with several thousand men and friendly Creeks. Jackson and
his men cut a swath down the Apalachicola River, burning villages and capturing forts as they
went. It ended when Jackson took Pensacola and Fort Barrancas (Mahon 1985).
During his campaign two British citizens, Alexander George Arbuthnot and Robert
Ambrister, were convicted by Jackson of aiding the Seminoles and executed. This further
strained tensions between the United States and Britain (although the current owner of Florida
was Spain) and caused problems for politicians in Washington. Three years later, in 1821, Spain
ceded Florida to the United States. A much more thorough discussion of the history of Florida
can be found in the following books: History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842 (Mahon
1985), The Florida War (Sprague 1848), and Florida’s Seminole Wars: 1817-1858 (Knetsch
2003).
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Who are the Seminoles?
The Seminoles’ history is unique. Prior to the era of extensive European influence, the
Seminole tribe did not exist. Seminole identity was both created by and in response to external
influence. Many scholarly books and articles have been written on the subject of who the
Seminoles are, how they coalesced into the modern, federally recognized tribe of today, and how
that transformation may have occurred (Fairbanks 1974, Weisman 1989, 1999, 2007). What
follows is a brief overview of the literature.
Modern Seminole Indians have been reluctant to share their story with outsiders or
researchers (Weisman 1999), although this is beginning to change. As a result of this reluctance,
many of the histories written rely on historical accounts, such as travel narratives of individuals
that have visited the Seminoles or documents relating to the government’s dealings with them.
Because these documents were all written by non-Seminoles and their intended purpose was not
an in-depth, scholarly, or unbiased rendering, they are problematic and require sifting through
potential biases to untangle historical truths.
The term “Seminole” does not appear before the mid-to-late 1700s (Weisman 1999).
Even through the 1800s, accounts are more likely to call them by tribe, such as Tallasees or
Mikasukis, rather than Seminole. Those who are known as “the Seminoles” can trace their
ancestry back to the Creeks, who in turn can trace their heritage to the prehistoric mound
builders of Georgia (Weisman 1999). It is also important to note that the term “Creek”—like
“Seminole”—is an English word, but one that has become so widely used that I will use it here
for simplicity, with the understanding that there is significant diversity among the Creek Band.
The Creeks, much like the Seminoles, changed as a direct result of historical pressures. For
example, the Creek Confederacy, which is well known today, was more likely a reaction to
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outside pressure and not a typical form of indigenous government (Weisman 1999). Due to the
constrainst of this research, a complete discussion of how the pre-contact Native’s of Florida
were profoundly altered by the Spanish mission system cannot be discussed in detail. But it is
important to state that through disease, religious conversion, and intermarriage, native life ways
were forever changed (Stojanowski 2005). After almost 200 years of Spanish imposition, disease
epidemics had so greatly reduced the population, Florida was almost devoid of its native
inhabitants by the time the Seminoles came into being.
As pressure from whites moving south increased, the Native peoples in those regions
responded by also moving south (Milanich 1995, 1998). With greater physical distance, cultural
differences increased. The Lower Creeks who inhabited Florida were shaped by their unique
experiences, such as trading with the Spanish and British, and eventually became more
Seminole—or “Cimarrones,” as the Spanish referred to them (Weisman 1999). A common tie
that brought the different bands together was their wariness of colonial authority. Pinning down a
specific time or event when the Seminoles fractured from their Creek roots and came into their
own has been controversial. Weisman (1999) suggests that it occurred when Governor Grant met
with the Lower Creeks on November 18, 1765, regarding a land acquisition, as he believed the
entire lower Florida Peninsula was under Lower Creek control. Being recognized by a foreign
government as a distinct entity, separate from the rest of the Creeks, may have set the stage for
the eventual fracture.
One of the first large and systematic studies of the Seminoles’ origins was undertaken by
Charles Fairbanks for a 1957 report to the Indian Claims Section of the U.S. Department of
Justice. The study was undertaken in response to a claim filed in 1950 by several Seminoles that
asked the U.S. government for compensation for the loss of approximately 32 million acres they
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claimed were their ancestral Florida lands (Fairbanks 1974, Weisman 1999). Fairbanks
concluded that the earliest peoples that were to become Seminole were the Oconee Creeks, who
had settled in the Alachua Savanna by 1738, and the Lower Creek Mikasukis, who settled near
Tallahassee around the same time (Weisman 1999). Fairbanks also hypothesized that being
either pro-Spanish or pro-British helped set the stage for the division between the Creeks.
British-assisted Lower Creek raids in 1702-1704 against the Spanish-Indian
mission chain in north Florida effectively terminated the last of the Florida
Aborigines and left the Spaniards on the Atlantic coast of Florida with an
unprotected rear. Into this void came bands of Lower Creeks, whose homes had
been along streams of central Georgia and in the Chattahoochee River basin to the
west. Those that settled in the Tallahassee Red Hills and on the Apalachicola
apparently did so at the request of the Spaniards, while others, including the
Alachua band of Oconees who settled closest to Spanish St. Augustine, were
decidedly pro British in sympathy. Thus the stage was set for the development of
factionalism among the new Indians of Florida (Weisman 1999:7).
As Weisman (1999) points out, the difficulties with Fairbanks’ 1957 study and a later
study by Craig and Peebles (1974) was that the Seminoles were seen as having become an
independent group in response to outside pressures. No consideration was given to understanding
the cultural change as one that occurred within the Tribe as well as a reaction to outside forces.
Craig and Peebles used a biological model to explain cultural change. Their hypothesis
incorporated a change in habitats due to migration, which, in turn, affected subsistence methods:
As tribes were pushed deeper into the swamps, they first adopted pastoralism and then
transitioned to agriculture or gardening. The studies by both Fairbanks and Craig and Peebles are
based on the idea that change occurred in response to stress (Weisman 1999). William Sturtevant
(1971) began to adopt a more anthropological approach to understand the development of
Seminole cultural identity (Weisman 1999). He argued that the Creek settlement pattern and
cultural practices were still preserved in Seminole identity; they had simply been modified and
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reconfigured as the Seminoles moved into their own identity. Some of these early studies fail to
recognize Seminole self-determinism and agency in shaping their own history. The Seminoles
were not passive recipients that were molded by pressures from outside, but instead adapted
quite successfully to the difficult situations they found themselves in (Wickman 2006).
Regardless, the ethnogenesis of the Seminoles is beyond the scope of this research.

Leading up to the Second Seminole War
Even though no official war had been declared, the time between the First and Second
Seminole Wars was not entirely peaceful. One unique aspect of those wars was the rather
artificial nature of the start and end dates given for them: A war would be declared over, yet in
many cases, hostilities continued. In fact, the Second Seminole War had been declared to have
ended twice before the official date later listed—on Feb. 21, 1837, Washington’s Daily National
Intelligencer claimed that “the war has terminated” (Laumer 1998), and the war was again
considered over in March of 1837 with the signing of the Treaty of Fort Dade (Motte 1963). The
start of the wars happened in much the same way, with hostilities increasing until a tipping point
had been reached and war was officially declared, thus allowing more troops and money to be
dispatched to Florida.
One major catalyst for hostilities occurred on September 18, 1823, when the Treaty of
Fort Moultrie was signed by the governor of Florida and several commissioners, along with
thirty-two of the leading Seminole chiefs (Mahon 1962a). This treaty stipulated that the
Seminoles (with the exception of six leading chiefs and their followers) would move onto a
reservation in the center of South Florida (Figure 4). The treaty was also supposed to provide the
Seminoles with rations, supplies, animals, and money for the transition, plus an annual annuity of
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six thousand dollars for twenty years (Sprague 1848). However, the treaty placed them on
unfertile lands, where starvation and resource deprivation were very real threats (Mahon 1962b).

FIGURE 4. 1831 map of the Seminole reservation (circled).
(David Rumsey Collection Image Number 0285031)

Another significant event in Florida’s history was Jackson’s election as President in
1828. His long history with the Seminoles greatly influenced his presidency. One of his first
messages as President was to suggest that the Indians be moved west despite the treaty (Mahon
1985). Failure to comply with the relocation would put the Native Americans “under the harsh
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jurisdiction of the states” (Mahon 1985). Removal was touted as the more humane means of
divesting Florida of its “Indian problem.” This suggestion eventually became law with Jackson’s
Indian Removal Act, which narrowly passed on May 28, 1830 (Mahon 1985).

Second Seminole War: Background
The Seminoles themselves were divided between those who were pro-emigration and
those who were against it; occasionally, hostilities would erupt between the two factions. On
November 26, 1835, Charley Emathla, a Seminole chief, was killed by Osceola, a young warrior,
for being pro-emigration (Mahon 1985). Events escalated further when a large organized attack
against the U.S. military occurred on December 28, 1835. A column of eight officers and one
hundred enlisted men under Major Dade’s command was ambushed by a band of Seminoles, and
all but three soldiers were killed (Mahon 1985) (Figure 5). On the same day, General Wiley
Thompson, the Indian agent in Ocala, was killed because he had previously put Osceola in
chains for six days for protesting when the gunpowder supply was cut off. This initial attack
against the U.S. is thought to have been planned over the course of a year (Robbins 2006). The
carefully orchestrated maneuvers were a two-part strike designed to cause the greatest fear
among the white population of Florida. The attack on Dade and his men was strategically timed
to maximize the Seminoles’ advantage. The place of attack was specifically selected so that the
Seminoles could wait “in crescent-shaped formation with interlocking fields of fire” (Robbins
2006:38). This attack has been acknowledged as the beginning of a seven-year campaign to
relocate the Seminoles to present-day Oklahoma.
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FIGURE 5. Top: “Massacre of Major Dade and his Command,” (1847 in Barber’s Incidents
in American History, http://www.johnhorse.com/trail/02/b/33zz.htm). Bottom: Cannon ramrod from
Dade’s Massacre, now at the West Point Military Academy Museum (photo by author).
The Second Seminole War consisted of a series of small skirmishes and was a
reoccurring strategy throughout the war. The Battle of the Withlacoochee was one of the larger
skirmishes, taking place on December 31, 1835 (Bittle 1966). Generals Clinch and Call led a
force of 250 regulars and 500 Florida volunteers into the Cove of the Withlacoochee (Laumer
1968). Various complications worked against this plan, however, ranging from the march’s
taking longer than expected, which meant losing the element of surprise; not having an adequate
means to cross the river, except for one leaky canoe; and the volunteers’ term of service expiring
the next day. When the army was ambushed, their forces were divided between the two sides of
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the river. In the end, the troops were forced to return to Fort Drane, and numerous arguments
broke out over who and what was to blame (Mahon 1967). The skirmish was crucial, however, in
demonstrating how serious the conflict was going to become.
By early 1836 many plantations had been raided or destroyed, and many other
settlements in Florida were in danger due to a severe lack of personnel and supplies (Robbins
2006). Personal rivalries between various commanding officers, most notably between Major
General Winfield Scott and Brevet Major General Edmund Gaines, exacerbated the early
difficulties encountered in the Florida War. Scott was preparing a complicated maneuver to
surround the Seminoles in the Cove of the Withlacoochee, and had arranged for three columns to
travel independently from different directions and converge on the cove on the same day.
Without significant knowledge of the environment and terrain, however, the plan was doomed
from the start (Mahon 1985), as will be discussed in more detail below.
At the same time, Gaines had heard of the fighting in Florida and took it upon himself to
assist, disregarding orders to head to Texas to take command of a fort on the border with
Mexico. As Gaines headed from Fort Brooke (present day Tampa) to Fort King (present day
Ocala, approximately 90 miles north of Tampa), his command was the first to encounter the
remains of Dade’s soldiers, which Gaines ordered buried. Throughout Gaines’ travels through
Florida, none of the troops or supplies he repeatedly requested were provided. On his return to
Fort Brooke, he decided to take a shorter route that would bring him through the former site of
the Battle of the Withlacoochee. This would prove to be disastrous: Before the troops could cross
the river, they were ambushed by the Seminoles. Gaines’s men hastily constructed a log
breastwork 250 yards square, and Gaines sent letters to Clinch telling him that he had drawn out
the whole force of the Seminoles and would keep them there until Clinch could arrive and attack.
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Gaines and his men were pinned down at what became known as Camp Izard for eight days until
Clinch could determine whether he had permission to assist (Mahon 1985). When he did arrive,
Gaines and the Seminoles had begun to negotiate and the Seminoles scattered.
Meanwhile, after much trouble, General Scott’s grand campaign was underway, with
each of the three columns ordered to head to their assigned starting position; on a specified day,
they were to begin their march into the cove. The center wing was supposed to flush the
Seminoles out into the waiting forces of the left and right wings. However, with no accurate
maps of the areas (Figure 6) the march proved to be longer and harder than imagined, especially
for the left wing. Accounts by soldiers on the march declared that the plan was too complicated
and the terrain too harsh (Mahon 1960:311). Without adequate supplies, means of
communication, or knowledge of the environment, all of the wings failed to meet their objectives
and returned to their bases after having fought only minor skirmishes (Mahon 1985). As Robbins
(2006) points out “The conflict quickly fell into a pattern. Columns would march into the
wilderness in search of the enemy, without a good idea where they were going. They thus
presented an ideal target for the Seminoles, who usually had set up ambushes”.

28

FIGURE 6. Theater of military operations in Florida 1837.
The text in the upper right reads: “This Map has been lithographed in order that Officers who shall receive
copies of it, may make such additions thereto as they may, by their knowledge of the Country, be enabled to.
Officer will, therefore, add any information they may obtain as to the Topography of the Country and send
the map, thus added to, to the Adjutant General, that, from the general information thus obtained, a correct
map of the seat of War in Florida may be drawn for the use of the War Department. Head Quarters of the
Army, Washington, September 1837.”
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On June 21, 1836, newly appointed Governor Richard Keith Call was given command of
the war in Florida in addition to being governor. Call quickly encountered many of the same
difficulties: lack of troops, lack of supplies, and much personal infighting between officers. Call,
however, began a campaign of sending troops out to sweep the landscape for the Seminoles with
varying success. Call suffered a serious setback in the Cove of the Withlacoochee when he came
under fire and then failed to cross the river and subdue the Seminoles. Command was then
transferred to Brevet Major General Thomas Sidney Jesup at the end of 1836, but Call remained
the territorial governor until 1839 (Mahon 1985). Jesup also was ordered to drive the Seminoles
from their stronghold around the Withlacoochee River. After a series of small skirmishes, Jesup
was able to arrange for a negotiation with some of the Seminole leaders at Fort Dade. On March
6, 1836, an agreement called “Capitulation of the Seminole nation of Indians and their allies by
Jumper, Holatoochee, or Davy, and Yaholooche, representing the principal chief Micanopy” was
reached (Mahon 1985:200). This agreement stipulated that all hostilities had ended, that the
Seminoles would migrate, and it was agreed that they (and their allies, including “their Negros”)
would be supplied with food and support until one year after they had reached their new homes
(Mahon 1985). Allowing the slaves to stay with the Seminoles caused great controversy and
delay. Finally, as the Seminoles gathered in Tampa to emigrate, they were abducted by a band of
other Seminoles who opposed migration. Jessup wrote:
Our cunning enemy has again foiled us, and has shown himself as successful in
the cabinet as in the field. During their protracted negotiations, they were enabled
to supply themselves with provisions, clothing, and ammunition; they brought in
large droves of cattle, the captured property of our citizens, which they sold to the
government, and received certificates therefore at a certain valuation: these were
taken by traders as so much money, and they were enabled to purchase supplies.
They obtained ammunition from the Creek volunteers, who received it from the
ordnance officers, for the purpose of hunting (Motte 1963:268).
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The failure to relocate this group of Natives restarted hostilities, and an effort to locate
and remove the Seminoles was once again undertaken. The status of the Negroes became a
central feature during the remainder of the War. Jesup tried various tactics to lure them or take
them from the Seminoles. Most of his plans stirred up controversy, such as offering freedom to
any Negroes who came in; allowing troops to keep any items they recovered from Seminoles
they defeated, including slaves; and trying to purchase Negroes from either the Seminoles or
Creeks who had captured them (Mahon 1985:251). These tactics were largely unsuccessful as
well. Jesup’s command did see some successful campaigns and captures, however, largely with
the aid of Negro guides. Other notable Seminole leaders were captured when they came in to talk
under a flag of truce. This soon became almost standard operating procedure for capturing the
leaders and this was how the famed leader Osceola was captured, despite public distaste for those
methods (Mahon 1967).
On May 15, 1838, Jesup was allowed to turn his command over to Brigadier General
Zachary Taylor. Taylor’s plan of attack was to divide Florida into squares that were 20 miles to a
side and post a garrison of 20 men in the center to patrol each allotted territory. Meanwhile,
General Macomb, who had newly arrived to assist Taylor, staged an elaborate talk with the
Seminoles and an agreement was reached that would allow the Seminoles to remain in a
specified area in the interior of Florida until “further arrangements were made” (Mahon 1985).
After much public outcry and additional murders, this short-lived peace agreement ended and the
usual skirmishing became the norm. Brevet Brigadier General Walker Keith Armistead
succeeded Taylor on May 5, 1840. Armistead’s tactics centered on bribery; he offered the
Seminoles significant amounts of money to migrate. Eventually, Armistead asked to be relieved,
and Commander William Jenkins Worth succeeded him.
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At first, Worth tried to flush the Seminoles from the Withlacoochee, as earlier campaigns
had done. He then attempted to drive the Seminoles out by encouraging settlers to move back
into the territory and aiding them in building forts and supplying rations (Mahon 1967). Further
campaigns were launched to round up the remaining Seminoles when, on May 10, 1842, Worth
was given permission to end the war in any way possible, even if it meant allowing the
remaining Seminoles to stay (Covington 1961). This declaration did not cause a sudden end, but
hostilities slowly decreased over the course of the next year. The passage of the Armed
Occupation Act on August 4, 1842, was meant to stimulate the settlement of Florida by citizens
who would continue to defend against the Seminoles without military intervention, and signaled
the end of the Second Seminole War (Covington 1961).

The Third Seminole War
The Third Seminole War was no more successful than the first two; however, it was a
much shorter war, lasting only two and a half years (1855-1858). There were still Seminoles in
Florida at the war’s end, although many had emigrated. Yet from a military strategy standpoint,
this was a very interesting war. The army had finally started thinking outside of their classical
training by employing more nontraditional methods, which proved to be more successful than
some of their previous ideas. Following the Second Seminole War, there had been roughly seven
years of tentative peace, and Florida officially gained statehood on May 3, 1845, along with
Iowa. But by July 1849, that relative calm had been broken by a group of five Seminoles who
murdered several white settlers. This caused a panic among the general public, who thought the
Indians were rebelling again. Settlers took refuge within the confines of the state’s forts despite
the Armed Homestead Occupation Act, under which they were supposed to help defend the
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territory in return for land (Covington 1981). The militia was quickly dispatched to deal with the
situation. Billy Bowlegs, a Seminole leader, realized the gravity of the situation and was able to
capture three of those responsible and turn them over to the military. This temporarily restored
peace.
The passages of The Swamp and Overflowed Land Act in 1850 (Covington 1981) finally
upset the fragile peace in the region. This act required that all federal lands more than half
covered with water be given to the states to be drained. With Florida’s extensive swampland,
speculators eagerly hoped to make their fortunes. However, this was the very land that the
Seminoles had recently been calling home. The pressure to remove the last remaining Indians
mounted. “In his 1853 inaugural address, Governor James E. Broome declared: ‘The Indians are
a blight to our prosperity and their presence prevents the influx of population and retards the sale
of large acres of land. The state will never submit to any policy short of removal’” (Covington
1981:26). Florida then passed a law making it illegal for any Seminole to reside in Florida
(Covington 1981). Forts were erected in the Big Cypress Swamp, and survey parties were sent
out in the hope that with enough passive pressure, the Seminoles would submit to removal.
While the survey parties did apply pressure, it provoked the wrong kind of response. In
December 1855, a survey party under Lt. George Hartsuff was killed, and the rumor was they
were killed in retaliation because the men took bananas from—or destroyed a grove of banana
trees owned by—Billy Bowlegs (Hammond 1969:188). True or not, the conflict started all over
again.
Throughout the three-year campaign of the Third Seminole War, the Seminoles struck
randomly throughout Florida, creating panic among homesteaders. Most of the conflict took
place in South Florida and the swamps of the Everglades. Eventually, boats were purchased and
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stores stockpiled near the Seminole stronghold to facilitate the military’s ability to strike back.
General William S. Harney, a veteran of the previous Seminole Wars, took command at the end
of 1856 (Fox 1993). His goal was to keep the Seminoles on the move to prevent them from
resting or growing crops to sustain their population. Despite his efforts and small successes, he
was eventually reassigned to deal with Brigham Young and his followers out west. Command
now fell to Colonel Gustavis Loomis, a West Point graduate of the class of 1811. His strategy
was to bring another delegation back from the western reservation to convince the Florida
Seminoles to emigrate, but this was not successful. More boat companies were deployed
successfully, and the militia became more efficient at finding and harassing the Seminoles
(Covington 1981). At the end of 1856, the Seminoles were finally granted their own reservation
that was not under Creek rule, which led to Billy Bowlegs’ agreeing to move in March of 1858
(Porter 1967). Despite the declared end of the war, hostilities were not entirely over; not all of
Billy’s followers had emigrated.
In the Seven years of the Second Seminole War, the Army lost 1,446 dead, 328 of
them killed in action, most of the rest to disease. With 10,169 soldiers serving in
Florida, the death rate was 14 percent, making it by far the deadliest of any of
American’s wars. The losses included 74 officers dead and 20 killed in action; 13
of the dead were Academy graduates. The conflict cost between $10 and $40
million, depending on who was doing the estimate (Robbins 2006:52).
The Seminole Perspective
While this abbreviated history provides a brief background of the Florida Wars, it does so
from the military’s perspective. Because my research focus is on military adaptation, a more
thorough understanding of the military’s history is necessary. Nevertheless, it must be
acknowledged that these wars would were profoundly different for the Seminole. The military
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argued that since the Seminoles were only recent arrivals in the Florida Territory, they had no
ancestral claim to the land.
Obviously, the Seminoles saw things differently. The Creeks had begun settling in
Florida in the early 1700s, and Weisman (1999) hypothesizes that a meeting in 1765 set the stage
for the Florida Creeks to fracture and begin the process of becoming Seminole. By the Second
Seminole War, several generations had passed in Florida, which solidified their ties to the land.
Since so little documentation exists that sheds light on Seminole history, and in the past
Seminoles have been reluctant to share their stories, it can be difficult for researchers to flush out
the Seminole half of the Florida narrative. The Seminoles—and especially the Mikasuki
Seminoles—were seen as formidable warriors fighting for their homes and their way of life
(West 1998). Wickman’s (2006) account of Osceola’s life paints a compelling picture of how
different groups were forced together in untraditional ways and were provoked and taken
advantage of by white settlers. Such depredations only strengthened the Seminoles’ resolve to
resist and to fight for their ancestral lands. Many Seminole leaders rose to prominence; one of
the most famous outside the Seminole community was Osceola (Wickman 2006).
As I will discuss in more detail throughout the dissertation, the Seminoles were
significantly more adaptable than the military, and devised new strategies to maximize their
effectiveness against often superior numbers. In addition to being much more familiar with the
terrain than the military, the Seminoles were also quick to discover the military’s strategies and
weaknesses and wage effective, guerrilla-type warfare. For example Wickman describes how
Oseola’s mentor teaching him to gather information at military installations by entering under
pretext of selling fish (Wickman 2006). This rouse allowed him to gain intelligence about the
military without attracting attention. This is just one small example, which demonstrates the
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cunning, and strategy the Seminoles approached the conflict with the military. Histories of these
events, often written from the white perspective, fail to recognize the strategies employed by the
Seminoles and instead paint their actions as strictly reactionary and defensive, when clearly they
were not. A more thorough discussion of Seminole planning and strategy can be found in
Lawre’s master’s thesis where he investigates Seminole and Creek combat behaviors (Lawres
2008).

The Bigger Picture
Throughout the entire conflict, several major problematic themes become apparent. One
was the gap between the citizen soldier/militia and enlisted men: terms of service for militia were
sometimes too short (not to exceed 3 months) for them to be of any use (Sprague 1848:103),
getting enough volunteers was difficult, and pay was extremely low (about six dollars a month)
(Schene 1976). Volunteers viewed the professional soldier as pompous and coming from an
aristocratic upper class. Another major problem was the shortage of supplies; small sums of
money were constantly being appropriated, rather than one large amount that might the war
quickly. Legislators in Washington were so far removed from the environment of Florida that
there was little comprehension of what was needed. This caused the war to be dragged out while
troops waited for the supplies they needed.
The command in Florida partially met Cohen and Gooch’s three areas for failure: the
failure to learn, anticipate, or adapt (Cohen and Gooch 1991). For example, officers on the
ground in Florida were ill equipped to navigate Florida’s unique environment. With high
turnover among commanders, the war was doomed to repeat ineffective tactics over and over,
which demonstrated a failure to learn. Then there was the lack of adaptation to local conditions
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and to the guerrilla-warfare style of fighting. It could be argued that this was also a failure to
anticipate, because the same mistakes tended to be repeated. For example, “because the Indians
were unencumbered and could retreat in several directions at once, and Army columns were
limited by their baggage trains and supply lines, there was no way to exploit a victory” (Robbins
2006:40). It was not until nearly the end of the conflict that the army started to find new methods
of attacking the Seminoles, such as the boat companies during the Third Seminole War, which
shows that learning and adaptation took place, albeit slowly. The Seminoles, however, were
quicker to adapt and developed a successful method, which involved setting an ambush with a
rapid round of fire and then quickly retreating. They used this method throughout the wars
(Covington 1981). Other small gains were made, such as learning that horses were ineffectual
during the rainy season and boats could be of more use, but again, it was not until the third war
that this was really implemented with success (Covington 1981).
While it is easy to dismiss the military as having failed completely in Florida, this is not
entirely the case. As will be shown in the following chapters, the U.S. was unsuccessful in
relocating all of the Seminoles as planned, which could be seen as a failure. However, there were
many Seminoles who were relocated, which demonstrates that the military had limited success.
The Seminoles who wished to stay, however, were more successful in their resistance strategies
than the military was in their combat strategies. The Seminole Wars, like any conflict, cannot be
viewed in clear-cut terms such as success or failure. Instead there is a continuum of outcomes
along this spectrum of success. While some engagements are seen as an immediate failure to
meet an objective, the lack of success in one instance may lead to learning and a change in
tactics, which could eventually lead to success down the road.
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The Cultural and Historical Impact of the Indian Wars
The Seminole Wars were unique in many aspects, with the most profound being the
multifaceted layers of causes. Unlike many conflicts, it is difficult to point to one clear cause and
effect for the start of the war, especially since it dragged on for so long, spanning approximately
40 years and three separate wars.
The causes of the difficulties in Florida must be apparent to the minds of careful
and intelligent readers; causes not springing up in a day, but nourished for years,
aggravated as opportunities offered to enrich adventurers, who had the temerity to
hazard the scalping-knife and rifle, and were regardless of individual rights or of
law. It must be remembered that Florida, at the period referred to, was an Indian
border, the resort of a large number of persons, more properly temporary
inhabitants of the Territory than citizens, who sought the outskirts of civilization
to perpetuate deeds which would have been promptly and severely punished if
committed within the limits of a well regulated community. This is the case on all
frontiers. It is unavoidable until well disposed citizens become so numerous as to
exert the supremacy of law, when the innocent but too often suffer with the guilty.
These temporary inhabitants of Florida, rather than its citizens, have had an active
participation in the events that have transpired within her limits for twenty years
past. They provoked the Indians to aggression, and upon the breaking out of war
ignominiously fled, or sought employment in the service of the General
Government, and clandestinely contributed to its continuance. (Sprague 1848:5)
Each round of violence had specific triggers, but a few trends can be seen as encouraging war.
These themes, discussed briefly below, are: manifest destiny, slavery, speculators, and, very
tangentially, cattle.
The Indian Wars were unique for the U.S., and played a large role in shaping U.S.-Indian
policy and relationships. Unlike more traditional wars against an invading or neighboring
sovereign nation, the Indians posed an interesting conundrum. They were seen as possessing land
that the government wanted, yet at the same time seen as not deserving to possess that land due
to the uncivilized nature of these “poor wretches” (Potter 1836). This cultural dynamic made the
conflict about much more than land. It set the stage for the U.S.’s initiative of Manifest Destiny
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and Western ideas of progress to crystallize. Manifest Destiny is arguably one of the most
compelling of those themes. According to Robert Utley (1984:34), “The idea of progress focused
on the Indian in two ways. First, he was a central feature of the wilderness, and by definition
conquest of the wilderness entailed conquest of the Indian. Second, he was living confirmation of
the very idea of progress itself. Progress came to be seen as rise from savagery to civilization”.
This idea of progress and civilization gave rise to a new phenomenon as well, the “Frontier”—
that borderland between the civilized and uncivilized.
The Jeffersonian answer to the recurring bloodshed was removal: Remove the
Indians of the East to the West, to lands not inhabited by whites or included
within the boundaries of any state. Give them new lands in the unorganized
territory beyond the ninety-fifth meridian. Protect them there from white
encroachment either on their domain or their way of life. In this officially
designated ‘Indian Country’, separated from the rest of the nation by a
‘Permanent Indian Frontier’, the Indians could dwell in free and happy isolation
from their tormentors, absorbing civilization at their own pace or rejecting it
altogether if they wished. Under Presidents James Monroe and Andrew Jackson,
removal became the dominant feature of the U.S. Indian Policy. Throughout the
1830s and 1840s the eastern Indians were uprooted and moved westward. Some
fifty thousand people made the trek, many at great cost in suffering, hardship, and
impoverishment. They yielded 100 million acres of eastern homeland in return for
32 million western acres and 68 million dollars in annuity pledges (Utley
1984:37).
The policy of isolation and containment became a dominant theme in American culture at
this time. However, in practice it was not so easy. Many Native peoples were reluctant to hand
over their ancestral homelands, or what little was left of it, and be herded off to some unknown
and unfamiliar landscape—thus leading to an entirely different form of warfare, one that the U.S.
found difficult to master. “Accustomed to the European manner of combat, most colonists were
appalled by Indian tactics. The deliberate killing of women and children was unconscionable to
many settlers. So, too, was the natives’ guerrilla style of fighting” (Ferling 1980). As Starkey
(1998:14) points out, “Commanders’ disregard of costly lessons is one of the disturbing features
39

of the warfare of this period. . . . This suggests, even to a very traditional military historian, the
importance of multicultural studies as an agent of humanity in war.”
The second most compelling—yet often not overtly discussed as a cause—theme was
slavery. Having as a neighbor a country that not only gave refuge to runaway slaves but often
allowed them to arm themselves was seen as an enormous risk. It both encouraged enslaved
peoples from the surrounding states to seek refuge and had the potential to incite a revolt within
the slave communities in the south. Pressure from slaveholders was a driving force behind the
United States’ decision to engage in the Second Seminole War (Howe 2007); Jesup wrote, “This,
you may be assured is a negro and not an Indian War” (Howe 2007:516).
Newspaper accounts of the time also discuss the concerns of land speculators regarding
Indian relations in Florida (Howe 2007). Once the territory of Florida had come under U.S.
control, eagerness to make a fortune in land speculation became rampant. Others saw “the treaty
as ‘a clever administration ploy to expedite Indian removal by opening the door to white
speculation in Creek lands’” (Howe 2007:417). Despite the fact that there were few people
willing to settle in Florida after such long and protracted wars, land speculators pushed hard to
remove the Seminoles so that more land could be purchased. Potter (1836) wrote, “The soil of
the hammock lands is of the most luxuriant character, and hence the desire of speculators to
drive the Seminoles off, whose reserved lands are principally of this description.” Finally, cattle
ownership also played a partial role in the Second Seminole War. Since Florida was a state
where cattle roamed free, the Seminoles were often victims of cattle thefts—when they
reclaimed their cattle, they were punished for stealing or leaving their reservation (Potter 1836).
This tension over cattle ownership was a constant source of friction between homesteaders and
the Seminoles.
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However, the settlement of Florida did not happen as the politicians in Washington might
have hoped. The Armed Occupation Act of 1842 could only be counted as a marginal success,
and the constant threat of attack meant that few people were brave enough to occupy such a
formidable environment. The act stipulated that in return for one hundred sixty acres of land, the
head of the household was required to bear arms to defend the property, live on the land in a
house for five consecutive years, and cultivate at least five acres (Covington 1981). Yet these
early homesteaders were often unprepared for this wilderness lifestyle, lacked knowledge about
farming, and, in some cases, did not even own a weapon to defend their property with. The
military complained bitterly about them because at the first hint of even a single Indian in the
area, they would flock to the nearest fortification for protection, consuming valuable rations
while they were there (Covington 1981). One account, signed “Actual Settler,” states the
following:
At the cessation of Indian hostilities, the settlers under the Armed Occupation Act
located for the most part on or near the main routes through the interior of the
country south of the line designated for such settlers, and the few who turned
towards the coast and rivers sought rather for places for towns, healthy residence,
islands, etc., than for rich hammock land. To verify this, I need only to mention
the fact that there is one hammock of fifty square miles without a permit on it;
another of thirty, and yet another of fifteen square miles within the limits herein
above mentioned. It is true there were some permits taken out upon the Crystal
River, Homossassa, Cheesahowitska, Wekiwachee Rivers, but this may be
accounted for by the fact that they were upon one of the routes of travel south.
These settlers were, however, of the class who had no experience in planting, no
intention of making a permanent settlement and soon abandoned their places
(Covington 1981:5).
Public Perception of the Florida Wars
Despite the fact that modern history has largely forgotten these long and complicated
wars, they left an indelible stamp on American history. Much of Jackson’s career was shaped by
his early military encounters with the Seminoles; the wars ended in passage of the Indian
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Removal Act, which ultimately affected all Native peoples in the United States. Yet not all of the
American public thought the war with the Seminoles was necessary or just. Some passionate
accounts describe the Seminoles as being similar to the founding fathers in fighting for their
lives. At one point during the Third Seminole War, bloodhounds were used to track the
Seminoles through the swamps. There was an enormous public backlash against this, because it
was seen as inhumane (Robbins 2006). Even after a compromise had been reached that the dogs
would be muzzled and unable to attack, the public looked down on the tactic.
Yet the majority of public newspapers of the era paint the Seminoles as violent and
inhuman (Figure 7). The inflammatory language used to recount events is fairly consistent with
contemporaneous public thought on the “savage nature” of Indians. Across the country, stories
were often reprinted word for word weeks and even months after original publication. Here is
just a sampling of the typical portrayal of the Seminole people in American newspapers.

FIGURE 7. Newspaper image depicting the Dade Massacre.
(http://www.csulb.edu/~aisstudy/nae/chapter_2/001_002_2.43.jpg)

Seminole War. —Since the engagement on the Withlacoochee, no intelligence has
been had of the main body of the Indians. The situation of the inhabitants east of
the St. Johns and south of St. Augustine, is truly deplorable. New Smyrna has
been burnt and all the fine plantations in that neighborhood are broken up. Many
of the negroes have been carried off, or have joined the savages. The Indians are
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dispersed in small parties, and when pursued they take refuge in the thickets
which abound every where, and fight with desperation until they are dead, no
matter what numbers they may be assailed. It is literally a war of extermination,
and no hope is entertained of putting an end to it, but by the most vigorous
measures (1836).
The information that we get from Florida is of the most appalling description, and
leads us to fear, that before the necessary aid can be given to the people of that
devoted Territory, the whole region will be at the mercy of a band of warlike
savages. The Seminoles have already secured an accession of strength not to be
derided, by an union that has been effected between them and the Creek Indians.
The force combined is unusually strong for a border war; ….. Beside the (?) of the
Creeks, the Seminoles are aided by a band of run a-way and captive negroes, who
are represented to be far more ferocious in their butcheries than the Indians
themselves. These miserable and abandoned creatures are urged onward by that
blood spirit of revenge that never tires…(1836).

Studying Conflict
Studying wars archaeologically and anthropologically is a recent phenomenon, especially
in North America. Only forty years ago, Ivor Noel Hume (1969:188) stated that “little can
usefully be said about battlefield sites . . . [where] . . . the salvage of relics becomes the be all
and end all.” Warfare has previously fallen under the purview of military historians, who relied
primarily on literary sources. Yet military history alone is not sufficient to fully understand past
conflicts. Accounts can be biased (written by victors, revisionist, etc.), incomplete (a single
soldier can only accurately relate the small part of the battle he participated in, and details can be
forgotten), or inaccurate (e.g., secondhand accounts based on faulty information) (Fox 1993).
Therefore, by adding archaeology to the study of historical sources, a more well-rounded picture
can be gained. As Fox (1993) writes, “Archaeology reveals the skeleton, which history then
clothes.” Much of the conflict archaeology literature has yet to be synthesized into a concise
history of this burgeoning field, and even the best name for it is being contested: Should it be
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called “conflict archaeology,” “battlefield archaeology,” “archaeology of battle,” or “military
sites archaeology”?
One point of agreement is that new technologies (metal detectors, GIS, GPR, total
stations, satellite imaging, etc.) have greatly enhanced the quality and level of detail possible for
research. One of the first sites to receive this treatment was the Battle of Little Bighorn by Scott
and Fox in the early 1980s (Drexler 2003). Volunteer metal detectorists were used to locate
artifacts from many areas of the battle. Using modern forensic science to analyze unique firingpin markings on shell casings and rifling signatures on bullets, the movement of individual guns
around the field of battle could be mapped accurately. This allowed for a more complete picture
of how the battle progressed than had been previously possible. Despite the newness of this
aspect of archaeology, great strides have been made to advance the field with journals and
conferences dedicated to its study.
The artifacts of war leave a distinctive mark on the landscape that archaeologists are able
to interpret and use to deduce behaviors. “Combat behavior is, from the archaeological
perspective, no more and no less susceptible to analyses than any other form of human endeavor”
(Fox 1993). Stanley South coined the phrase “Revolutionary War Military Battle Pattern” when
discussing the patterns of deposition relating to Revolutionary War sites, and he broadened his
hypothesis to include “supply lines, logistic bases, military supply, types of arms available, etc.”
(Fox 1993:4).
Battlefield archaeology has been described as “perhaps the most historical in orientation
and the least theoretical in interpretation” (Drexler 2003). I argue that this does not need to be the
case. Many theoretical perspectives can be applied to the study of battlefields and conflicts. For
example, Fox (1993) uses a stability/disintegration model to investigate the Battle of Little
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Bighorn. In this dissertation, I will draw on the theory of culture contact/interregional interaction,
military theories such as KOCOA, and the role of standardized education.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE EDUCATIONAL BAGGAGE OF A WEST POINT
EDUCATION IN THE SECOND SEMINOLE WAR
Legends of West Point.
Methinks Mr. Editor I can already see a smile lighting up your
countenance at the idea of legends at West Point. Of all Places in the world this is
certainly the last in which one would expect to be entertained by a traditionary
tale. The principles of Vauban and Cormontaigne, together with the various
methods, analytical and synthetical, of demonstration philosophical, are sufficient
to banish from the minds of those who are within sight or hearing of the academy
all idea of things which cannot be measured by feet and inches or subjected to
some philosophical experiment. Indeed I know from my own experience that the
two first years are alone quite sufficient to unhinge every idea previously
conceived, unless mathematically supported, and to lead to the rejection of every
other which is not backed by lines, triangles, or some other mathematical
authority. So accustomed does the mind here become to demonstration, and so
confirmed in the habit of inquiring into the manner of proof, that all subjects,
without distinction of kind, run the risk of being subjected to the same process. I
recollect giving a hint to my chum on one occasion by saying: My dear fellow,
you’ve got a hole in your breeches. His reply was in the usual form, “How will
you prove it?”(Army and Navy Chronicle 1836:123).
Doctrine is not only an idealized description of how things are done but also an
attempt to inculcate habits of mind and action that change organizational culture
and behavior (Kilcullen 2010:20).

Introduction
I chose to use the phrase “educational baggage” for this chapter title because I propose
that not only did education hinder the success of the military during the Second Seminole war,
but that its approach to war—literally, its large baggage trains (as just one example)—presented
a logistical nightmare that the U.S. Army had to learn to deal with. Also, French military
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influences resulted in an educational and logistical heritage, which, I argue, significantly shaped
how the war in Florida progressed. These are just two instances of how environmental
knowledge and military training intersect with the landscape. The Second Seminole War
provides a unique opportunity to critically assess the many assumptions we bring to a historical
event because of the unique set of circumstances the military had to deal with. Through the use
of GIS modeling, I investigated how this classical military training was brought to bear on the
Florida landscape and what, if any, compromises had to be made to allow those traditional
methods to work in a subtropical, frontier setting.
The first formal training of American soldiers occurred at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania
during the winter of 1777–1778. By December 19, 1777, the American troops had begun arriving
(Pruitt 2012), and French arms arrived the following spring. The key figure in the training was
Friedrich Wilhelm August Heinrich Ferdinand von Steuben, better known as the Baron von
Steuben. He defined the proper layout of a military encampment (Whitehorne 2006:30-35). More
importantly, he taught the troops at Valley Forge how to march as a single unit and fire in two
ranks (von Steuben 1985:28-29). The soldiers were trained how to use the new French muskets
and bayonets as a single fighting unit that would stand up to a British charge (von Steuben
1985:23-25,55-56). However, General George Washington did not forget the importance of
using guerilla tactics. When the British left Philadelphia in June 1778, Washington sent Colonel
Daniel Morgan and his Virginia riflemen to harass the British and slow down their march so that
the American army could catch up and engage them. Morgan was a veteran Indian fighter skilled
in the arts of concealment and hit-and-move tactics (Smith 1964:6).
On June 28, 1778, the Continental Army and the Crown forces clashed at Monmouth
Courthouse in New Jersey. For the most part, the newly trained American troops followed von
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Steuben's training and stood their ground against advancing enemy columns. However, guerrilla
tactics were again employed. Colonel Joseph Cilley handpicked a platoon of skilled riflemen
who took positions in a wood-line and heavily sniped at the Second Battalion, British 42nd
Highland Regiment of Foot, successfully forcing the Highlanders into a retreat (Martin
1988:129-131,Stone et al. 1996).
After the Battle of Monmouth, the British moved the war to the southern states. Colonel
Francis Marion of South Carolina created his own company of Rangers, which operated
independently of the conventional American army. Using guerrilla tactics and their intimate
knowledge of the swamplands, they successfully harassed the British by performing lightning
raids and disappearing into the swamps, much as the Seminole Indians would in the 19th
century. Marion earned the nickname “Swamp Fox” because of his tactics (Whitehorne 2006).
The training of the U.S. Army at the new academy at West Point, however, reverted to the rigid
European style and abandoned the necessity of guerrilla training.

Officer Training and the French Legacy
West Point officially began in 1802 as a loosely defined educational system in which
cadets would stay for any length of time and were of any age (McDonald 2004). Sylvanus
Thayer, superintendent of West Point from 1817 to 1833 (Betros 2004), changed this. His actions
perhaps had the biggest impact on the shape of military strategy of the Second Seminole War and
are arguably still important for modern day military education. Thayer graduated from
Dartmouth College in 1807 as the valedictorian of his class. He was then awarded an
appointment at West Point and graduated the following year, in 1808, as a second lieutenant.
During the War of 1812, he directed the construction of fortifications at Norfolk, Virginia, and
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was promoted to the rank of major (Betros 2004). Afterward, he was awarded money to travel to
France, where he studied at the École Polytechnique, the French military educational institution
(Abbot 1878). The school was founded in 1794, during the French Revolution, to serve primarily
as a preparatory school for the various branches of service (Boynton 1871). Admission was
based on results of a public examination and successful completion of prior schooling. The
curriculum was designed to be a two-year course of study. Upon completion of the coursework,
cadets were allowed to choose the branch of service they wished to join, based on merit and
available openings (Boynton 1871).
In 1817, President Monroe appointed Thayer to the superintendency at West Point, where
he enacted policies of standardization, discipline, and rigorous testing based on what he had
learned while in France. He sought to create an American version of the French system, and
therefore French texts and treatises figured heavily in the curriculum, which required the cadets
to read French. West Point’s new curriculum included classes in French, math, drawing,
philosophy (physics), infantry tactics, gunnery, strategy, theoretical military science, drill, and
many others (Robbins 2006). Reports of the Board of Visitors in 1821 show that “elements of
permanent fortification” were also part of the curriculum. It is this training that may have
significantly influenced the course of the Second Seminole War, because cadets learned to
follow a prescribed set of guidelines for each situation they encountered. Thayer created a fouryear program to ensure conformity and continuity between graduating classes. Every aspect of a
cadet’s schooling was to prepare him for a military career. As one cadet wrote in 1822:
If there is a means stronger than any other of cementing the union of the States,
and perpetuating our government, it is the national Military Academy at West
Point. To this institution, young gentlemen are sent from all sections of the Union.
They come together with all the sectional prejudices, habits, and knowledge. . . .
Their former habits, manners, and prejudices soon become extinct. They form a
new character, a national character, which is no where else formed in the country.
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. . . They separate and are scattered to every part of the country; but their feelings
are not separated, and their interests are not divided, and generally never will be. .
. . From this source an uniformity of political principles and opinions and national
and personal attachments will be formed and disseminated, which will bind
together our States, and perpetuate our union, when without this cord they might
separate (Skelton 2004:29).
How the military is trained affects the outcome of any engagement. Most militaries
operate based on tradition, training, and orders. It is this tradition—and how knowledge is
constructed—that is of interest here. Education at West Point focused heavily on the French
education model (Betros 2004). The French had the leading military educational institutions in
the world in the 19th-century (Betros 2004). These French academies focused heavily on
fortification and engineering and did not deal much with drill and troop movement theories.
“Thayer saw West Point as primarily a school of engineering and showed little interest in
cultivating either liberal arts or strictly military courses” (Betros 2004).
In Western Europe, at least, what might be termed fortress warfare dominated the
landscape. Huge, geometric structures signaled the significance of military
architecture and artillery. Officers had to know how to defend or besiege and
capture fortresses. Technical awareness became imperative, as artillery and
engineering, together or separately, became a distinct branch or component of
armies by the eighteenth century (McDonald 2004:25).
This French connection created formulaic methods with which officers were taught to approach
problems. Regardless of environment or previous success or failure, these strategies appeared to
have been implemented repeatedly in Florida. For example, the same type of fortification was
built, regardless of who the commanding officer or engineer was or what the environment was
like at the proposed fort’s location. This suggests that standardized education was the cause.
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This new French-based training had shortcomings, such as overly emphasizing traditional
European-style tactics rather than flexible guerilla tactics, which had been more commonly used
in the United States.
Overall, however, the West Point approach to military science was narrow,
technical, and derivative. . . . With a few exceptions, most notably (Dennis Hart)
Mahan himself, Academy-trained military thinkers focused mainly on traditional
fortification, tactics, and the particulars of military weaponry and equipment
rather than on strategy or broad military policy. Moreover, they tended to accept
uncritically European models rather than seeking flexible solutions to military
problems within the context of American conditions (Skelton 2004:33).
It is interesting to see how much of the American military heritage is based on French
influences, even though the American military would be engaged in wars that were very different
from those fought in Europe. This enculturation of how to fight a war properly had an
overwhelming impact on how the war in Florida was conducted.

Dennis Hart Mahan – Educator and Accomplished Strategist
Dennis Hart Mahan was another key figure in the shaping of West Point’s curriculum. He
graduated in 1824 at the top of his class and became an instructor at the academy. After two
years of teaching, he was ordered to France to enroll in the Military School of Application for
Engineers and Artillerists at Metz (Abbot 1878). This school was designed to teach artillery and
engineering after the cadet had completed the scientific training at the École Polytechnique. It
also was a two-year curriculum; however, it focused on teaching aspects of “practical study.”
Upon graduation, cadets joined a regiment and were “employed in practical exercises with troops
till they obtain the rank of second captain” (Boynton 1871). Subjects of study at Metz consisted
of
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topography and geodesy, including military drawing and surveying, under special
circumstances; field fortifications, military art and legislation, permanent
fortification, and the attack and defense of fortified places, accompanied by a
sham siege: architectures, as applicable to military buildings and fortifications;
the theory and practice of construction, and artillery (Boynton 1871:371).
Mahan brought this new knowledge back to West Point, where he served as a full
professor of civil and military engineering for the next thirty years (Pappas 1993). He published
many of the leading treatises on military art and science, and also translated several French
works for use at West Point (Abbot 1878). Yet the school's focus on engineering would make
Lieutenant Henry Prince a key player during the Second Seminole War. Prince graduated in
1835, and by 1836 he was serving in Florida. As the engineer in charge of rebuilding both Fort
Foster and Fort Dade, he left a significant mark on the landscape that reflected his West Point
training. Mahan had not yet published his treatises on military science when Prince was his
student, but as a professor of civil and military engineering, Mahan would certainly have lectured
on the subjects he was writing about and, in turn, influenced Prince’s ideas about how to build a
fort and what a proper fort should look like (Betros 2004).

Other Notable Military Theorists
Philosophizing and publishing treatises about military strategy has a long history that
dates back hundreds if not thousands of years (Phillips 1985). Referring to the European military
revolution of 1560-1660 in Europe, Parker states that “they required troops who were highly
trained and disciplined, men who would act as cogs in a machine; and the cogs had to learn how
to march in step and how to perform their movements in perfect unison—they even had to dress
the same” (1976:196). This legacy had a lasting effect on global military doctrine. When the
academy at West Point was forming, France was seen as the leader in military science.
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The Marquis de Vauban (1633-1707) was considered one of France’s greatest military
thinkers and wrote extensively on military science. Vauban’s key publication, The New Method
of Fortification (1762), emphasized the new reliance on scientific methods of warfare and even
discussed the best soil type and location for placing forts (Figure 11). This could have been a
significant lesson for Florida, which has a plethora of marshes and swamps. A critical feature
that Vauban notes is that marshy ground should be avoided, because it causes illness. It is
surprising that this fact took so long to be implemented in Florida; many forts were built near
marshy grounds/standing water, and illness was rampant.

FIGURE 8. Excerpt from Vauban's treatise. (Vauban 1762)
In addition to becoming more scientific, the principles of speed and timing emerged as central
themes with many famous tacticians:
The Duke of Wellington commented that “time is everything.” “Strategy,”
Napoleon reflected, was an “art of making use of time and space.” Jomini located
tempo and rapid marches at the center of his military theories. Clausewitz opined
that military geniuses achieve “rapid and accurate decisions” because of superior
faculties to evaluate time and space. (Cunningham and Tomes 2004:119)
To achieve this level of efficiency, strict training of troops is imperative. West Point served to fill
that need for training in the Unites States.
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The Board of Visitors and West Point’s Curriculum
Annual exams were administered by the Board of Visitors each year at West Point. After
reviewing the cadets’ progress, a formal written report on the state of the institution as a whole
was submitted. These reports provide valuable insights into education at West Point. The earliest
record of the Board of Visitors has pages of recommendations on the books needed for the
library. The list of topics of books requested includes philosophy, geology, hydrostatics,
magnetism, astronomy, mathematics, and architecture, among others. However, no militarythemed books were requested. In 1821, the course of study was as follows (Board of Visitors
1821):
4th Class, 1st year—Algebra, Geometry, Plane and Spherical Trigonometry and the
use of Logarithms, French Language
3d Class, 2d year—Descriptive Geometry, Application of Algebra to Geometry,
Analytical Trigonometry, Integral and Differential Calculus
2d Class, 3d year, Mechanicks, Astronomy, Physicks, Chymistry, Drawing
1st Class, 4th year—Fortification, Artillery, Tacticks, Civil and military
Architecture, Application of descriptive Geometry to Stereotomy &c, Geography,
History &c
Ultimately, the goal of the course of study was to teach the cadets basic French and mathematics
during their first year. As they moved up each year, courses of study became more specialized
and cadets were split into sections based on merit (Figure 9). Those that were the highest ranked
learned more specialized subjects, to prepare them for jobs as engineers, while the second- and
third-ranked sections of each class focused more on the skills officers would need in the field,
such as artillery or tactics.
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FIGURE 9. List of courses and text books used at West Point, 1824 (Board of Visitors 1824).

West Point Graduates and the Second Seminole War
The global connections that helped to shape the outcome of the Seminole Wars are often
overlooked in the literature. Yet this conflict is the first war in which a large portion of the 452
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officers are known to have served in at least one of the three Seminole Wars, and had been
trained at the newly created United States Military Academy at West Point. Of these, 15 served
during the first war, 285 served during the second, and 146 served during the third. Some of
these officers served in multiple wars and may have been counted twice.
Brevet Major-General George W. Cullum compiled an exhaustive list of all graduates of
the Military Academy. Each graduate’s entry contains a short biography, a description of their
military career (if known), miscellaneous notes of interest, and his unique identifying number,
which is now known as a “Cullum number” (Cullum 1868). Cullum gave the first graduate of the
Academy the number one, and each cadet after that was numbered according to graduating class
and merit. I made exhaustive use of these lists; information relating to officers who served in the
Florida was extracted and is listed in Appendix A.

Conclusions
A better sense of the mindset officers of the Second Seminole War brought to conflict
can be gained by studying the available texts they read during their time at West Point. While it
may be impossible to show a direct cause and effect of this standardized education, I argue that
some of the trends seen in Florida’s fortified landscape are a result of standardized education:
Despite a constant change in command, similar tactics and methods were employed repeatedly.
I have demonstrated that there is ample reason to believe that officer education may have
significantly shaped the war in Florida; however, testing this hypothesis has proved difficult.
There are few models for investigating an entire war in general, and none that I am aware of that
include education—and determining how to approach the concept of education archaeologically
can be challenging. As I will show in the following chapters, modern military approaches can be
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used to investigate the Second Seminole War and provide the tools necessary to investigate
hypotheses about education and adaptation.
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CHAPTER 4:
USING MODERN MILITARY THEORY FOR HISTORIC
CONFLICT ANALYSIS
“Fort” Brooke, Tampa Bay, Jan. 9th, 1836.
Mr. Editor:—The attention of the public may in some degree, be attracted
to this point, and I therefore give the following information:
This place was never fortified; two block houses were indeed built at the
end of a street four or five barracks, and quarters on each side. The Secretary
ordered “Cantonments” to be called “Forts,” and to that rule this post conformed.
The existing defences are called the “Fraser redoubt” in compliment to the
late gallant officer of that name. It is a triangular stockade, with two block houses
and a battery of two 12 pounders looking upon a plain; and some 100 yards from
the barracks and a large grove of venerable live oaks, the gorge, or third side, was
open to the bay shore, and has since the battle of Withlacooche, been enclosed
with a 6 pound battery flanking it and making a cross fire upon the salients of the
gorge. All that is fort about the position, has proceeded from the thews and
muscles of its garrison from about the 1st Dec. to the date of this missive, Of all
miserable contrivances in the paper way, paper forts are the most tormenting;
impending evils check stronger epithets. It is the lot of man to do, to bear and to
suffer; and here to do, or die (Army and Navy Chronicle 1836:79).

Modern Military Theory Meets Conflict Archaeology
Traditionally, fortifications have been studied in isolation, one site at a time. Little work
has been done to connect fortifications within the framework of the larger fortified landscape. By
zooming out and broadening the scope of the investigation to include more holistic and
integrative analysis, greater insight into how a complex and connected landscape would have
functioned is possible. In Florida especially, forts were built to be a network of supply depots.
The supply-chain nature of these structures means that they were inherently interconnected, yet
they have only been studied in isolation. Not only were these structures a network, they were
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connected to the physicality of their place. How forts or depots fit into the landscape, how the
landscape was used and modified to fit the fortification, how roads and trails connected
fortifications, and how these ultimately changed the landscape by fracturing it as a display of
power and ownership are all important, yet overlooked, aspects of Florida’s frontier past.
In this chapter I will describe how this complex landscape can be teased apart through the
use a geographic information system (GIS) to perform physical comparisons between actual
landscape features. The application of modern American military theory to this fortification
network not only yields better understand of how the network functioned, but also provides a
method to standardize analysis that allows for comparison to other systems, such as the network
of fortifications on the Western Plains during the later Indian Wars. Previous studies of
fortifications have tended to require unique terminology to explain the results. This is partly
because conflict archaeology as a discipline is very young. As the field develops a more uniform
lexicon, it will be easier to compare and contrast findings.
Conflict occurs between groups of people and is more than just the physical locations of
hostilities. By using a more applied anthropological perspective, we can further humanize the
causes and outcomes of conflict and develop a model to investigate other conflicts. My research
goal is to expand the use of modern military science, especially KOCOA, to investigate historical
conflicts in a more holistic manner—to recognize the social and cultural aspects of conflict and
the role they may play in the outcomes of war.

Military Sciences Applied to a Historical Conflict Setting
As discussed previously, conflict archaeologists are starting to use current military
terminology. Yet often this just provides a unifying term for something that has previously been
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known by other names. In my opinion, it has not provided a significant amount of new
information. However, it does provide a solid foundation upon which new insights can be
layered. Modern methods employ highly precise GIS analysis, which may not useful to
understand past conflicts because the locational accuracy of historical documentary information
is extremely suspect. Therefore, the use of modern environmental data is not fruitful for the
study of decision-making processes of the 19th-century, and having a unified language to discuss
elements of the landscape as the soldiers would have known it becomes necessary.
Current American military theory provides this unifying framework. It is easily
accessible by civilians, comprehensive in scope, and can readily be modified for discussion of
historic events. I chose American military theory for this study for two reasons. First, a large
store of military documents used to train present-day soldiers is widely available. Two of the
most useful resources for research of modern military theory are Army field manuals FM3-0 and
JP3-0 which have been approved for public distribution and are easily accessible on the Internet
(Department of Defense 2001, 2006). Second, current military training is based on the model that
was developed and refined at West Point Military Academy thus making it a natural starting
place for using modern military science when studying past wars.
My goal for this chapter is not to present a primer in military theory, but to extract only
those theories that can be related to past events and discuss how this modern definition benefits
my historical analysis. For a more detailed look at other modern theories, refer to FM3-0
(Department of Defense 2001).
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Modern Military Terminology

Levels of Warfare
There are three levels of warfare: strategic, operational, and tactical (Department of
Defense 2006). The strategic level is the ultimate goal of war for a nation or multinational
organization and is implemented through policy and national strategic objectives. The
operational level is the “design and conduct of operations using operational art—the application
of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and
experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ
military forces”(Department of Defense 2006:II-2). Finally, the tactical level is how specific
battles or engagements are executed. Figure 10 is a diagram of the levels used in Desert Storm.
In the case of the Second Seminole War, the strategic level would be the national Indian
Removal Policy of 1832; this legislation set the Second Seminole War in motion. The
operational level would be how each commander of the army in Florida organized their overall
strategy—whether it was the grand campaign of General Scott, which planned to send multiple
columns throughout the interior of the territory to find the Seminoles, or Taylor’s military
squares plan. Finally, the tactical level of the war would be how each engagement was
orchestrated and how unit commanders conducted their troops.
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FIGURE 10. Levels of warfare. (Department of Defense 2001:2-3)
It is important to understand these three levels of warfare because while the ultimate goal
was to relocate the Seminoles, there were often disconnects in how the three areas functioned.
For instance, Washington—which set the policy—was so far removed from the day-to-day
activities of Florida that troops were often frustrated with the government for not understanding
what was necessary to bring the war to an end.

Principles of War, Tenets, and Elements of Combat Power
As can be seen in Figure 11, the U.S. military uses an operational framework composed
of nine principles of war (objective, offensive, economy of force, mass, maneuver, unity of
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command, simplicity, surprise, and security), five tenets of war (initiative, agility, depth,
synchronization, and versatility), and five elements of combat power (maneuver, firepower,
leadership, protection, and information) (Department of Defense 2001).

FIGURE 11. Elements of a full spectrum operation.
(Department of Defense 2001:4-3)
While these terms are largely self-explanatory, they are worth illustrating as they would
have applied to the Florida campaign (Table 1), because in most cases these aspects of warfare
contributed to the overall difficulties of the mission (Department of Defense 2001). Additionally
this list of terms important to combat power is useful in historical research because it acts as a
checklist to ensure all aspects of conflict are considered, including many aspects that
traditionally are not discussed in the archaeological literature, yet are crucial when considering
past conflicts.
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TABLE 1. Elements of a full spectrum operation as applied to Florida.
Element
Objective
Offensive
Economy of
Force
Mass
Maneuver
Unity of
Command
Simplicity
Surprise
Security
Initiative
Agility
Depth

Synchronization
Versatility
Maneuver
Firepower
Leadership
Protection
Information

Florida Example
Changed throughout the war. First, the goal was to relocate the Seminoles to a
central reservation; then it was changed to relocating them to a different territory.
Limited by the terrain, supplies, and lack of information.
Chronic shortage of troops due to short enlistments and widespread disease.
Affected by the troop shortage and the distance they were spread across.
Could not bring baggage trains into the swamps and were limited by the amount of
supplies the men could carry.
Requires a single command structure, but Florida changed commanders often.
Also, there was frequent disagreement about command and delay in receiving
commands.
The idea to relocate the Seminoles seemed simple, but due to other failures
implementation of the plan was unsuccessful.
Tried but could not find the Seminole strongholds and, if found, the Seminoles
would flee before the army arrived.
Forts were secure areas, but the army tended to travel by roads and the Seminoles
knew this, which made traveling risky for the army.
The attempt to find and engage the Seminoles at their location to set the terms of
battle.
The reliance on baggage trains hindered the movement of the troops.
The plan to use three columns of troops to simultaneously attack the Seminoles to
deny them freedom to maneuver.
A grand maneuver that involved three columns of troops converging on the
Seminoles at the same time failed due to a lack of knowledge about the terrain and
how long it would take for each column to travel there.
The military tended to continue employing the same strategies: searching the
wilderness, talks or parlays, incentives, and trickery.
The army moved slowly through the wilderness and was often deterred by
landscape barriers such as swamps and rivers.
In terms of weapons, the military and the Seminoles were well matched; however,
the military had easier access to powder, ammunition, and repairs.
Command changed several times, which further hindered the evolution of tactics.
Forts were the main source of protection; the army was vulnerable outside of them.
The army was seriously lacking in knowledge about their terrain and their enemy.

The military was not as successful as planned in most aspects of warfare, which
undoubtedly contributed to the protracted nature of the war. Even though the war in Florida
occurred before modern technological advancements, such as rapid communications, were
available, it can still be argued that the military did not adapt rapidly enough to successfully
operate within the limits of the available resources and information. Despite the fact that
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objectives were routinely not met, the military would have been profoundly affected by their
experiences in Florida. While evidence of how these experiences manifested is currently lacking,
additional research will hopefully shed light on this area of investigation.
Understanding the elements of combat power is especially relevant to studying historic
wars, because situational understanding plays such a key role: The commander needs to have a
solid understanding of the situation to direct troops and firepower. This becomes significant in
Florida because, as will be shown, much of the war was directed by officials who were in
Washington and far removed, both physically and conceptually, from the troops in Florida.

Area of Operation and Landscape Visualizations
Current military strategy visualizes the landscape in a way that most effectively defines
goals. In Figure 10, the image on the left is from FM 3-0 and depicts how a region would be
occupied to carry out a successful campaign; the image on the right uses examples from Florida
to demonstrate how these concepts work in a practical setting.
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FIGURE 12. Left image is from FM 3-0 Area of Operations, Right image is adapted to a Florida
example. (Department of Defense 2001:4-21)
The above diagram illustrates some of the ideas that were used during the Second Seminole War.
A series of fortifications was constructed so that troops would never be too far away from
supplies. Some of the fortifications were more substantial structures that would be classified as a
home station in modern terminology. Fort Brooke would be considered a home station, because
it was a larger type of fortification (more along the lines of an unwalled plains “fort”). It was a
more residential fort used for directing the movements of troops in the field. Fort Brooke was
situated on Tampa Bay, making it the largest port in the area, and was the major pipeline for
supplies into the field. Transport by steamboat was a major means of transportation for troops, as
well as the fastest and safest means to travel around the coast. Therefore, Fort Brooke provided a
means for acquiring troops, goods, and supplies.
The smaller forts/depots would be classified as force projection bases. “These bases may
be areas of operations but they also serve as short-term support bases that sustain deployed
combat units. They may provide the range of support offered by a home base” and can shape the
outcome of an engagement (Department of Defense 2006). These would be the temporary forts
built as needed to serve specific purposes, such as Fort Dade and Fort Foster. These types of
structures were to serve as staging areas to allow troops to push into areas of operations. These
are analogous to the small, remote fire bases used in later wars, such as the Vietnam War.

Terrain
The terrain and weather or climate of a place can have a significant impact on the
effectiveness of an operation (Department of Defense 2006). Failure to plan for these factors can
cause the failure of the mission. This was beginning to be understood in Florida. As previously
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discussed, Florida’s environment was unlike anything the military had previously encountered.
Due to this unfamiliarity with the climate, the army expended a significant amount of effort to
continue to operate in the traditional way, rather than change tactics to suit the environment.
The progress of the Florida war from the 1st of January, 1836, was attended with
large expenditures of money, and serious embarrassments. The climate, ignorance
of the swamps and hammocks, and the treachery and activity of the enemy,
baffled the skill of the most zealous and intelligent officers (Sprague 1848:96).
Another problem with Florida’s environment was the temperature. With warm
temperatures and high humidity almost year round, the military was ill equipped; often, the men
were forced to wear their woolen winter clothes in hot temperatures due to a lack of supplies and
summer clothing (Sprague 1848). The tough climate also created other obstacles such as
difficulty finding potable water, which took a toll on the health of troops and animals.
From the lateness of the season into which we were thrown, from the causes
already stated, we found the heat, even before the 20th of April, so oppressive, that
the troops could not execute even ordinary marches from this cause alone. . . . The
sink-holes, or ponds, on which both men and horses had generally to rely for
water, were now, many of them, dried up; and in the others the water was tepid,
besides being filled with vegetable matter and animalculae. . . . Add to these
causes of distress and disease the swamps and hammocks which were traversed,
the deficiency in bacon. . . . It will astonish no one to learn from the testimony
that we had very many individuals, officers and men, that could neither ride nor
march. The only recource was to crowd them into wagons, for in a savage country
we could leave no one behind (Sprague 1848:141).
Perhaps the most critical aspect of Florida’s terrain was the military’s lack of knowledge
about the environment, which seriously hindered operations.
Eustis and Lindsay, as shown by their testimony, had no competent guides, and
could obtain none. Clinch’s column was rather less badly provided in this respect,
yet he had not a guide that knew any of the intricacies of The Cove, a Creatan
labyrinth, held from the knowledge of the white man, as the sacred groves of the
Druids were never entered except by the initiated. In short, all the difficult parts of
Florida were, to the whole army, one terra incognita. Government gave me no
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topographical information, nor had any to give; and the booksellers’ maps only
afforded outlines filled up with unlucky guesses (Sprague 1848:143).
Eventually, though, some level of adaptation took place. The army soon learned to
abandon certain areas during the hot summer “sickly season” and return when the climate was
more favorable and disease not as prevalent. “This being the commencement of the sickly
season, and his men much broken by exposure and harassing duties, it was deemed prudent and
but an act of justice to give them an opportunity to rest, and thus avoid the diseases incident to
the climate at this season of the year” (Sprague 1848:113).
Also, the failure to understand the swamps and waterways significantly hindered military
progress—baggage trains and cannon carriages tended to get stuck and were sometimes
abandoned. Rivers were dark in color, and therefore confusing; soldiers were never sure how
deep the water was, and would often opt not to attempt to cross for fear of drowning (Sprague
1848). Detailed records of daily weather observations were kept at Fort Dade and some of the
other forts, showing how important weather was thought to be.

Centers of Gravity
Again, although this is a modern term, the concept was well understood by both the
military and the Seminoles. For instance, attacking the enemy’s centers of gravity (COGs) in a
decisive and swift movement can “create dilemmas causing paralysis and destroying cohesion”
(Department of Defense 2006). Troops often attempted to find the Seminole stronghold in the
Cove of the Withlacoochee, because they believed it to be the Seminole’s COG and that
destroying it would end the war. The Seminoles had a much easier time of attacking U.S. COGs,
because they were forts at known locations and were prominent features on the landscape.
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Linear vs. Nonlinear Operations
Linear and nonlinear types of operations probably had the most direct relevance to the
Second Seminole War. In linear operations, troops remain in contact and move as a group.
Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations with identified forward
lines of own troops (FLOTs). In linear operations, emphasis is placed on
maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to other friendly forces; . . .
conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the
information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered.
Linear operations also are appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy
force or when the threat to LOCs (lines of communications) reduces friendly force
freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to
concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily (Department of Defense
2006:v-17).
However, in nonlinear operations forces operate separately and without direct, continual
contact.
Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along multiple LOOs
(line of operations) from selected bases (ashore or afloat)…to protect themselves,
individual forces relied more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and
freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on the
communications, intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment”
(Department of Defense 2006:v-17).
The Seminole War could be characterized as a nonlinear operation based on today’s
definition. Units were dispersed across Florida and operated fairly independently for large
periods of time. However, based on the technology of the time, spacing forts within close
proximity was considered a high level of communication. This attempt to build a network of
fortifications shows that the military knew they needed a linear operation to be successful. Due
to limitations in money, manpower, and supplies, however, in actuality these forts were not as
effectively connected as their planners had hoped. “I speak, sir, of detachments beyond
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supporting distance; for all the columns were habitually subdivided, within that limit, in
searching for, and in attacking the enemy” (Army and Navy Chronicle 1837:181).

Types of War
Another aspect of modern military terminology that can be adapted to an archaeological
setting is defining the types of warfare encountered. While it may not seem as important to
decide whether a particular war was an irregular war or an insurgency, knowing what kind of
war it was allows the researcher to choose more appropriate methods to investigate the war.
Tactics that work for traditional warfare are very different from those for an insurgency.
Kilcullen (2010:2) states, “The character of any particular conflict is impossible to understand
without reference to three defining factors: the nature of the insurgency being countered, the
nature of the government being supported, and the environment—especially the human
environment—in which the conflict takes place.” While this specifically refers to insurgency,
these three factors are important to know for any type of conflict.

Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare
Another important distinction is the difference between traditional and irregular warfare.
Traditional warfare takes place between “nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation states . . .
[and] typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force on force military operations in which
adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities” (Department of Defense
2006:I-5). The U.S. military was more accustomed to this type of warfare and focused heavily on
training cadets at West Point for this type of engagement. In contrast, irregular warfare (IW) is
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marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and
influence over the relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric
approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities,
in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will. In IW, a less powerful
adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a
more powerful, conventionally armed military force, which often represents the
nations’ established regime. An adversary using irregular warfare methods
typically will endeavor to wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to break the will
of the opponent and its population (Department of Defense 2006:xi).
The Second Seminole War could be classified as irregular warfare, although it may not
have been intentionally carried out in this manner. The Seminoles were outnumbered, and
therefore played to their strengths of knowing the terrain and attacking in sporadic episodes,
which kept the military distracted. The army responded with traditional methods, such as grand
troop maneuvers, in an attempt to outflank or outmaneuver the Seminoles.

Insurgency
David Kilcullen, perhaps the most prolific current military analyst, has written a
comprehensive treatise on the ideas of insurgency and counterinsurgency (2010). Current field
manuals define insurgency as
an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government
through the use of subversion and armed conflict. . . . Stated another way, an
insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control (Department
of Defense 2006:1-1).
Kilcullen (2010:x) points out that
insurgency, therefore, is irregular not in the sense that it is uncommon—it is
exactly the opposite—but in the literal sense that it is “against the rules.” And
since these rules are set by nation-states and their military establishments, this
form of war is, always has been, and is likely to remain the preferred choice for
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nonstate armed groups and others who have nothing to gain from playing by rules
established to favor their adversaries.
Kilcullen stresses that it is important to understand each conflict in its own context instead of
using another conflict as a template for comparison. Another key feature of insurgency and
counterinsurgency that is applicable to Florida is that “counterinsurgency is at heart an
adaptation battle: a struggle to rapidly develop and learn new techniques and apply them in a
fast-moving, high threat environment, bringing them to bear before the enemy can evolve in
response and rapidly changing them as the environment shifts” (Kilcullen 2010:2). While it can
be argued that the Seminole Wars are probably not an insurgency in the strictest sense, they do
follow some of the same principles; for instance, they, too, are a war of “competitive adaptation”
(Kilcullen 2010:2). This gets to the heart of my research, by developing the tools to measure
adaptation or failure to adapt by the military.
While military theory regarding insurgency may not be directly applicable to the
Seminole Wars, some of the ideas underlying counterinsurgency strategies shed light on aspects
of conflict that should be considered when trying to understand the Florida Wars.
This means that enemy-focused strategy, which seeks to attack the guerrilla forces
directly, risks dissipating effort in chasing insurgent groups all over the
countryside, an activity that can be extremely demanding and requires enormous
numbers of troops and other resources. Counterinsurgents who adopt this
approach risk chasing their tails and so exhausting themselves (Kilcullen 2010:9).
Since Florida never had a large number of troops, and commanders were not fast to adapt
to changing situations, the Florida Wars cannot be considered a counterinsurgency. The
Seminoles were fighting as an insurgency, but the U.S. responded as if it were traditional
warfare, which compounded the problems that arose and ultimately contributed to failure.
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Conclusions
The Second Seminole War provides archaeologists and military historians an ideal
opportunity to broaden the approaches that have traditionally been used. Now that conflict
archaeology has become a separate discipline, it is time to advance the methodologies and
theoretical approaches. Modern military theories are an ideal starting point for this endeavor, but,
as the following chapters will show, they cannot be applied to historical events without
modification.
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CHAPTER 5:
EVALUATING CULTURAL ADAPTATION USING
LANDSCAPE THEORIES
They took along a six pounder, from the belief that it would produce a panic
among the savages. But they seemed to have assembled in such numbers, as to
render the stout defence of the unfortunate troops quite unavailing (Army and
Navy Chronicle 1836:56).

Introduction
KOCOA’s framework was designed to investigate a physical landscape. An
archaeological view of landscape, however, is more nuanced perhaps than the military’s. To use
KOCOA as a model for testing hypotheses about human behavior and decision making with
regard to the landscape, it is crucial, first, to understand how landscape and the cultural
adaptation to landscape has previously been conceptualized in the field of archaeology.
An overwhelming amount of research has been conducted on landscapes, and it would be
impossible to cover all of the various themes of landscape research in this dissertation. Over the
last several decades, various theories of landscape have been developed and critiqued in the
literature. Some current trends in landscape theory in archaeology include an acknowledgment of
the complexity of landscape (Bender 2002), the role of power in understanding landscapes
(Ortner 2006, Spencer-Wood and Baugher 2010), landscapes as palimpsests (Strang 2008), and
the use of phenomenological approaches (Johnson 2012). Bender (2002:S107) summarizes the
topic’s complexity: “This plurality of place is always in the making, and how it is used and
perceived depends on the contours of gender, age, status, ethnicity, and so on, and upon the
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moment.” Another concept newly emerging in landscape research is the idea of landscapes of
action. Robb (2013:661) states that
the ensemble of practices and conditions people participate in creates a tacit
landscape of action which guides and prompts action. Although landscapes of
action are often physical places . . . the term can also be used to suggest a
conceptual landscape in the sense of somebody surveying possible courses of
action, considering how well each one copes with the challenges of the moment
and what its foreseeable consequences might be.
With the breadth and variety of potential avenues of research into landscape theory, my goal in
this chapter is to highlight relevant theories that will help elucidate how the Seminoles and
military interacted within the Florida landscape and the effect this had on how both groups
interacted with each other and each with their environment.
Understanding the Seminole Wars as a complex set of interrelated features rather than a
linear set of battles between opposing forces requires a more complex set of theoretical
orientations than has been previously applied; we must move beyond simplistic, single-site
documentation to a holistic analysis of the complex nature of this war. To accomplish this goal,
we must begin with a few assumptions. One is that the military is its own cultural entity as
defined by Geertz (discussed below). Because the military is defined in cultural terms,
interregional interaction theory can be applied to understand how the military and the Seminoles
interacted. Interaction theory, which is assumed to have a landscape component, must be
broadened to include a specific type of landscape interaction during times of hostility.
Conflict landscapes are a unique type of entity, and only now is a body of theory
emerging that addresses their specific needs. In turn, conflict landscapes have a unique role in
shaping identity and power relations, because they are landscapes of opposition by definition—
an “us versus them” dichotomy that has important ramifications for understanding how groups
interact. This oppositional power struggle will have important consequences for the way the
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landscape is occupied and modified. As Zedeno (2008) points out, landscapes are socially
constructed through direct interaction with nature and may be shaped by social forces, such as
identity and memory. In turn, those social processes may institute physical modifications to the
landscape (Zedeno 2008). For example, features such as roads were built by white settlers and
the military in Florida to exert control over the wilderness. This alteration of the landscape
created a feedback loop that changed how groups navigated the new environment.

The Military as a Cultural Entity
Anthropology’s history with the military has often been controversial (Gonzalez 2007).
My goal here is not to delve into this debate, but to acknowledge that this is a difficult subject
and to demonstrate that for the purpose of my research, the U.S. military officers of 1835 can be
examined as a cultural entity or subculture. To discuss the processes involved when cultures
come into contact, we must first discuss the definition of culture, clarify the terms “identity” and
“ethnicity,” and briefly discuss theoretical perceptions of cultural boundaries. This discussion
centers on how groups of people interact with each other and with the built environment. While I
acknowledge that no single definition of culture is sufficient or can be easily articulated, my use
of culture is based on the definition Geertz has laid out: “a system of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop
their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973:89). I chose this definition based
on its focus on “system” and “symbolism.” Geertz also sees the role of anthropology as making
sense of cultural phenomena and recognizing their patterns, rather than just recording
phenomena (Carrier 2012). Pattern recognition is also key to my research on landscapes, because
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KOCOA operates through recognizing the various parts of a terrain and categorizing them by
usefulness.
This earlier definition of culture has several shortcomings, such as running the risk that
the idea of culture can, in itself, become a stereotype according to which groups are categorized
(Ortner 2006). Yet with no perfect definition of culture, this incomplete definition will have to
suffice. Many of the officers in Florida were West Point–trained, which provided a unifying
influence that affected how soldiers were trained to act and think. The military also fulfills
Geertz’s definition for culture (Geertz 1973), in that West Point’s training and complex
hierarchies of regulations can be seen as inherited; its graduates’ means of communication and
behavior are unique (Zirker et al. 2008), and are certainly symbolic in expressing a clear message
(of hostility to those that oppose them). The military also meets the last requirement of culture, in
that it can change and/or adapt to situations.
Viewing the military as a cultural institution allows for the application of several
anthropological theories. One area of interest is how the military as a culture or subculture
interacted with the Seminoles, who were a unique and distinct cultural entity by the time of the
Florida Wars.

Why Use Interaction Theories When Studying the Landscape?
Interregional interaction theory can shed light on why it is important to understand how
groups interact and the processes by which they do so. Also, because the landscape can be seen
as both the catalyst and the backdrop for interaction, I will discuss it in tandem with interaction
theories. Reciprocally, the landscape is modified as a result of interaction or anticipated
interactions (for example, forts are built in areas deemed to be in need of defense). The landscape
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is critically important, as it has both constraints and benefits that, in turn, affect how those who
inhabit the landscape adapt to or modify it. In this section I will first present an overview of
interaction theory, followed by why it is important and how it is affected by—and
simultaneously affects—landscape modification, then discuss some key landscape features that
can affect interactions.
One potential shortcoming of previous interaction research is the effect that conflict has
on intergroup interactions. Many interaction studies view conflict as a politically dominant group
(core) trying to colonize another group (periphery) (Stein 2002). This simplistic, top-down
approach fails to capture the complexities in Florida. The dominant group (the army) did not
want to colonize the periphery (the Seminoles); they wanted to remove or eliminate them. In
other words, they wanted no interaction with them. This requires a different perspective when
using interaction theories to study any of the Indian wars. I intend to incorporate a variety of
different approaches into a method that will allow for a more comprehensive investigation of
these nontraditional or irregular wars. These approaches, some of which have previously been
introduced, include the use of interaction theories, modern military theories,
education/knowledge acquisition theories, and landscape theories.

Interaction and Identity
Determining how cultures interact and change has long been a question of archeological
interest (Noronha and Goodchild 1992, Schortman and Urban 1987, Schortman et al. 1986,
Steadman 1995). A multitude of theories and frameworks have been developed over the years to
explain, interpret, and model cultural interactions, and each further refines and defines these
explanations of interactions (Schortman 1989, Wells 1980). The interest in cultural interaction
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stems from a need to understand and explain the built environment and the artifact assemblages
that were left behind (Wells 1980). Below is a brief discussion of how ideas about interaction
have evolved, followed by a discussion of how an interaction framework can be influential in
discussions of fortified landscapes. Contact between cultures occurs on a physical landscape
(Stark 1998), and fortified landscapes are a particular type of feature that has been overlooked in
contact studies (Oosterbeek 1997, Parkinson and Duffy 2007).
The next important concepts, which are integral to an understanding of interactions, are
identity and ethnicity, again, this is a more complicated discussion than can be accommodated
here. How groups maintain identity and differentiate themselves from those they perceive to be
“others” is important for understanding how these groups will interact. This is particularly
relevant here, because it is believed that identity can delineate the boundaries in the
archaeological record (Lightfoot and Martinez 1995, Parkinson 2006, Wobst 1974). Yet because
interaction is assumed to occur, it implies that these boundaries are at least partially fluid—
which can complicate the picture. Further confusion arises from occasional use of the terms
“identity” and “ethnicity” as interchangeable in the literature.
Stone’s discussion of the situational negotiation of identity demonstrates this fluidity
between the terms (2003). However, her discussion of interaction highlights the need to
understand social identity in order to understand migration and the resulting interaction between
groups (Stone 2003). Interaction is identified through the artifact assemblage, and she argues that
archaeology needs to move beyond identifying instances of contact and migration and focus
instead on “the nature of interaction between migrants and indigenous populations to understand
how ethnic identity is tied to this interaction” (Stone 2003:32). To Stone, ethnic identity is how
individuals express their identity in a given situation, and the outcome of that expression depends
79

on whether the situation needs “to either de-emphasize separate identities or emphasize and
constantly reify the we/they distinction” (Stone 2003). Stone also notes that interaction studies
tend to fall into two camps: one that “concentrates on processes of social categorization and
interaction” and is based largely on work by Barth and Cohen, and a second that “concentrates
on cultural content within the ethnic group rather than interaction between them” (Stone 2003).
Each of these camps has their own assumptions. Looking at group interactions assumes that
individuals are cognizant of the decision-making process and the symbols used to express
identity, while looking within an ethnic group assumes that individuals are unaware of the
decision-making process and use of symbol. This last assumption follows Bordieu’s idea of
habitus, which implyies that a culture, as a group, would not change without external stimulus or
contact (Swartz 1997).
How groups are defined in the archaeological record involves defining boundaries, and
contact is assumed to have occurred when artifacts are seen outside their normal distribution.
Archaeologists have traditionally focused on ethnic groups as the boundary of research
(MacEachern 1998), but boundaries can be defined many other ways as well, such as the
boundary of a study area, a household, or a community. However, the important aspect here is
that through the process of maintaining identity boundaries are created (Stone 2003). Boundaries
play a significant role in the discussion of contact between groups, because not only is it
important that groups be defined, but also how we define differences between groups and how
individuals move across those boundaries. This has given rise to an entire area of research on
boundary theory, which encompasses Bordieu’s concepts (Kooyman 2006, Swartz 1997) and
Barth’s study of “the relationship between social boundaries and the construction of ethnic
identity” (Parkinson 2006:34).
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Boundaries are significant in archaeology, because they are seen as a “transitional space”
and shed light on how space was constructed (Kooyman 2006:424). As Smith (1999:1) notes,
“geographical space must simultaneously be shared and divided,” and therefore the division and
use of space can provide significant information about the people occupying it. Kooyman (2006)
also points out that there are many different kinds of boundaries, and of which has a different
level of permeability, which can shed light on the types of behaviors that created them. It is this
concept of permeability that is interesting, because boundaries exist despite this movement. “In
other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and
information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete
categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of
individual life histories” (Barth 1969:10). Therefore, by understanding how space is divided and
defined, much information can be gathered in such areas as social interactions, social identity,
and beliefs and behaviors regarding space and others.
There are, however, many difficulties in studying boundaries in the archaeological
record. First and foremost is that social boundaries, and sometimes even physical boundaries, are
not always visible in the archaeological record (Kooyman 2006). Also, there is the issue of scale.
Multiple boundaries can overlap within a study area and can be difficult to untangle. For
example, activity areas within a house will have boundaries, each house within a community will
have property boundaries, sections of the community may be distinguished from other sections,
and communities will each have their own boundaries. Also, when looking at boundaries
archaeologically, unless there is some overlap in the location or debris from one activity intrudes
into another activity area, it may be difficult to determine the time that passed between activities
or if those activities were contemporaneous (Kooyman 2006). Another difficulty for
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archaeologists studying boundaries is translating “cultural boundaries,” which are defined by the
artifacts, into the “social boundaries” that were in operation during the period under study
(Parkinson 2006).

Understanding Landscapes
Landscapes are complex entities layered with social, political, symbolic, and physical
meanings. As archaeologists, it is crucial to not only understand “the physical environment onto
which people live out their lives but also the meaningful location in which lives are lived”
(David and Thomas 2008:38). Landscapes also contain rules that govern those who live there
and vice versa. For example, who can access what locations and when demonstrates that
landscapes are contested territorial spaces (David and Thomas 2008). Fortified landscapes were
neglected in landscape archaeology literature until recently. As Knapp and Ashmore (1999:2)
stress, “taking a holistic landscape perspective compels us to stress the interrelationships among
people and such traces, places, and features, in space and through time.”

Interaction Theories
Many interaction theories are limited in their unidirectional nature, due to the assumption
that dominant cultures actively dictate to passive recipient cultures (Fitzpatrick 2008, Schortman
1989, Wobst 1974). In an attempt to move away from frameworks that view the recipient culture
as passive,interregional interaction models were developed (Stein 2002). These were prominent
methods of explaining culture change (Steadman 1995, Stein 2002). This has led to a move away
from creating typologies of interactions to developing a framework to look at the variables and
the “processes that explain why the organization and effects of culture contact can be expected to
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vary under different structural conditions and historical contingencies” (Stein 2002). This
framework was developed to break away from unidirectional models and capture the more
complex nature of group interactions (Wells 1980). Wolf’s (1982) study of Europe’s interactions,
for instance, which looked at multivariate levels of interaction, may have helped shape current
thinking on interregional interaction (Steadman 1995).
These models do not completely abandon previous studies, but incorporate earlier
frameworks as components of a new multivariate framework. For example, Schortman and
Urban’s framework draws on acculturation studies, ethnicity studies, and system analysis to
discuss interregional interaction in the Maya periphery (Schortman and Urban 1987, Schortman,
et al. 1986). This new perspective allows for more variables to be considered in order to
understand “why the organization and effects of culture contact can be expected to vary under
different structural conditions and historical contingencies” (Stein 2002 p. 906).
Stein lays out seven important features that form the basis for understanding interaction
networks:
(1) a concern with both processual (e.g., replicable methodologies) and
postprocessual (e.g., agency, practice, historical contingency) approaches; (2) a
rejection of unilinear models; (3) a focus on multiscalar examination (i.e., “topdown” perspectives of the network and “bottom-up” perspectives of households
and social groups); (4) a recognition of patterned variability in power relations
that is affected by distance, level of technology, and degree of social complexity,
among other factors; (5) the recognition that interacting complex societies are
heterogeneous with different groups whose primary goals and interest are often in
conflict; (6) the ability of internal dynamics (e.g., economic, political processes)
to shape the network’s organization; and (7) the principle that “human agency is
as important as macroscale political economy in the organization of interregional
interaction networks” In other words, this perspective does not treat less
developed peripheral polities as “passive recipients of unidirectional influences
from the core” (Stein 2002:907).
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The important distinction between interregional interaction theory and previous models is
this multivariate approach to understanding past behaviors. This interregional interaction model
acknowledges that no single perspective can provide a complete picture, but by incorporating
several perspectives and scales, a better understanding can be attained. Also key is the model’s
use of network analysis and the realization that these processes often happen in conflict or
opposition to outside groups. However, what this list of features does not address are the
physical effects of contact. All of the variables listed above are crucial for understanding how
cultures change, yet there are no variables that address the role of the landscape, such as the
resources available that can direct contact or how those resources are accessed. Schortman and
Urban (1987) acknowledge this when they write that culture change is known to occur when
resources are localized. But what happens when resources are restricted by other populations?
This is one of my points of interests. How a landscape is fortified will affect who controls
various resources, which in turn will affect (based on the points discussed above) how cultures or
groups interact and change. The U.S. military certainly tried to restrict the Seminoles’ access to
resources, ranging from gunpowder, liquor, and food to cattle and trading along the coast, and
even tried to prevent them from raising crops.
An underlying theme in an interregional framework has to do with how interactions are
defined and who/what is engaging in these interactions. Ths study of how cultures interact is now
termed “intercultural interaction.” Due to the difficulty in defining “culture” based on the
archaeological record, however, other frameworks view interaction from a society level
(intersocietal interaction or interregional interaction), because “society” is easier to define.
Schortman and Urban define society as “a group of people who interact on a daily basis with
each other and who share certain basic understandings that permit those interactions” (1987:40).
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Regardless of the scale of the study (subculture, culture, society, ethnicity, etc.), groups are
spatially bounded and, because of this, interaction models can be developed. As discussed above,
because identity is formed in opposition by creating an us/them dichotomy, this lends itself
nicely to a discussion of war, because war is a clear form of this dichotomy and opposition.
Another consideration that needs to be accounted for is that groups are made up of
individuals, and individuals sometimes do not act in concert with the larger group (Parkinson
2006). Also compounding the complexity of untangling these interactions is that individuals
have their own status, but this status changes depending on the situation. This creates a nested set
of identities, each displayed through specific means and in specific situations. Because of the
situational-specific nature of identity and status, patterns of behaviors and contact can be
hypothesized (Stone 2003). All of these factors depend on interaction to determine how identity,
boundaries, and behaviors are expressed.
The environment and access to resources can also have a significant role in mediating
interaction. “In fact, the physical territory over which ethnic statuses are employed depends on
the range of resources considered important by people in different societies and the extent to
which the need for these resources brings [sic] individuals together into repeated contact
requiring predictable interactions” (Schortman and Urban 1987:64). It is the role of the
environment that I am interested in. Contact is often seen as being shaped by the environment
and resources; however, the aim of this study is to demonstrate that the way in which the
landscape is modified and built arises from contact. This built landscape then applies new stimuli
and can further mediate how contact occurs.
This cyclical nature of environment and culture change is important because, as Wells
(1980) points out, culture is a system, and a change in one area leads to a change in other areas.
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His study focuses on the exchange of goods and the resulting consequences, which demonstrates
the importance of the social context of exchange and the social implications of exchange,
because “the circulation of goods can be viewed as a form and expression of social interactions”
(Wells 1980:144). This idea of trade goods as a proxy for interaction can be modified to
investigate the process of fortification as a proxy (as well as a mediator) of interaction by looking
at why and how places were fortified and what effect that may have had on intergroup
interactions. Archaeology can provide physical remains that shed light on what kinds of trade
and interactions between groups may have taken place.

How Interregional Interaction Has Been Investigated
Below is a brief discussion of some of the ways interregional interaction models have
been applied to archaeological questions. Each study focuses on specific components of
interaction to answer specific questions. However, some generalizations can be made about the
methodology of interaction studies. As Schortman and Urban (1987) point out, interaction
studies can focus either on content—that is, what items are passing between cultures—or the
process of culture change. I will provide a few examples of studies that focus either on exchange
of content or the process of change in interregional interaction studies. This is a short overview
and is by no means exhaustive.

Exchange of Content
Most interregional interaction studies focus on material culture as a proxy for contact or
interactions (Kelly 1997, Wells 1980). Pottery is one popular indicator for interaction, because of
its prominence in the archaeological record and its stylistic variability (Clayton 2005, Odess
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1998, Shady and Ruiz 1979, Stoltman 1991). Hegmon et al. (1997) investigate the “organization
of production” to show that distribution of items can illuminate what types of interactions were
taking place (regional or interregional). If production of a specific artifact type was made in
several locations, this may be due to shared knowledge as well as exchange, as opposed to
concentrated production and knowledge (Hegmon, et al. 1997). By incorporating the distribution
of other artifacts that occur alongside the pottery in question, information can be obtained about
whether it was the pottery or the people that moved (Hudson 2006). For example, are other
cultural traits appearing in the new locations along with the pots? Or is it just the pots?
Stark’s (1998) study of technological boundaries is similar to Hegmon et al.’s discussion
of distribution. Boundaries are delineated through the technological choices and processes
required to manufacture an item. Technological boundary theory uses the extent or distribution
of technology as a proxy for a social group, which serves as an alternative to the information
exchange model. As discussed previously, understanding the nature and extent of a boundary is
necessary to determine whether an item is found beyond its boundary, which can then provide
information about contact, exchange, and behavior. In the Seminoles’ case, many goods were
being traded. Seminoles became adept at negotiating for supplies, food, and ammunition by
making promises to emigrate they seemingly never planned on keeping. At the same time, the
military often hired Seminoles to procure fresh meat to provision the troops, which demonstrates
the flow of items in both directions between these two groups that were at war with each other.
Similar to the study of the distribution of material culture in interregional interaction are
studies that focus on trade. Trade models are used to explain how materials are passed between
groups. This approach broadens the focus of earlier trade studies: Rather than only looking at
what and where items are traded, trade is seen as an agent of change. However, also similar to
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what occurs when studying artifact distributions, defining boundaries can be complicated by the
fact that an exchange of items usually occurs beyond face-to-face interaction (Welsch and Terrell
1998). That is, artifacts can be traded multiple times, and the group that created them and the
group that ultimately receives them may never come into actual contact. Welsch and Terrell
(1998:51) question “what kinds of social phenomena are being mapped by particular
distributions of material culture and what social groupings are being created, maintained, or
delineated by exchanges involving material culture.” The goal of interregional interaction models
is to tease apart what these distributions tell us about social and behavioral processes.

The Process of Change
Another prominent area of interaction studies emphasizes the role of economic factors for
interaction, with trade and exchange being the primary agents of cultural change (Hirth 1978,
Reeve 1993). This approach to interregional interaction can focus on a small subset of artifacts
deemed to be prestigious items, which serve as a proxy for elite interactions (Green and Rodell
1994, Hayden and Schulting 1997). Obsidian trade networks are an ideal example of this (Bressy
et al. 2005). Another approach to the economic aspects is exemplified in Reeve’s (1993) study,
which demonstrates that trade was necessary to sustain large population centers, because the
local environments were not rich enough to support a significant number of people. In addition to
economic factors, interaction studies also look for political motivations for contact: Having the
means to obtain scarce, prestigious resources can be used to consolidate power. Besides
resources, Green and Rodell (Green and Rodell 1994) discuss how the built environment can
also be used to display power, and Kanter’s (2008) discussion of political competition illustrates
how politics shaped culture change within the Chocoan Anasazi.
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Behavior is the central factor in interaction studies; the goal of an interaction model is to
identify methods to investigate the processes of social changes. It is assumed that as groups
interact, knowledge and ideas will be transmitted along with material items. Stark (1998 p. 209)
states, “in this framework, generally called the information exchange model, material culture is
seen as a mechanism for the conscious conveyance of information, although the information
content may vary depending on the viewer.” Interaction studies can elucidate how social
structures operate. “Weber defines social interaction as behavior which ‘takes another’s action
into account and is thereby oriented in its course’” (McDermott and Roth 1978:341).
While this overview of interregional interaction provides a paradigm on which further
analysis of conflict landscapes and hostile interactions can be layered, it is only one of several
potential models that may be useful. It could be argued, for instance, that a world-systems
approach or the use of practice theory can also be employed to understand change, each with its
own strengths and weaknesses. New discussions about reassessing territoriality may also provide
fruitful insights into the Florida situation. VanValkenburgh and Osborne (2013:2) state that they
“regard territoriality, the dynamic configuration of boundaries within a landscape, as a product of
the engagement of political institutions, physical environments, and human subjectivities.”
World-systems theory, which, arguably, also offers insight into my research, implies an amount
of distance between areas deemed “core” and those deemed “periphery” (Hall et al. 2011). While
there are many different ways to investigate the social, political, and environmental landscape of
Florida, it is beyond the scope of this research to discuss them all. I chose interregional
interaction based on its network approach to the problem; change was not seen as being
instigated from the top down or bottom up, but rather as a complex web of interactions. Yet even
this paradigm needs modification when investigating conflict. Even interregional interaction
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seems misleading, because in Florida’s case it can be argued that there was only a single region:
the territory of Florida. Even so, within Florida these two competing groups inhabited different
micro-landscapes or regional niches and had different relationships with the landscape (for one
group the dense hammocks of Florida was a safe haven; for the other it was inhospitable and
deadly).
An interaction model is ideal for investigating the processes and outcomes of fortifying a
landscape. An approach that considers multiple variables as well as multiple scales and
perspectives is crucial, because a unidirectional model will fail to capture the complexities of the
relationships between the U.S. military, the Seminoles, and the landscape. The act of physically
dividing the landscape with built features (forts and roads, in this case) will directly impact how
cultures on that landscape interact and how they gain access to resources. These built features
will ultimately cause changes within the local cultures. How the landscape will be divided,
however, is contingent on how the cultures that share it are interacting. In this study, I propose to
incorporate the landscape into a feedback model of change.

How Culture Contact Analyses Can Benefit Fortified Landscape Studies
Interregional interaction models are powerful analytical methods that offer the tools and
framework necessary to understand past social networks and the process of culture change. I will
broaden this framework to study interaction and culture change during war. Scott states that
military sites and those that inhabit it “offer a unique perspective on the behavioral aspect of a
culture, or cultures, in conflict” (Scott 2009:299). Interaction studies tend to overlook war and
overt hostile interaction in favor of amicable or only covertly hostile interactions, such as trade
and political maneuvering. Below, I have outlined ways that interregional interaction models can
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be used to explain how fortified landscapes can affect interactions, and conversely, how
interactions can affect the fortified landscape. While Stein’s seven points of interregional
interaction acknowledge the need to view change from the top down as well as from the bottom
up, this concept has not been applied to the landscape (Stein 2002). I propose that the landscape
must be considered when studying an interaction, while simultaneously showing how, in turn,
the interaction shaped how the landscape was modified. But first, to study conflict landscapes
from an interaction perspective, some definitions are necessary to clarify what a landscape of
conflict is and how it poses a unique set of problems.

Fortified Landscapes
A fortified landscape is loosely defined in the literature as any place that contains some
form of defense. To understand this concept, it is easier to first understand each part: fortified
and landscape. Landscape is defined in this study as “spaces in which a group of humans actively
interact with a natural environment” (Rockman and Steele 2003). Landscapes in the broadest
sense encompass social landscapes, built landscapes, and natural/ecological landscapes, as well
as the meanings applied to a landscape (Ashmore 2002, Rockman and Steele 2003). Historical
military dictionaries and encyclopedias of the time offer insight into how military terms, such as
fortification, were defined.
An 1810 publication entitled Military Dictionary, or Explanation of the Several Systems
of Discipline of Different Kinds of Troops, Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry; The Principles of
Fortification, and All the Modern Improvements in the Science of Tactics (Duane 1810) has a 27page entry defining “fortification.” It distinguishes between “fort” and “fortification” with a fort
being “in the military art, a small fortified place, environed on all sides with a ditch, rampart, and
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parapet.” The entry for fortification describes these structures as larger and more permanent for
the most part, but also has a subentry on field fortifications. Accordingly, forts and fortifications
have a specific set of parts with a unique terminology for each, such as bastions, ramparts,
parapets, glacis, and fascines, to name a few. There are numerous combinations of designs in
which these parts are assembled to create a fort. The in-depth discussion in the military literature
on forts and fortifications demonstrates how important landscape features were to military
operations.
I will use the term “fortified landscape” to mean the landscape that was engineered by the
military and considered defensible. The terrain was specifically chosen, altered, and constructed
to meet the military’s ideological perspective of landscape. However, this is further complicated
by the fact that a landscape is rarely a pristine, natural environment; much more likely, it has
undergone many generations of revisions by numerous cultures and peoples. For example, in
Florida, the Spanish had a very different method for dividing the landscape; they viewed it from
a different perspective, and had used it for different purposes than the U.S. military intended to.
The military inherited this already divided landscape, which must be considered in any research
into Florida’s landscape change.

Key Features of a Fortified Landscape
Many important features dominate a fortified landscape; the most obvious are the forts
and the presence of an army. The most important criterion for site selection in the 19th-century
was the availability of potable water. However, lesser features are also strategically critical for a
Western military. For instance, roads were particularly important in the context of Florida:
Without roads, the army is not able to resupply, move easily, or feel safe in a “civilized” world.
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Roads were so important to 19th-century travel that in a KOCOA analysis, they could be
considered Key Terrain and not just Avenues of Approach. The concept of military roads was
perfected by the Romans, who built straight roads from outpost to outpost and removed any
obstacles in between. As will be discussed below, roads are both functional and symbolic and
leave tangible traces of power and ownership on the landscape.

Frontiers vs. Fortified Landscapes
There has been much discussion in the literature about the archaeology of frontiers.
However, the term “frontier” is conceptually different from the concept of a fortified landscape.
Although fortified landscapes often occur on “the frontier” and entail interethnic contact,
frontiers tend to be dynamic in nature, with boundaries that fluctuate (Forbes 1968). Frontiers
also tend to be classified as colonialist enterprises, with core-periphery interactions taking place
(Lightfoot and Martinez 1995). Yet not all frontiers are fortified, so there are subtle differences
between fortified landscapes and studies of frontiers. “Boundaries” are sometimes used
interchangeably with “frontier.” However, as McCarthy suggests, frontiers have an element of
outwardness, while boundaries are more concerned with looking in (McCarthy 2008).

How a Landscape is Modified Will Reflect the Types of Interactions Taking Place
The multivariate approach to interregional interaction is directly applicable to
understanding how cultures will interact on a fortified landscape. As Cameron (1998:186-187)
states, “Architecture structures daily use of space by breaking space into compartments within
and around which other activities take place. By defining patterns of encounter and avoidance,
architecture directly (as well as symbolically) reflects social relations” and is perhaps the best
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clue to social identity. While Cameron discusses the physical ways contact can be mediated,
Stone (2003:35) points out that physical modification of the landscape (which includes
architecture) also has a symbolic aspect, in that it can “project and reify ethnic identity through
the use of markers that distinguish an ethnic group from others in the community, a visible and
active marking of the we/they distinction.” A further discussion of the symbolic nature of a
fortified landscape will follow; however, in this context it is important to note that the symbolic
aspect helps to solidify identity and group unity. This is accomplished by creating opposition to
another group. “Ethnic groups cannot exist in the absence of this competition for power; that is,
they do not exist in isolation and only continue and are called into operation in opposition to one
or more other groups within an overarching sociopolitical organization” (Stone 2003:35).
Fortifying a landscape is clearly oppositional. However, there has been little discussion of how
forts create group identity among the fort’s inhabitants. Once an identity has been created, it will
shape how that group interacts with others. Forts can be viewed as what Stone (2003) calls
“active markers,” in that they actively mark the landscape and demonstrate group affinity and
meaning.
Hirth’s (1978) discussion of gateway communities offers insight into how this network of
forts operated during the Second Seminole War. Hirth argues that the exchange of commodities
led to the organization of complex societies. This exchange relied on long-distance trade, which
caused the creation of what he calls “gateway communities” along trade routes to control the
movement of goods (Hirth 1978). These gateways would have developed either as a direct
response to trade or through a process of settling frontier areas along previously established
routes that then gained importance for trade. These communities were usually built on the cusp
between areas of production of scarce resources and demand for them, to reduce the cost of
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transportation across long distances. This is a good analogy for understanding Florida’s forts.
The military built forts to serve as supply mediators to the outlying communities, troops on the
move, and, on occasion, the Seminoles themselves. Forts were strategically placed supply depots
so that supplies could be sent to the areas that needed them.

Knowledge Can Be Passed Between Groups Despite Hostile Interactions
Information is an economic and political resource that can be bought and sold. Precourt
(1980) discusses information in the same terms as property, in that it is controlled and used as a
resource; he refers to this type of information as being “property-like.” When this view of
knowledge and information is combined with Schortman and Urban’s (1987) discussion of
information exchange, it is directly applicable to this discussion of fortified landscapes. “We
assume that what passes among societies along ethnic networks is information, that is, energy,
materials, social institutions, and ideas” (Schortman and Urban 1987:69). Since information is
seen as a commodity, we can hypothesize that it will be exchanged despite active warfare,
because it is a resource that can be used for negotiation and bargaining.
Fortified landscapes often occur where there is active conflict; yet despite hostile
interactions, information can still spread. When discussing fortified landscapes, it is important to
consider what kinds of information can be traded, either overtly or covertly, between groups—
even if they are in conflict. Information is spread overtly through direct contact, such as during
peace negotiations, and covertly by, for instance, observing the enemy’s tactics and learning
from them. Environmental knowledge is often passed between groups; however, it does not
follow the typical core-periphery model (Lightfoot and Martinez 1995): The indigenous
population has the experience of and knowledge about the local environment, and the colonizers
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are at a disadvantage. There are numerous examples of colonizing forces learning from
indigenous peoples after a period of acculturation and then using indigenous environmental
knowledge and guerilla tactics (Hirsch 1988, Richter 1983). In one example, during the Pequot
War, the military traveled a great distance around where they perceived the Pequot tribe to be
residing so that they could attack from behind, thus employing an indigenous guerilla tactic
(Hirsch 1988). Major Robert Rogers may be the most notable in this regard; he issued 28 rules
for his Rangers in 1757 (Rogers 1757). Rogers was one of the most famous early guerilla
fighters, and his rules are still in use today; avoiding detection, moving stealthily, and
maintaining sentries to avoid ambush are recurring themes.
Interregional interaction models investigate what causes social change. Schortman and
Urban (1987), therefore, state that not all information can cause social change. However,
information that does produce change within a society has developmental significance. This
change occurs through a positive feedback system, because of the interconnected nature of
society; as stated previously, a change in one area will result in changes throughout a culture.
During conflict, information is expected to be a significant propagator of change, because it is
highly valuable and commodified. Both the military and the Seminoles would have tried to be
secretive about their information, yet at the same time, both required information about each
other to make decisions. The role of information in culture change has not been extensively
discussed in the literature, and will be further investigated in this study.

The Perception of Future Interactions Will Shape How a Landscape is Modified
Interaction studies may also shed light on how individuals who are fortifying a landscape
perceive future interactions: An expectation of future hostilities may encourage continual
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fortification of the landscape, whereas an expectation of peace may discourage such costly
investments. On the other hand, continuing to fortify a landscape even during peace can offer
insights into processes such as peace maintenance or serve as a reminder of ownership (Delle
1999). Dobbert states (1975:22) that “culture is built up out of the transactions between the
members of a society and between members and their environments over time; . . . transactions,
both with persons and with an environment, imply an exchange of information; and . . .
transaction and information exchange imply the buildup and maintenance of a system.” Similar
to Schortman and Urban’s (1987) discussion of feedback loops, when information is obtained it
is used to make changes, and those changes, in turn, affect the group. Choices are made by
assessing the costs and benefits of an action, based on past experiences and education (Hitchcok
and Bartram 1998). Therefore, each decision is determined situationally through the perception
of the situation and the knowledge at hand (Hitchcock and Bartram 1998). Kenzle (1997) also
points out that defensive structures describe the state of social relations and can therefore be
useful in investigating social change.

Physical Features Can Change the Way Cultures Access Resources
Studies of fortified landscapes also benefit from inclusion of a culture contact approach.
How a landscape is divided and shaped can influence how those cultures will interact, and can
cause changes in those cultures. The modification of the landscape also becomes a powerful
symbol or message to those groups in contact. The process of fortifying a landscape involves a
system of putting up barriers, both physical and social, and those features portray ideas of
differential access. Kenzle (1997) shows that these sociophysical boundaries have social
implications, because they distinguish insiders and outsiders by serving as physical markers of
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inside and outside. Kenzel’s study of fortifications in the American Southwest shows that walls
serve as “the facilitation of interpersonal regulation by 1) demarcating zones of territorial
control; 2) promoting desired social contact, and conversely by limiting undesired contact; 3)
regulating the flow of people through the environment; and 4) helping to maintain privacy”
(Kenzle 1997:199). This clearly demonstrates that walls serve to control access to space and
resources by limiting access. Fortifications in Florida functioned in a similar manner.
Fitzpatrick’s study of interregional interaction among Micronesian islands may provide a
similar analogy to the fortifications in Florida. Contact in Mirconesia involved long-distance,
open-sea voyages between islands for the purpose of accessing resources—in this case,
quarrying “money” disks. Even though fortifications were no longer present, the bounded nature
of the islands provided a situation similar to fortification. The purpose of these dangerous
voyages was to obtain valuable, scarce resources as a means of gaining and controlling power
(Fitzpatrick 2008). The villages that were on the islands with the rock quarries would have
received payment in the form of labor for the right to quarry. Because these islands were
physically separated, it created a unique form of interaction and contact. Fortifications in Florida
could be argued to serve a similar function. Forts were physically separated, and were designed
to control strategic resources (supplies, bridges, river crossings, etc.), and consolidate power (by
physically dominating the landscape); this would have significantly impacted how these cultures
interacted (one group controlled the resources and the other had to find a way to “pay” if they
wanted access to them). Even though in Florida this occurred on the same landscape—as
opposed to among isolated islands—many of the same social processes may have been in place.
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Fortified Landscapes Can Modify Culture and Identity
Cameron states that “architecture not only reflects social organization and values, it also
can play a key role in shaping social values” (1998:186). Her analysis of Puebloan architecture
demonstrates that the shape and style of the large, public great houses may have directly
influenced today’s multistoried, close-knit Puebloan communities when the great houses began
to be used domestically (Cameron 1998). Van Dyke also states that “architecture shapes and is
shaped by human activities and perceptions” (1999:471). This clearly demonstrates how
architecture is created and that how it is used can significantly impact the cultures using it. In this
analysis, I argue that the process of fortification (i.e., how the forts were built and where) had a
significant impact on the way these cultures interacted.
Schortman and Urban (Schortman and Urban 1987) show that the immediate natural
environment a group occupies will be a significant factor in how that group changes and
develops. Other groups in the area can become the impetus for change, but because both groups
will be subjected to similar contact situations and the same environment, this will cause them to
co-evolve (Schortman and Urban 1987). As Kohl (1987) shows, cultural evolution is “dependent
upon its relations with other societies; . . . cultures are open, not closed systems.” This tripartite
relationship between the two groups in contact and their relationship with the physical
environment that they both inhabit can be useful for investigating the processes of social change
during the Seminole Wars.
The process of interaction can shape and change both the cultures and the fortified
landscape, which will add unique pressures for culture change. The example of the Seminole
War clearly shows how conflict can shape cultural identity. The Seminoles were an
amalgamation of several northern tribes that only coalesced as a cultural unit during the war,
99

becoming a more unified front against attack. Prior to contact, the cultural entity known today as
the Seminoles did not exist. There are many other examples, such as Major Rogers and his
Rangers, of how the military shaped its strategy during the Indian Wars to adopt “Indian” tactics
(Hirsch 1988). Arguments have been made that even though the military usually only adopted
guerilla tactics begrudgingly, these tactics profoundly shaped the culture of the military, and this
legacy can be seen even in today’s modern wars (Knetsch 2003). Fortified landscapes create a
dichotomous landscape, and this, in turn, can lead to a dichotomous relationship between
cultures (us vs. them). This unequal power relationship causes a constant negotiation of identity:
Some behaviors will need to be modified to survive, yet at the same time maintain identity.

A Fortified Landscape is a Symbolic Landscape
Understanding the symbolic nature of a fortified landscape is an important aspects of
interregional interaction. As Kenzle states, “The latent functions of architecture involve the
transmission of meaning or the communication of ideas about space, structure, appropriate
behavior, social responsibility, power or status, and cosmological belief” (1997:197). The built
environment can communicate many levels of meaning, and each set of meanings comes with a
set of appropriate behaviors (Rapoport 1982). Rapoport (1982) discusses the levels of meanings,
which range from low-level to mid-level to high-level depending on the complexity of
information being transmitted. Van Dyke (1999) differentiates between the communicative
potential of internal and external architecture based on who is the viewer. Kenzle writes, “The
delineation of territory is a defensive mechanism and communicates both ownership and
personalization of space” (Kenzle 1997:199). Architecture can serve as clear markers for
inhabitants about their place and behavior and as markers for outsiders. In the Pueblo example,
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gates and plazas allowed the group to see who entered, which caused “selective admission and
exclusion,” and the walls strengthened group cohesion (Cameron 1998). This is echoed in
Florida, with forts limiting access by having main gates through which all personnel had to enter.
Landscape (as well as the features on that landscape) can serve as a social diacritic by
displaying symbols of identity, inclusiveness, and separateness from “others” (Schortman and
Urban 1987). Because social meanings are reproduced on the landscape, they should be
identifiable in the archeological record through recognizing boundaries for these markers. For
these meanings to be conveyed, they need to be publicly visible (Schortman and Urban 1987).
The diacritical role of architecture is currently under discussion in the literature. Cameron (1998)
states that “buildings are stationary . . . so they have less chance to be viewed by individuals
outside the community. As a result, they might be less likely (than, for example, traded items or
clothing) to be used in active cultural signaling of group membership; people within the
community already know the messages they might send.”
Schortman and Urban’s (1998) discussion of proxemics, which refers to the behaviors
and beliefs concerning the proper use of space and includes patterns of knowledge that focus on
the environment and survival, questions the role proxemics play in creating social change. They
state that “no evidence exists that changes in the perception of space have significant
implications for changes in other spheres” (Schortman and Urban 1987:69). As applied to the
Florida campaign, I disagree; I believe that ideas governing the use of space were highly
significant in shaping intersocietal interactions during the Second Seminole War. Rapoport
(1982) contends that “people react to environments in terms of the meanings the environments
have for them.” By creating a fortified landscape, ideas about power, behavior, and identity are
also created—and because they occur on hostile landscape, the meanings they portray will
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significantly shape how others react and interact with them. “Bordieu argues [that] . . . cultural
resources, processes, and institutions hold individuals and groups in competitive and selfperpetuating hierarchies of domination” (Swartz 1997:6)—and a fortified landscape clearly
portrays a hierarchy of domination. By incorporating Stone’s (2003) idea of “ethnic signaling” or
Wobst’s idea of “active signaling” into an analysis of interregional interaction, a more complete
investigation of the role of fortification in culture change can be conducted (Cameron 1998).
Forts clearly serve as a form of nonverbal communication, and because changes in cultures have
a cascading effect due to feedback loops, I hypothesize that the diacritical nature of forts would
certainly have had an effect on all groups involved.

Conclusion
Discussions of fortified landscapes and culture contact/interregional interaction studies
are occurring more frequently in the archaeological literature. However, these discussions rarely
intersect. I argue that much can be gained by combining these perspectives, especially in frontier
areas or areas of conflict. The stereotype of “taming the frontier” usually involves a significant
investment to create a “civilized” landscape that contains the same types of features as other
established population centers. These can include towns, roads, private residences, and services.
Because this is taking place on “the frontier,” however—which is seen as hostile and
dangerous—major investments in protection are often perceived as necessary. These investments
in protection take the form of fortifications and other military features such as camps, roads,
supply depots, etc. The militarization of a landscape will significantly impact the culture of any
individuals living there (both settler and native); however, it can also shape how these polarized
cultures interact with each other. Often, both inhabit the same landscape; even so, those features
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of the built landscape will have extremely different meanings for each. To the settler, a fortified
landscape can mean safety; for the military, it can mean a strategic resource; and to indigenous
people, it can be a symbolic representation of domination and hostility. Some of the first
settlements in America, such as St. Augustine and Jamestown, were city-forts. The landscape
was fortified because of fear of the native population. This extra layer of complexity needs to be
considered in any study in which the landscape plays a significant role in mediating contact
between groups. While it is assumed that cultures will interact differently during war than during
peaceful coexistence, by specifically investigating how these cultures interact and how
information, knowledge, and material goods pass between them, a richer discussion of the kinds
of relationship they had can be gained. Landscapes are not only the background for, but also
provide the context and meaning of, interactions.
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CHAPTER 6:
ROADS AS PALIMPSESTS OF POWER AND CONTROL
For politicians and civil servants, the growth of empire building and nationalism,
proceeding hand in hand with the rise of map-making agencies and colonial
administration, was an increasingly important focus of frontier attention in the
19th and 20th centuries (McCarthy 2008:202).

Introduction
As discussed above, the landscape has significant potential as a physical representation of
dominance and control. By physically altering the landscape to demonstrate ownership, complex
layers of meaning get assigned to a single space. As Lyons states in her research on rural
architecture, a pattern of building was used “to generate hierarchical power and produce
meaningful material contexts through which they claimed land, jural rights, and engaged in
alliance building” (Lyons 2007:180). While this statement concerned her research in rural
Ethiopia, it also applies to the way the U.S. military approached Florida, building forts and roads
based on a perceived aesthetic that had been learned through training at West Point and was
meant to assert power. One way the military attempted to “conquer” Florida’s wilderness was
through an intense building campaign of fortifications. While fortifications in general receive
significant scholarly attention, a second feature that is just as important, if not more so, often gets
overlooked: roads. Roads are necessary for moving large columns of troops and baggage trains.
They allow for forts to act in concert as a network rather than lone outposts. They also are very
visible on the landscape and are symbolic of a very Western idea of transportation and
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modernization. Roads are often taken for granted in archaeological settings, but are vital when
discussing western ideas of transportation. Transportation was something settlers in Florida
struggled with. Due to the nature of the terrain, moving wagons of supplies between locations
was a serious undertaking, even with the crude roads that were available. In order to discuss
Florida’s fortification network as a web of connected points, it is crucial to understand how those
points were connected. Below is an overview of what roads are and why they are a vital piece of
the fortified landscape puzzle.

Symbols of Power: Roads
Roads are a vital component of social networks and yet are often overlooked in
archaeological investigations. Not only are roads important for travel, transportation, and
communication, but they are also crucial in nation-building enterprises and the construction of a
“modern” landscape (Laurence 1999). Roads and trails have been recognized for their
importance in spreading culture (e.g., the Romans built roads and bridges wherever they went),
but have only received a minimal of scholarly research (Chevallier 1976). Discussions of roads
usually center on how they were built (Laurence 1999), how they were used (Nelson 1955), or
how they evolved (Burghardt 1969). But all of these assume that roads are a single static entity,
when in reality roads contain multiple features: destinations (nodes), environments, purposes,
and meanings that make up a complex physical and social network. My aim here is to investigate
how roads contain a network (the differentiated parts that make up a road), what their role is in
social relationships, and how roads could be used for different purposes such as conquest.
Military roads and roads of conquest have received even less attention in the literature, and
distinguishing between a road the military simply uses and a road the military built for military
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purposes can be difficult. I argue that to fully appreciate the role of roads in society, we must
consider not only the purpose for which the road was built, but also the other components and
features that comprise the entire road network.

Understanding Roads
The term “road” is apparently such a commonplace word that no scholarly discussion of
roads defines the term. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a road is defined as “an
open way, generally public, for the passage of vehicles, persons, and animals . . . a course or
path.” It is difficult to determine the difference between a trail and a road based on this
definition. This distinction is important, because each will tell different stories about the people
who built them or used them. For this discussion I will define a road as a purposefully built (or
cleared) tract that connects different features on the landscape, while a trail is created through
use over periods of time. Burghardt (1969) describes some misconceptions about roads. For
example, there is a false assumption that roads evolved from preexisting animal trails, which
became footpaths and then roads. This may be the case in some instances, but it clearly does not
explain the origin of the majority of roads. He also notes that there is a romantic view of roads
heading “to unknown, far-off lands” (Burghardt 1969). This, too, is not the case, and his study of
roads in the Niagara Peninsula of Ontario demonstrates that roads always have a destination.
And lastly, roads are popularly believed to follow the topography. This is true in many instances:
Rivers are forded at shallow, narrow places, and steep inclines may be avoided. However, as
technology advances, topology is not as limiting as it once was; even so, it still has an effect on
road placement (Burghardt 1969). There are many misconceptions about roads. They are often
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overlooked in discussions of historical landscapes, social networks, nation building, and war yet
it is crucial to understand how roads can benefit any of these analyses just mentioned.

Importance of Roads
Road networks are critical for communication, travel, safety, conquest, and habitation.
They were the main arteries for the movement of people and goods around the landscape. An
examination of road networks can provide valuable information about the people who built them,
the roads’ intended purposes, and how they were used. I use the term “network” here because
roads are not a single, uniform entity; they are made up of complex sets of interconnected
features. For example, the types of terrain the road is crossing will influence how it is
constructed. Road features are specific to the environment the road crosses. For example, bridges
will only be found over water or deep ravines. This fragments a single road into multiple road
sections with different typologies and cannot be considered as one single, uniform feature.
Although this may be seen as standardization across cultures, not all cultures will react to similar
environments the same way. For example, the Seminoles would leave canoes on the river banks
to cross, the U.S. military would build bridges (Mahon 1985), and others may have built a road
that detours around the water or ravine. Because roads are complex features, looking at which
elements combined to create the network or system can offer insight about what the purpose of
the system was, how it was used, and how it fit into a way of life.
Looking at landscape as a differentiated system provides a unifying method of analysis
for interpreting the multitude of histories that take place on the landscape. Each region has had
many different cultures, political systems, and ways of living that have existed in that region
over the centuries; by having a standard landscape-level method of analysis, we can begin to
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understand how these different systems operated, how they changed the landscape, and how they
themselves changed over time. Every culture had to meet transportation needs. How they chose
to meet them will be informative. More insight can be gained into how these cultures operated
and what their interests were by determining whether they built a footpath or a formal road and
how they dealt with a difficult terrain.
The U.S. military built permanent roads that were wide enough for wagons to travel and
contained bridges, but what was considered permanent in the frontier of North America was very
different from the Romans’ view of permanent: The U.S. military’s focus was on ease of
movement and exerting control over a difficult landscape, rather than creating formal paved
roads that were aesthetically pleasing to travelers. This demonstrates that issues of display,
power, prestige, and dominance all surface when each component of the network is analyzed and
its place in the network examined.

Physical Function of Roads
Roads serve multiple functions that are both physical and social. The same road can be
used by different people for different purposes, which can complicate defining what kind of road
it is. For instance, a military force may build a road and view it as a strategic defense. Because it
runs between two towns, however, the populace will use that road for travel and trade, whereas
government officials may see it as a way to send messages and build alliances. This causes the
same road to contain multiple identities and meanings. So while roads facilitate similar physical
functions (travel), the social uses and meanings can be very different.
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Travel and Transport
The main purpose of building a road, trail, footpath, etc. is for travel. Regardless of
whether it is for traveling to a religious location or to hunting grounds, people need to navigate
their landscape. The need to move through the environment can be met in two ways, either by
purposefully creating roads or having trails form through habitual use. Additionally, what kind of
travel is taking place will shape how the road is constructed; for instance, size will depend on the
road’s intended use. If people are moving through the landscape unencumbered, then the width
of the road does not need to be great, whereas if wagons are being used for transport, then the
road must be wide enough to accommodate them and free of obstacles (Bogart 2004). The need
to transportation goods and supplies is another major reason roads are built. How a culture meets
its transportation needs will determine the features of the road. Foot traffic, mule or camel teams,
and wagons will each have their own requirements for road construction.
Another interesting feature is that how a road is built may inhibit others from using it. An
example would be a road built for walking, which would render it too narrow for wagons. If
transport needs to be fast, roads may be paved and bridges built. The Inka had a different use for
roads. Vast road networks were needed to collect tribute, which was essential for maintaining
power over a large area. These networks were heavily focused on economic and administrative
functions, and their main feature was storage points along each route for supplies and surplus
(Jenkins 2001). Therefore, their roads were often winding trails through the mountains, because
their need to connect outlying settlements was more important than fast travel (Jenkins 2001).
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Alteration of the Physical Landscape
Because roads are intentionally built, they require a modification of the landscape that
they cross—trees and vegetation will be cleared, steep grades may have to be flattened, unstable
ground will need to be reinforced, and low areas may have to be raised. Construction of the road
itself causes these primary alterations of the landscape during the physical construction.
However, roads also create secondary and even tertiary modifications to the landscape. A
secondary modification would include features along the road such as tolls, depots, and water
sources, which are there to service the road. Tertiary modifications would be the addition of
nodes and destinations along the way such as towns, crossroads, and features to assist travelers.
These are not directly part of the road, but now have a vital connection to it.

Social Function of Roads
As mentioned earlier, roads also fill many social functions, and the same road can serve
multiple social functions simultaneously. Social functions vary by individual as they view the
road and travel it, and this can shape how they interact with the road—for example, which
features along the road they access (e.g., military supply depots or inns), which features they do
not have access to (e.g., a fort), and what their final destination is can all shape their experiences.
Below are a few of the major functions roads served; each will be discussed briefly.

Communication
Aside from moving people and things, roads were essential for efficient communication
(Adams and Laurence 2001). News and information could only spread as fast as people could
travel, and therefore roads were a significant tool in creating social networks (Chevallier 1976).
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Communication along roads can occur formally or informally. Formal communications include
intentionally passed messages, such as government documents, military orders, or letters to
family members. Informal communication is the information that spreads as people travel and
bring news to new places. Also, roads were often built specifically to serve the post office and
the delivery of mail (Nelson 1955).

Power
Roads can also serve to demonstrate power and prestige, through ownership and control,
having the resources to build a road, or having the authority to collect taxes. Rome is a clear
example of how roads were used to demonstrate power in newly conquered areas (Laurence
1999). Building or repairing roads was a major mechanism for Roman emperors to assert power
and to demonstrate their prestige to those traveling the road, because roads would be named after
builders or repairers, and monuments and arches would have lined the roads declaring who
maintained them (Laurence 1999).

Symbolism
Very similar to power, roads also serve as symbolic entities. They are symbolic of
ownership or control of an area, but they can also symbolically represent alliances by connecting
two distant towns (Chevallier 1976). Roads can also be seen as symbolic of the strength of an
empire. The longer and more numerous roads are, the more they demonstrate the power and
resources of the ruling elite, such as was the case with the Inka (Jenkins 2001). Roads can also be
symbolic of boundaries, as in the case of the Fort King Road, which served as the western
boundary of the Seminole reservation.
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Road Components
Roads have many components, and their arrangement gives meaning and identity to each
road. Many of the components are necessitated by the environment. Low-lying, swampy areas
will either need to be avoided or construction methods will be required to raise the roadbed or
lay planks over the wet ground. Forts and buildings on the road will be limited to higher ground,
where there are adequate building materials and water nearby for the troops; they must also be
close enough to other areas that supplies, messages, and troops can pass between them. Despite
the obvious environmental constraints, social aspects shape what components roads will have;
these will depend on the purpose of the road. I have organized the main components of roads into
four conceptual categories and will discuss how each is important in shaping road networks.

Destination
Roads are not blazed into the wilderness, but are built to reach a specific destination
(Burghardt 1969). Destinations can include towns, forts, ports, villages, or homesteads, to name
a few. The destination, and even its size, can dictate what kind of road was built. Because I am
discussing roads as part of a system, it is important to note that many of these destinations would
not have had just one road leading to it, but that larger destinations are in fact nodes of a larger
network of transport connecting the road to ships, canals, railroads, or other roads. If the
destination is a single military outpost, for example, then the road leading there would be built to
allow the ease of movement of large numbers of people and goods. If the outpost is on a remote
frontier, it most likely will not contain items along the road to assist private travel (inns, markets,
etc.). If the road is leading to a major city center, it will be built to allow for large-scale travel
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and transport, but it may also include inns, markets, smaller villages, watering holes, etc., to
assist in the public’s travel.

Way Stations
Before mechanized transportation, traveling was a slow process, taking weeks or months
to reach a destination. Therefore, commonly traveled roads would have developed secondary and
tertiary features, many of which were meant to assist travelers. These can include water sources
or cisterns, stables for fresh horses, supply depots, camps, or inns. These features were not the
final destination, but were important for travel; therefore, they deserve to be discussed in a
separate category. Many of these features will be unique to the route’s purpose. For example,
Syrian Hajj routes contained public water cisterns along the way to provide water for travelers in
the desert (Peterson 1994). Religious temples, monuments, and cemeteries also can occur along
heavily used public roads (Chevallier 1976).

Structural Components
Roads are not uniform, and are not necessarily linear features. They contain many
specifically engineered parts and sections to meet the needs of both terrain and traveler. Items
range from technological aspects such as the construction of the foundation of the road bed; the
width, length, and shape (straight and direct or winding); planks called “corduroy”; topology;
and soil type to bridges or crossings, as well as associated parts such as ferries or canoes that are
necessary for continuing on the road, but are not attached to it.
The Romans, who were the most famous of the early road craftsman, built complex
paved roads. Roads would have multiple structural components, and construction would be
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determined by the type of ground to be built on. If the soil was unstable, a deep roadbed would
be dug and the base built up with rubble, sand, and stone layers. The surface was sometimes
paved with mortar or clay, which would require regular repairs. In low-lying areas, drainage
ditches could be used to divert the water away from the road, or causeways were built with poles
as a base and layers of rocks placed on top to raise the road (Chevallier 1976). Roman roads tend
to follow straight, direct paths between destinations, and their builders altered the landscape to fit
their needs rather than build the road around the landscape (especially for shorter roads; this was
not always the case with longer roads) (Chevallier 1976, O'Connor 1993). Bridges were built and
hills were cut through to accomplish this. The Romans knew that the shortest distance between
two points was a straight line, and this was the fastest way to move an army from point to point.
Many Roman roads were so well constructed that they are still in use today.

Knowledge or Information
Information is important for traveling the road, but is not always necessary or available.
Items such as signs or markers to show the way, mile markers, maps, or a person’s experience
are included in this category. Roads are only useful if you know where they go and have an idea
about what to expect (e.g., will a boat be necessary? Will the wagon fit on the road?). Romans
considered itineraries and mile markers important, but scale maps were not widely used
(Brodersen 2001).
By defining the parts that are absolutely essential, a better model can be developed of
how the road operated. Also, roads tend to evolve slowly over time, with new features being
built and added independently of each other. A master plan for the entire road for its entire
history would be unlikely to exist at the outset of building it. Features were added as they
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became necessary. This piecemeal approach can provide insight about the progress and
development of not only the roads, but society as well. A chronological approach to features of
the road and along the road can elucidate the shifting behaviors of the cultures that built them.
Investigating how it was built and modified can shed light on purpose and intention, which is
sometimes a difficult process in historical and archaeological analyses.

Roads of Conquest or Military Roads
Roads of conquest were built for a specific purpose that offers a unique perspective into
the past. Roads can be investigated as unique artifacts of war that, in turn, can be used to
investigate the process of war. A road of conquest is defined here as any military road with the
aim of subduing and controlling an outside group and tends to be built on the frontier or
periphery of control. Roads of conquest and military roads are very similar in nature and
sometimes used interchangeably. In this paper I define them as follows: a road of conquest is
built with the intention of war, whereas military roads are built for military purposes but can
include peace-time purposes. Although road use (for either type of road) is not restricted solely
to the military, these roads served the function of allowing troop and supply movement across
the territory. In the U.S., roads of conquest were almost always built by the Army Corps of
Engineers and were funded by Congress for military purposes. Often, these roads connected
important military installations or strategic resources rather than towns.
The distinguishing feature that separates military and public roads, I postulate, is the
builder’s intention. Defining military roads is further complicated by the fact that often it was the
military that had the skilled engineers (again, frequently West Point–trained) and it was they who
built many public works projects such as bridges and canals in addition to roads. Therefore, these
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features may have been built by the military but were intended to be public; this is why
determining intention is important. Features designed for the public will obviously be useful to
the public and easily accessible by it, whereas roads of conquest will always be built by the
military, which will retain control of them. Another aspect of this road type is that they tend to be
on a frontier or in an area of culture conflict. Roads of conquest are built to subdue another
group; therefore, they will be built to allow the military to enter a new area in an attempt to gain
and maintain control.
These roads were immensely important to the military, because they were the only
effective means of travel and communication, and had landmarks for orientation. Moving large
columns of troops, supplies, and horses is a slow process, and without the aid of a road it can be
enormously difficult. There are countless examples from the Second Seminole War in which it
took several days for the military to get a baggage train across a river when there was no bridge
(Mahon 1985). The military also relied on roads for communication and the transmittal of orders,
which could be useless if it regularly took months for them to arrive. Finally, roads can serve as
boundary markers and points of reference, which can be important in an unsurveyed wilderness.

United States History of Roads of Conquest
The first wartime roads to be built during the Indian Wars were in Indiana. They were
constructed during the turn of the 19th-century (Nelson 1955). A lack of roads had plagued
North American military campaigns, especially throughout the conflict with Native Americans.
For example, General William Hall’s attack on Canada’s Fort Malden was a disastrous failure
because of the lack of roads through the Michigan Territory’s swamps. This defeat eventually led
to Michigan’s being lost to the British in 1812. It was not regained until 1813, and this was only
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accomplished because roads and trails were built first (Nelson 1955). Though the lack of roads
was acknowledged to be a chronic problem for the military, Congress was reluctant to authorize
the building of roads for either military or public use because the Constitution only provided for
post roads, and Congress felt that it was not within its power to make internal improvements for
the states (Nelson 1955). But by 1812 Congress had acquiesced and started providing limited
funds to construct roads. After several other defeats due to a lack of roads, President Monroe
signed the Survey Act of 1824, which called for federal surveys of routes for roads and canals
necessary for military, commercial, and postal purposes (Nelson 1955). Major General Edmond
P. Gaines said that roads and canals were “more essential to the . . . national defense than
fortifications designed for . . . our seaports” (Nelson 1955:10).

The Fort King Road as a Case Study of Military Roads of Conquest
The Fort King Road is discussed here as a case study of military roads of conquest
because it was built, maintained, and mainly used by the military during the Seminole Wars. It is
considered part of a network because it was part of a much larger network of roads, trails, and
forts that crisscrossed the Territory of Florida. It was also a major piece of the military
infrastructure, because it ran between two of the largest and longest occupied forts (Fort Brooke
and Fort King); it also connected the interior of the territory with the coast. It is considered here
to be a road of conquest, because the sole reason for the military occupation of Florida was to
relocate the indigenous population. Military resources were stretched thin, and every piece of
construction that was undertaken was only done so if it was considered necessary to the overall
strategic plan. Because of the strategic nature of the Fort King Road, it fulfills the KOCOA
categories as both Key Terrain and an avenue of approach.
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Investigating the Fort King Road as a road of conquest that contains distinct but related
parts offers an interesting way to investigate militarized landscapes. Examining how this road
operates on a larger scale and intersects and/or is integrated into other features allows us to treat
it as a dynamic and evolving system. But it can also be considered as a natural/biological system
(the environment it is located in), a physical system (how it is built), and a cultural system (by
which it serves a multitude of cultural needs). All of these concepts will need to be defined and
analyzed before undertaking a systematic analysis of the Fort King Road as a landscape feature.

Brief History of Florida’s Roads
The Spanish occupation of Florida began in the mid 1500s, and colonization in the New
World occurred through religious conversion rather than as a result of overt military campaigns.
In 1565, Jesuit missionaries established the first mission in St. Augustine. From there missions
slowly spread out along the Florida-Georgia border and into the panhandle. Missions located
farther into the interior appear to have been at the request of local chiefs, which makes this
colonization strategy unique (McEwan 1993). The missions’ primary role was religious
conversion; they also served as a support network for the maintenance of the colony. Though
there was a military presence and a number of garrisons, this was a unique instance of
colonization that did not require the military to be the driving factor. Therefore, any roads built
by the Spanish are difficult to consider as roads of military conquest. Rather, they were roads
primarily built for travel and the collection of tribute, and it was their presence that was
indicative of religious conquest: They were not built to move troops to overtake the indigenous
population, but to convert them to Christianity.
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Because the settlement of Florida was a colonizing enterprise by the Spanish, a brief
discussion of Spanish roads is in order even if they are not roads of conquest. Early records show
that the Spanish relied on preexisting Indian trails and trade routes for travel. “Unfortunately, the
early Indian trails used by the European explorers were not mapped or well documented in their
diaries because they were so commonplace. These writers tended to record only peculiarities and
anomalies” (Duever, et al. 1997). Another issue was the temporary nature of many smaller trails,
which were frequently moved when villages and hunting grounds moved. Some of the larger
trails, however, would have been more permanent, and it was probably these that the explorers
relied on. The Spanish would have needed communication and supply routes between the
missions, as well as routes to collect the tribute they required from the Indians. They too felt the
need for a better road system with more direct routes (rather than routes that followed the
topography), and several requests were made for road improvement (Duever, et al. 1997). One
road the Spanish built was along the east coast, which was known as The Royal Road or El
Camino Real. This was not a road of conquest, but rather a road of communication and
infrastructure. Reports show that it was still in use even after the mission period ended, but had
fallen into disrepair during the British occupations (Duever, et al. 1997).
There was not a great Spanish presence in South Florida or even around the Tampa Bay
area. Therefore, by the time the U.S. military moved into the Tampa Bay area and the interior of
Florida, there was probably not much Spanish infrastructure left. From the scant records
available, it does not appear that the Fort King Road was built along either an Indian trail or an
old Spanish road.
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History of The Fort King Road
On February 28, 1824, Congress approved an act to survey and create roads in Florida
(Figure 13). It is interesting to note that the first federally funded roads in Florida were
designated specifically by Congress as public roads as opposed to military roads. Further
complicating the picture is that these roads were then called “military roads” only because they
were built by the Army Corps of Engineers and the military, regardless of purpose (Duever, et al.
1997, Nelson 1955).

FIGURE 13. The Congressional Act authorizing the building of roads in Florida, approved
February 28, 1824. Reproduced from (Duever et al. 1997)

In 1825, Congress realized that it needed to connect the outposts in Florida and
appropriated $12,000 for road construction for military purposes. A road was to be built from
Fort Brooke (present-day Tampa, where the Hillsborough River meets Old Tampa Bay) to the
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north end of the territory. The full road was not constructed immediately, but a trail began to be
blazed that would run from Tampa to Ocala. Originally it was called The Military Highway, but
was also known as the Federal Road, the Old Military Road, and the Fort King Road.
Road construction would have been something covered in classes at the Military
Academy. Mahan’s 1838 treatise on civil engineering had an entire chapter of 24 pages
dedicated to the construction of roads (Mahan 1838). However, as with most subjects taught at
West Point, it was focused heavily on well-engineered paved roads that would have been found
in cities. One large section of the chapter is dedicated to mountainous terrain, which is not even
applicable to Florida. Much of the remaining chapter is dedicated to the various types of road
coverings, drainages, and the requirements of each soil type. None of these recommendations
seem to have been implemented in Florida, as will be seen in the discussion below.
The Fort King Road was a major artery for military movements during the Seminole
Wars (Morris and Hough 2009). It also served as the western boundary of a short-lived Seminole
reservation in the center of the territory. However, little systematic research has been done on
this major piece of military infrastructure. The road was roughly 100 miles long, crossed three
rivers, and eventually had four forts stationed immediately adjacent to it. Beginning at Fort
Brooke in Tampa Bay, it ran north/northeast across the Hillsborough River at Fort Armstrong
(later renamed Fort Foster). Then it crossed the two forks of the Withlacoochee River at Fort
Dade before terminating at Fort King in Ocala (Figures 14 and 15). This major supply road saw
the movement of many troops and supplies, as well as many skirmishes and battles. Its purpose
was to create a network of forts to prevent Indian uprisings. While it allowed for faster travel, it
was also a weakness, because the Seminoles knew exactly where the army had to pass and could
easily attack.
121

FIGURE 14. 1838 map of Florida showing the major roads
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FIGURE 15. 1838 map with roads and trails highlighted within the study area.
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Components of the Fort King Road
Returning to the list of components that might comprise a road, we can compare the Fort
King Road’s components to other roads of conquest. This will elucidate how the Fort King Road
functions, how it is similar to other roads of conquest, and how it is unique.
Comparing the components of the Fort King Road (Figure 16) to other roads of conquest
can be difficult. First, the context of the Second Seminole War was unique; both the environment
and the historical setting were unlike anything previously experienced by the military. Having a
history of multiple occupations and different perspectives can obscure how the road operated.
Also, the American situation was different from situations in other countries. During the
Seminole Wars and many of the other Indian Wars, the objective was to expel the indigenous
population from colonized areas. Military campaigns in other countries, in contrast, tended to
focus on the invasion of neighboring countries. Despite Florida’s unique military history, some
general comparisons can be made to other road networks for military conquest throughout
history.
The components of the Fort King Road can provide information about how the road fit
into the military’s strategic plan. Below is a brief discussion of the four components of roads:
destinations, way stations, physical structure, and knowledge. In Florida, forts were the roads’
major destinations. Florida was considered a hostile frontier, and most settlements would have
had some form of fortification. This was different from the Roman situation, because Roman
roads often connected towns that were already established for civilian purposes rather than
military outposts (O'Connor 1993).
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FIGURE 16. GIS map of the components of the Fort King Road (1838 map)
The way stations along the Fort King Road are one component of the road and would
have been very specific in nature. This was a frontier setting and was, for the most part, an
undeveloped landscape. Therefore, points along the road were mostly smaller forts acting as
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depots for storage of materials and locations for troops to camp (although the troops would camp
outside the wall of the forts). Roman roads are a well-known example that can be used as a
comparison, because many features of Roman military strategy have influenced military
campaigns throughout history. However, with Roman roads, it can also be difficult to determine
whether they were roads of conquest or just public roads the army happened to use. Some
distinctions are possible, however, because it appears that how wide a military road should be
had been standardized. As stated in the Law of the Twelve Tables, a set of 5th century Roman
laws: “Military roads must be 8ft (2.4m) wide on straight sections and 16ft on bends” (Chevallier
1976). Roman roads also contained many features along their lengths. One such military-specific
component, the granaries and other storage facilities that supplied the marching troops with food,
served a function similar to that of forts in the Seminole Wars.
Roman roads could also, essentially, contain a police force—a military unit stationed to
patrol the roads (Chevallier 1976). This was different from the Fort King Road. Although the
military traveled the road frequently and could act as guards while traveling, units were not
dispatched with orders to patrol the roads. Roman roads also had various public components,
such as places for overnight stay, relays for changing horses, and even fortified villas, so Roman
roads appear to have had more features that were available to private citizens than the Fort King
Road. While this may be due to scale and population density, it may also suggests that Roman
roads of conquest often focused on creating political alliances to maintain control rather than just
military force.
Structural components of the Fort King Road consisted mainly of a dirt road with bridges
across the rivers. In areas of wet ground or swamps in if that area could not be avoided, it would
either be filled in with sections of corduroy (as seen along other roads in Florida, such as the
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Bellamy Road across north Florida) or the ground built up with vegetative matter. In a letter to
General Jesup, General Foster states:
P.S. Five days labour of one hundred men, upon the road from Fort Dade to this
place [Fort Brooke] would be of very great advantage, forty axes, ten spades, six
scythes & several reaping hooks to cut the long grass of the ponds & place it upon
the deep parts of the way covered with earth, will make an excellent causeway
over which the most heavy loaded wagons can pass without difficulty, where now
the road is almost impassable. The roots & stumps would all be cut out. Teams to
drag the grass short distances will be wanted. It is generally found where the
ground is in want of the causeways (Missal and Missal 2005:103) emphasis
original.
Structurally, the Fort King Road differed greatly from Roman roads, which were
designed to be permanent structures; many are still in use today. Each section of the road was
specifically crafted for its unique environmental context. The Fort King Road appears to have
been a more temporary road, with stumps often left between wagon tracks. Other roads in
Florida dating to this period sometimes contained sections known as plank roads or corduroy
roads, which were roads with logs or planks laid horizontally across the road in swampy areas
(Duever, et al. 1997). Roman roads contained similar features, but they were buried under layers
of stone and dirt and served more as a foundation than a surface treatment (Chevallier 1976).
Knowledge of the Florida environment was limited, but a few maps dating to that time
show the rough location of roads and forts. Therefore, by building forts and roads, the military
acquired environmental knowledge; only when an environment had been occupied did the
military come to understand it.
Many diaries of soldiers note the distances to different features, which further
demonstrates that knowledge about roads was sufficient without the use of signs and markers
along the route. One hypothesis for the lack of maps and markers may be that the road network
was relatively small, and most travelers could navigate with only a rough idea of the route. The
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Roman network, on the other hand, was much more extensive and relied on an accurate system
of mile markers to navigate it (Chevallier 1976, Laurence 1999). Also in use was a system of
itineraries, which were written tables of destinations and mileage (which were read much the
same as a bus schedule is today) rather than scaled maps (Adams and Laurence 2001, Chevallier
1976).
The components and features of roads can tell us much about how the road was used. All
of these components worked together as a system to meet the physical needs of travel as well as
the social needs of a people. Physically, travel and transport are crucial for any large, sedentary
society. The ability to move food, goods, and people is what keeps urbanized societies and
economies functioning. But roads play an even greater role, and both the Fort King Road and
Roman roads exemplify the social aspects of a road network. Military campaigns rely on the
speed of communication, and Rome was well known for its reliance on this. Power and
symbolism are also crucial in military campaigns. Because roads are a physical line on the
landscape, they carry great meaning: ownership, power, trade networks, alliances, and much
more.

Perception of Landscape
Even though the focus here is on the Fort King Road as a road of conquest, multiple
perceptions of this road must be mentioned. Each culture will have its own view of the road, and
the road will hold different meanings for them. For example, to the Seminoles it was a direct
affront to their way of life. A road could essentially become a barrier, because crossing it was
risky. For example, the road was a specific boundary of a reservation that they were forbidden to
leave (Knetsch 2003, Mahon 1985). Therefore, to the Seminoles, the road would have been an
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obstacle and something that they preferred to avoid. At the same time, they also used the road to
their advantage, such as in the attack on Major Dade. Knowing that troops passed through
prescribed locations, they ambushed his column of troops as it traveled the road, killing most of
the soldiers (Laumer 1995).
Pioneers and settlers of Florida would also have a different view of the road. For
instance, it may have represented civilization: they relied on roads to obtain supplies and
information. Many were coming from a world in which roads were more pervasive, and most or
all traveling was done on them. To these settlers, roads would have been one of the first
necessities in building a community; this was proven by the homesteaders who settled near roads
and ports rather than on more fertile hammock lands after the Armed Occupation Act of 1842
opened up large tracts of land in Florida.
Lastly, the military’s perspective of the road would have been entirely strategic. These
roads would have been built in the straightest line possible between two points to speed
communication and travel. Any sharp bend in the road could potentially cause a huge bottleneck
when traveling with large columns of troops. Money and resources in Florida were stretched
thin; therefore, none of the military construction projects (forts, buildings, roads, etc.) would
have been of large, permanent, infrastructural items (Mahon 1985). Building was done
expediently, with the assumption that structures would be temporary. This poses an interesting
conundrum with the Fort King Road. It was hastily built and just wide enough for a wagon to
pass; stumps were left in the middle, if wagon wheels could pass on either side—and yet the Fort
King Road was considered permanent. It survived throughout the wars once it was built and was
a crucial piece of infrastructure. Therefore, even the perception of permanence is open to
interpretation.
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Conclusion
Archaeology has wrestled extensively with identifying and understanding how various
groups, ethnicities, or communities interact, because this is so central to understanding the past.
Interregional interaction theories can provide a baseline to investigate how groups at war interact
and how hostilities can shape those interactions—which do not cease at the start of conflict, but
rather are shaped by and in turn shape it, causing a domino effect. How groups interact will
affect how the landscape is modified, and how the landscape is modified will affect how groups
interact. All of these cyclical processes leave traces on the archaeological record, and discerning
their context and meaning is complex: Which caused which—did the conflict shape the
landscape, or did the landscape cause the conflict?
Fortifications are an ideal landscape feature through which to understand how group
interactions shape the archaeological record, because forts are a particularly clear form of
architecture built for a clear purpose. Along with fortifications, many additional structures are
necessary for support. One such forgotten, yet immensely important, feature is roads.
Roads seem to be overlooked in the literature, and discussions of roads of conquest are
almost nonexistent—yet they play a crucial role in all aspects of society. Roads can shape how
people use a landscape and perceive it; they can also provide a wealth of information about how
they were used. While roads are typically examined as a linear feature connecting two locations,
I argue that even a straight road running between two points on a map can be considered a
system because of the complex arrangement of elements. A single road can contain multiple
building techniques, a variety of features, and multiple meanings, from physical transport needs
to a symbolic statement of ownership. With the increasing availability of spatial technologies, I
propose that the study of road systems and networks can be greatly advanced, and the importance
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of roads understood, beyond their economic context. Roads are a crucial and yet often invisible
piece of the landscape. In order to move people and goods between points on a landscape a road
is needed but is usually taken for granted archaeologically. In order to see Florida’s fortification
system as a network, roads are the lynchpin tying these fortifications together. Roads are doubly
important in Florida due to the nature of the terrain ranging from marshy/swampy areas, dense
hammocks, or open sandy prairie all of which are troublesome for wagons to traverse without the
aid of a prepared surface. As will be shown in the following chapters, transportation difficulties
were something officers habitually did not take into consideration when approaching the war in
Florida.
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CHAPTER 7:
FLORIDA’S FORTS AND WHAT KOCOA CAN TELL US
In addition, armies were encumbered by huge supply trains, by their storage
magazines, and by the rudimentary character of transport and the road network.
Armies were not the static institutions so often pictured by historians; when led by
skillful generals, they could be capable of all kinds of complex operations, even
amphibious assaults against defended shorelines. Yet due to limits in firepower
and mobility, they could not pin down or pursue a shattered opponent and destroy
him completely. Invariably the vanquished escaped to fight again. (Kohn 1975:3)
Note to Reader: Portions of this chapter have been published in Historical Archaeology, 2012,
46(1): 62-73.

Introduction
KOCOA has become a common—and often a required—tool for studying battlefields
and conflict. The premise for this type of analysis requires an understanding of the landscape,
which is also crucial for the archaeological study of conflict. The preceding chapters have
discussed the background of the Second Seminole Wars, modern military theory relevant to
conflict archaeology, how education was standardized at the Military Academy at West Point,
how archaeology can offer insight into the behaviors and mindsets of the soldiers in Florida, and
what information the material remains transmit about creating a “livable” fortification. These
data sources can now be combined to demonstrate that KOCOA can be broadened from its
traditional use as a method for creating map boundaries into a method for investigating the
success or failure of the military’s adaptation to the Florida environment.
132

Tracing the origins of KOCOA is difficult, as the basis of this concept has always been a
part of military decision making under the rubric of various other names. It is a formalized
memory aid for a common sense principal. KOCOA is the acronym of the modern US Marine
Corps, while the US Army uses OCOKA or OKOCA. OKOCA as a term can be traced back to
an earlier field manual from 1990 and perhaps even earlier in other manuals not available for
public distribution (Department of Defense 1990). This method of terrain analysis is a formalized
process that has been theorized and analyzed by the earliest military philosophers and is a deeply
historicized process despite its new label. The education at the Military Academy was based on
this tradition of landscape analysis and has been further refined into the acronym we know today.
Therefore, when using KOCOA it is important to acknowledge that it is a current version of
traditional military knowledge, and that it has a long history, which has shaped its current form.
Terrain is a vital part of the decision-making process when engaging in conflict between
groups, especially when an organized military is involved. At the Military Academy in 1821,
cadets took classes in geography, landscape drawing, geometry, and field fortifications. These
classes focused heavily on understanding and utilizing the physical environment. Before
discussing how the military implemented its knowledge about the landscape, it is first necessary
to understand why Florida’s fortified landscape was different from any other fortified
landscape—which involves more than just the semitropical climate.
Florida had a unique 19th-century fortified landscape. To put this war in perspective and
to show how different it was from all other domestic wars the U.S. fought, from the
Revolutionary War to the Civil War, Florida had twice as many forts as any other state or
territory despite its shorter history as a U.S. territory. This was demonstrated in 1868 when
Brevet Major-General George Cullum created a biographical sketch of all West Point cadets. The
133

multivolume tome lists the military achievements of each cadet in order of class rank each year.
He also included several tables of data, the most interesting of which is a list of every fort in
existence (to his knowledge) at that time in the whole of the U.S. and its territories. A tally of
forts by state shows that Florida is clearly unique (Figure 30).

FIGURE 17. Number of forts as of 1868 (Florida in red). (Cullum 1868)
Florida is listed having 155 forts; Virginia has the second highest, with 70. The list includes forts
built in 47 states and U.S. territories from the Revolutionary War on, and includes many frontier
territories that also saw conflict against Native Americans. What made Florida so different in the
way the military approached it? I propose that it was Florida’s unique semitropical landscape,
combined with the new training program for officers at West Point that contributed to the
excessive fortification policy, which was imposed due to unfamiliarity with surviving such a
different kind of terrain. Through the use of KOCOA, these questions will be investigated.
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Understanding Florida’s Fortified Landscape
Investigating military education archaeologically presents difficulties. However, forts
serve as an ideal focus for finding the intersection of training, environmental knowledge, and the
physical landscape. Forts are an important key to understanding how education was put to use
because they are a tangible “artifact” with remains that can be recovered archaeologically. They
require specialized knowledge to design and skilled laborers to build. Military texts discuss
fortifications in great detail. Since West Point’s curriculum centered heavily on engineering and
Mahan’s treatises (which were used as textbooks at West Point and are still available for
reference), it is clear how these officers were trained. Figure 31 shows a sketch of Fort Brooke—
but just how factual these sketches are is up for debate. Archaeology, in turn, can reveal the type
of fort, where it was built, and how it was supplied or outfitted. KOCOA can provide the
framework for bringing together and interpreting these various data sets.

FIGURE 18. Image of Fort Brooke.
Source: http://floridamemory.com/items/show/27126
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KOCOA’s Current Function
Based on the extensive training officers received, there is ample reason to believe that
this education significantly shaped the war in Florida. Testing this hypothesis, however, has
proved difficult. There are very few models for investigating an entire war in general, none of
which includes education. Current research methods for studying “fields of conflict” and
battlefields utilize modern military operational strategies such as KOCOA and apply that to past
events. KOCOA, which stands for Key Terrain, Observation and fields of fire, Cover and
Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach (Fitzpatrick 2008, Fonzo 2008), is a modern
method for quickly—and often mentally—assessing the strategic nature of a landscape
(Department of Defense 2001, Marine Corps Institute 1997).
More recently, the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) has adopted it as a
standard tool for historical analysis, but stresses that it is used only where “fire was given or
exchanged” (McMasters 2011). KOCOA was first used as a landscape tool for archaeology in
1996 at Gettysburg (McMasters 2011). However, despite this new and widespread use, it is
difficult to find clear discussions of the methodology. On the most basic level, KOCOA allows
researchers to take documentary evidence (such as from diaries, letters, and field reports) that is
locatable on the physical landscape and map it according to its strategic importance. This allows
for the “core” of the battlefield to be inclusive enough to encapsulate more than the field on
which troops formed and attacked each other. It allows for features, such as the road that made it
possible for the troops to arrive at the battlefield, to be considered, because this defines how the
armies approached each other and significantly affected the outcome of the conflict.
KOCOA is a powerful tool that allows for descriptive and textual information to be
mapped onto a physical landscape. Using GIS, different aspects of a landscape can be tagged
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with their corresponding KOCOA feature (Maio et al. 2013). This allows for better
understanding of how the larger landscape was used during conflict rather than just the
immediate battlefield. It also allows for a fresh perspective on past events.
This use of modern military theories to approach the Second Seminole war provide an
opportunity to invoke Ann Stoler’s concept of “reading with the grain” (Stoler 2009). Using
KOCOA for historical analyses requires a significant venture into the archival materials related
to the event in question. However, students are taught to approach archives critically, to view
them “against their grain”, or from the bottom up (Stoler 2009). However, as Stoler argues,
archives can be treated as an ethnographic source of information in and of themselves. Seeing the
archival documents in the context of the ones who created them, allows for a more emic view of
past events. In this case using modern military theory to understand military history allows for
the colonial viewpoint to be reconstructed as well as interrogated, leading to a richer, multivocal
understanding of past events.

Examples of KOCOA and Archaeology
Identifying the reasons for this extensive fortification program in Florida is challenging. I
have yet to find documentary evidence that discusses a specific fortification strategy or unifying
plan for Florida. Excavation can shed light on where and how these forts were built, but trying to
answer the question of why a location was chosen requires different methods. KOCOA has
moved into the spotlight for military archaeology, mostly due to the efforts of the ABPP, which
now includes KOCOA analyses as part of its training for new grant recipients. However, actual
guidelines for how to perform this analysis are extremely difficult to find. This “analysis”
usually consists of a data table that lists each landscape feature, its corresponding KOCOA
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category, and some roughly placed boxes on a map (highlighting all Key Terrain, for example)
(Fonzo 2008). Figure 32 is a typical data table, which was created for a grant application. An
example of a KOCOA map from the Battle of Buckland Mills is shown in Figure 33.

FIGURE 19. KOCOA elements from the Battle of Buckland Mills. (Fonzo)
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FIGURE 20. An example KOCOA map for Key Terrain from Buckland Mills. (Fonzo)
The ABPP requires this form of analysis and documentation because it helps identify not
only the core of the battle but also the extent of other relevant features. This can also be used in a
preservation context, by determining the extent of key features. For the ABPP, however,
KOCOA is only used to define battlefield boundaries (McMasters 2011). However, the concept
of KOCOA can be used to address the following “What” and “Where” questions:
Where is the battlefield?
What were the objectives of the combatants?
What were the Key Terrain features?
What were the Avenues of Approach/Retreat?
Where did the fighting begin?
Where were the areas of heaviest combat?
Where did the fighting end?
I propose adding the following to this list:
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Why was an area fortified?
How were fortification locations chosen?
What kind of fort was built, and why?
How did this strategy evolve through time?
What other adaptations did the military make through time?
What role did standardized education play in how the landscape was modified?
The ABPP’s use of KOCOA provides the basic building blocks for battlefield analysis. My
research design adds to the model’s potential by investigating the “Why” questions.
Interestingly, in its KOCOA PowerPoint training, the ABPP advocates use of the idea of
Inherent Military Probability, as: “Nineteenth-century military historian Hans Delbrück
demonstrated that intelligent inspection of the terrain could prove or disprove many traditional
battle accounts. Following Delbrück’s principles, A. H. Burne proposed and tested the concept of
Inherent Military Probability, which he defined as the ‘solution of an obscurity by an estimate of
what a trained soldier would have done in the circumstances’” (McMasters 2011). This is much
more in line with my study’s research goals, yet there are no guidelines on how this commonsense approach to battlefields should be applied. My research will provide additional
methodologies for applying KOCOA to conflict analysis—but first we must understand the
landscape and training soldiers would have received. Otherwise, simply applying modern theory
to modern maps or modern terrain will not work.
When attempting this analysis for the Second Seminole War, I encountered several
difficulties. First, applying modern terminology to historical documents involves significant
speculation. For instance, the assumption that a landscape feature is salient simply because it
made it into the written record may be false: It could simply mean that the army stopped for a
rest and a bored soldier decided to jot down the day’s events and describe his surroundings—
while the truly significant features were never described because the army was on the move and
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there was no time to stop and record them. Another difficulty is that KOCOA is usually applied
to a single event that occurred at a single location during a small timeframe. Attempting to use
KOCOA for a seven-year campaign that ranged across most of the territory of Florida, therefore,
is more problematic. Also, when dealing with a longer engagement, it is necessary to recognize
that each side will have different goals, which ultimately shape the face of the conflict. Yet
despite these and other difficulties, I argue that KOCOA provides a useful starting place for
broadening our understanding of conflict archaeology because it allows for education and
training to be factored into models of adaptation.

Maps as Environmental Knowledge
One important distinction between my use of KOCOA for this study and how it has been
used in previous studies is the type of maps employed. In earlier studies, KOCOA was applied to
modern topographic maps, as demonstrated in the example from the Battle of Buckland Mills. A
typical KOCOA analysis would be to go through the primary literature and plot the places
mentioned on a current map. Yet during the mid-1800s, most of the interior of Florida was
unmapped territory. This has important ramifications for my analysis, for which the maps
themselves are important artifacts and vitally important for what Leone calls “recovering mind”:
The mind works in orderly ways that are not self evident, using, it is sometimes
said, a logic like arithmetic or a grammar. The basic assumption is that the human
mind categorizes and divides; creates contrasts and opposition; that it reverses,
displaces, and distinguishes between inside and outside, culture and nature, male
and female; furthermore that the mind sues a limited repertoire of contrastive
categories like these to think about virtually all reality” (Leone 1982:742)
Leone also stresses that all artifacts (which would include maps) are made by people who have
ordered thought patterns, and that order and meaning are recoverable (Leone 1982).
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Primary sources, such as soldiers’ diaries, are rife with passages about how little is
known about the Florida wilderness, which demonstrates that there was very little reliable
environmental knowledge of the terrain they were occupying. The military as a whole had large
gaps in its knowledge about the terrain, which means that those soldiers’ perspectives on the
Florida landscape were quite different from our current, highly precise, satellite-image versions.
Grand, large-scale maneuvers were planned—yet, with no clear picture of the terrain that had to
be crossed, most of them were unsucessful. By looking at a sample of maps from this period, a
sense of the extent of their lack of knowledge can be gained. If large areas were unknown, it
might be reasonable to assume that occupied areas were done so out of chance discovery rather
than due to a strategic decision-making process about the nature of the surrounding features.
For this analysis, I used ESRI ArcGIS 9.1 to perform all of the spatial analyses. GIS
software packages have become fairly standard for archaeological mapping and analysis;
therefore, only a brief overview of the capabilities of the software will be discussed here. For
more detailed information, numerous texts on the subject are available.

KOCOA of Florida
While KOCOA is usually used for investigating the landscape surrounding a specific
battle, in the case of the Second Seminole War, KOCOA is used in this analysis to investigate
the larger concept of a fortified landscape. The area around the Fort King Road and the forts,
bridges, battles, encampments, bivouacs, and other associated features will be investigated using
this technique. The Fort King Road was a main road running roughly from present-day Tampa to
Ocala and was also referred to as the Military Road. Using KOCOA, a pattern of how a
landscape was assessed and used can be identified. For example, what an officer deemed
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strategically important (Key Terrain) versus what was expected to provide Cover and
Concealment shows how the soldiers on the ground viewed and interacted with their physical
surroundings. Therefore, when a fort was built, the location may show what part of the landscape
was seen as strategically important. The same concept applies to roads: If effort was expended to
create a formal road, it signifies the strategic importance of that place.
KOCOA has been used in a variety of ways by archaeologists around the world (Fonzo
2008, McMasters 2011, Scott and Bleed 2011). Even so, the full potential of this methodology
has rarely been exploited. While traditionally KOCOA has been used more as a method for
categorizing the landscape and less as an analytical tool, it does provide a unique opportunity to
approach archaeology from a more anthropological point of view. Modern military science uses
KOCOA as almost a mental checklist of how to assess one’s terrain, but by incorporating
archaeological and historical evidence, this can yield insight into the mental processes the
individuals, for instance, who fought the Seminole Wars. For instance, by knowing how they
used and modified the landscape, KOCOA can suggest what parts of the terrain they felt were
important (i.e.,forts would have been built on what was seen as Key Terrain). Therefore,
archaeology uses almost a reverse form of KOCOA. Showing how the landscape was fortified—
or avoided—provides insight into how the officers inhabiting that landscape perceived it.
The 19th-century conflict in Florida was unlike any war the United States had ever
fought. Thus, studying this conflict is more difficult, as no previously developed methodologies
appear to be viable. If KOCOA were used strictly as intended by the ABPP, the area surrounding
Fort King would have a lone box that could be added to the area of the fort for Cover and
Concealment. This box would also serve to demarcate the Key Terrain, because the fort was built
in an area that was deemed worthy of protection (Figure 34). In addition, it falls into the
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Observation and Fields of Fire category, since the fort was close to the top of a small bluff. The
area surrounding the fort would have been cleared of trees to prevent ambush and to serve as an
area for troops to camp, because they might not have all fit within the walls of the fort.
Depending on which historical map is used, either a single Avenue of Approach in the form of
the Fort King Road can be added, or up to four roads and trails that terminate at the fort. Finally,
the only Obstacle in the area would have been a small stream that is at the bottom of a shallow
ravine to the east of the fort.

FIGURE 21. KOCOA map of Fort King.
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This method does not provide any insight as to why the fort’s location was selected; it
merely provides a way to classify and group data into categories. As demonstrated by Figure 34,
Fort King was not placed on the highest point of the landscape, according to the archaeological
evidence. Even if a hypothetical KOCOA analysis based on how the troops should have
approached their landscape were conducted, it would look almost identical to what they actually
did, but with the box closer to centered on the highest elevation. So why is this approach not very
useful for conflict landscapes, as opposed to the way KOCOA has been applied to battles such as
Gettysburg or the Battle of Buckland Mills? Even if the entire Fort King Road area were
included, it still does not add much to the understanding of the area. One reason, I argue, is
because this analysis is applied to modern topographic maps. The Florida landscape is vastly
different today from what it was in the 19th-century, whereas much of the original landscape at
sites such as Gettysburg is extant (Figure 35).

FIGURE 22. KOCOA map of Gettysburg.
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Using a map created at the time of the Second Seminole War not only offers a more
realistic representation of the historic landscape, but will also provide information about what
knowledge had been gained about Florida’s wilderness, since it was largely unexplored. Maps
can shed light on areas that have actually been surveyed, in contrast to maps based on oral
accounts or a local informant’s descriptions.
For example, the 1838 map could be used as a base map, because it is one of the more
accurate and detailed maps available to officers during the Seminole Wars (Figure 30).

FIGURE 23. Map of Florida 1838.
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Importing this map into ArcGIS and digitizing KOCOA features from it provides a sense of how
the landscape was used by the soldiers of that time. Each type of KOCOA feature can be traced
to create a shapefile in ArcGIS. This creates a less cluttered view of these maps, with only the
important features highlighted, and yields a more visually appealing map. This digitized map
makes it easier for new patterns to be discerned (Figure 37).
One of the first elements that stand out in Figure 38 is that all of the battles the
cartographer included are clustered along roads and trails. Whether this is because soldiers chose
to engage the enemy at these locations along the road for easy access, or because the Seminoles
were ambushing soldiers as they passed by, is difficult to determine at this stage of analysis.
Further research will attempt to separate the correlations between roads and battles. All of these
observations, however, could be made from the original map without need of digitizing—so
what new information does KOCOA provide?
The strength of KOCOA is that it becomes a unifying framework within which a host of
different types of information can be systematically cataloged. This standardization, in turn,
makes it possible to compared various battles and military engagements. However, KOCOA was
designed to be used in conjunction with a European style of fighting, in which two armies meet
on the open battlefield. The design of KOCOA is not as well suited for assessing irregular
warfare and insurgencies. Even so, with some adaptation KOCOA has much to offer for
understanding these small Indian wars.
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FIGURE 24. KOCOA features on an 1838 map.
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Historical KOCOA Analysis and Difficulties
KOCOA is a recent methodology that has been applied ad hoc to past landscapes. While
it has gained prominence in the literature with frequent use, relatively little has been written on
how to perform this type of analysis in an archaeological context. Though researchers have
attempted to perform this analysis on what the landscape would have been like during the event
in question, the trend has simultaneously been to approach this “past” landscape with modern
eyes. A feature we would perceive as strategically important might not have been how the
officers of the time would have viewed it. Another difficulty with the way KOCOA analyses are
performed is the reliance on historical records. The methodology usually includes researching
the historical literature and maps of the period in question and flagging any locations mentioned
as part of the conflict on modern topographical maps. However, to do this for the Second
Seminole War would be problematic. Primary data are scarce, aside from dispatches to
Washington and a few journals. In addition, official dispatches, orders, and communications tend
to leave out locational data and instead focus on getting supplies, troops, and money. And even if
the documentary sources had locational data that were useful for KOCOA, which map should the
data be mapped on—a highly subjective and error-filled historical map that represents soldiers’
knowledge at the time, or a modern topographic map that would not have been available in the
19th-century, but is necessary to create site reports and analyses?

Combining Perspectives
It will be difficult to tease apart the reasons for this dearth of mapping. It may be that
historical maps are intentionally created as large tracts of unmapped wilderness; unmapped,
barren lands give the impression that there was no ownership of the land and that no one was
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occupying it as a ploy for the government to assert ownership (Byrne 2008). Perhaps it due to a
lack of surveyors to create the maps or was it a combination of both? Regardless of the reason,
because no single map dating to the mid-1800s accurately depicts the true spatial layout of the
Florida landscape, I will use four historical maps created around the time of the Second Seminole
War to create a more complete picture.

FIGURE 25. Historic maps used for GIS analysis
Top Left: 1836 Map (source: http://fcit.usf.edu/florida/maps), Top Right: 1836 Map (source: http://floridamemory.com),
Bottom Left: 1838 Map (source: http://davidrumsey.com), and Bottom Right: 1845 Map (source: http://davidrumsey.com)
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In these four maps, even Tampa Bay—which was the main port during the war and, ostensibly,
should have been well known—was drawn four different ways. The maps were imported into
ArcView and overlapped, as shown in Figure 38. When these maps were overlain, it became
obvious that there was a huge variance in landscape feature locations. Figure 39, for instance,
shows significant locational variation for the Withlacoochee River, which was a significant key
feature in the war. This demonstrates the amount of error in environmental knowledge. To put
this in perspective, the variance in where the river is drawn is greater than the width of Tampa
Bay.

FIGURE 26. Map showing an overlay of the digitized Withlacoochee River.
Each line represents the river as shown on various maps.
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This variance highlights inaccuracies not only in the map, but also of the soldiers’ and
mapmakers’ knowledge. Most likely, these maps were sketches of major features and had not
actually been surveyed. For most people of the time, these maps—if they even had access to
them—provided the only knowledge they had of the interior. Some had been specifically created
so that officers could take them into the field and make corrections and additions to revise the
collective knowledge about the wilderness. Even so, by combining these historical maps, a
conceptual landscape based on the collective knowledge of the troops in Florida at this time is
possible.
In spite of these inaccuracies, some interesting conclusions can be drawn when the maps
are considered as representations of spatial knowledge. Essentially, they are snapshots of what
was known about the Florida environment. The four maps were stretched and georectified so that
they matched each other in size and shape. All features that were of military importance were
digitized, including—but not limited to—roads, trails, swamps, high ground, rivers, and lakes
(Figure 40). When the features for all four maps are viewed together and color-coded by map,
the result is illuminating (Figure 41), and a specific pattern emerges.
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FIGURE 27. Features digitized from the 1838 map.
The two earlier maps show most of the features centered around the Fort King Road and
the Withlacoochee River. The 1838 map includes a significant number of swamps, with detailed
information (Figure 42); this suggests that perhaps, by this point in the war, the military had
realized how important the swamps were as a resource for the Seminoles and, in turn, a
dangerous place for themselves. Finally, the 1845 map has more detail information for the
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southern and eastern parts of the state, which suggests that the military had expanded deeper into
the wilderness. This expansion is more readily seen in Figure 41, which only compares the 1836
map to the 1845 map.

Tampa Bay

FIGURE 28. Digitized features from four maps.
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FIGURE 29. Features from the 1836 map compared to those from the 1845 map.

KOCOA as a Predictive Model
Instead of using KOCOA to analyze what the military perceived as important during the
Seminole Wars, I suggest that KOCOA be use as a predictive model against which hypotheses
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about how these soldiers adapted to their landscape, as an outgrowth of their training, can be
tested. “Human beings adapt not to their real environment but to their ideas about it, even if
effective adaptation requires a reasonably close correspondence between reality and how it is
perceived” (Trigger 1989 p. 261). Archival data provide a basis for understanding how officer
training should have functioned in Florida. Historical treatises, in conjunction with soldiers’
accounts, can be mapped using KOCOA, and variations between what the texts say and where
these forts were archaeologically found suggests that at some level, learning and adaptation have
taken place. This change signals not only a change in strategy but also a change in the defining
characteristics of military culture and operations.

Study Area
My first step in the analysis was to define the limits of the study area. For the purpose of
a feasibility study, it would be excessively complicated to attempt to model the entire war across
the entire State of Florida. Therefore, I focus on a 50-mile buffer around the Fort King Road
(Figure 43). This road was chosen because it was a major artery for military movement and was
a central feature in the Second Seminole War. Fifty miles was arbitrarily selected as the buffer’s
radius, because it encompasses the major areas of the war and, in addition, represents the
approximate distance the army could march in three days. In most case, this was the extent of
sorties into the wilderness, due to the amount of provisions that could be carried by the troops.
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FIGURE 30. Map of Florida showing the study area, 1838 map.
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To create the master map for the analyses, I chose a map from the Rumsey Map
Collection (Hood 1838) because it was the most detailed map that could have been easily
accessible by the officers stationed in Florida (Figure 43). The accuracy of these early maps is
unreliable, because they were closer to sketches than to surveyed maps; therefore, it was
impossible to stretch the Hood map to fit the real-world shape of Florida. Attempts to georectify
it to a modern coordinate system stretched the desired features beyond recognition. The alternate
approach, of importing a Tagged Image File Format (TIFF) image into ArcGis, would have made
it difficult to work with the data because, without an accurate map scale, all of the digitized
features would only be images with no statistical power. Therefore, a compromise had to be
made. The map image was imported into a GIS environment where the spatial reference was set
to North American Datum, (NAD83), High Accuracy Reference Network (HARN), and State
Plane Coordinates for West Florida in feet. This projection was chosen because much of the
modern geodetic data used in this analysis were already available. The Hood map was then
scaled so that when its scale bar was digitized, the length matched the modern real-world length.
The scale bar drawn on the Hood map represented 35 miles. When the Hood map was digitized
and added as a layer to the GIS map, the GIS map was scaled up or down until the scale bar
length also measured as 35 miles. The map was then georeferenced so that this scale became
permanent. I realize that this is not the most accurate way to reference a map, but due to the
inaccurate nature of the source material, it produces a workable facsimile. It should be noted that
although the distance is correct for the Hood map image, the map is not georeferenced to realworld latitude and longitude coordinates.
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Different Groups, Different Strategies
KOCOA can be applied to the Second Seminole War to more fully understand the nature
of this protracted engagement. However, it should be applied differently depending on the
objective: capturing the military’s perspective of the war or the Seminoles’. For example, Key
Terrain is any landscape feature that confers an advantage. In Florida, there were a variety of
types of terrain that could be considered key or decisive. For the military, it could be high, dry
ground, whereas for the Seminoles it could be an island or hammock in the swamps that was well
hidden. This is because each side had different goals. For the Seminoles, the goal was to stay
hidden and in Florida—very different from the military’s terrain requirements. Another
important factor to note is that this discussion relies heavily on a masculine view of landscape,
since my topic concerns the military and Seminole warriors. Different genders will have different
strategies and interactions with the landscape.
Table 3, shown below, defines each category and is based on tactical diagramming (Heal
2005) and a report on the Battle of Buckland Mills (Fonzo 2008). I have also added examples of
the types of military features and Seminole features that would fit each category.
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Feature

Key Terrain

Observation
and Fields of
Fire

Cover and
Concealment

Obstacles
Avenues of
Approach

TABLE 2. Seminole Wars examples of KOCOA
Military
Definition
Examples
Seminole Examples
Dense hammocks, hiding
Any landscape
High ground, dry places, islands,
feature that confers ground, roads,
inaccessible land suitable
for farming, rivers
an advantage
bridges, forts
Any landscape
feature that allows
for surveillance of
Within firing range of
the enemy as well High ground,
hitting the military but
as the use of
block houses,
concealed behind trees or
Weapons
Vegetation
Clearings
Any feature that
allows for
Forts,
protection from
fortifications,
incoming fire and
breastworks,
obscures
natural features
Areas of dense vegetation,
movement from
such as ditches or inaccessible hammocks, or
the enemy
ravines, etc.
islands
Any feature that
Rivers, dense
impedes
vegetation,
movement
swamps/wet areas Walls, pickets, breastworks
Roads, trails,
occasionally
Any route that
allows for easy
rivers when boats
were available
Travel
Roads, trails, rivers

The landscape features used in the above table were taken from primary sources that
discuss how each side (military or Seminole) actually used the landscape to their advantage. A
few examples are given below, taken from Sprague (1848), to demonstrate how landscape
classifications were made. Water as a barrier is a common theme discussed throughout the letters
in Sprague’s history, in which the Seminoles disappear across a body of water or swamp and the
soldiers are unable to continue their pursuit (Obstacle). What can be assumed from these
descriptions is that the Seminoles used water to their advantage (Key Terrain).
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Driving the enemy before us for the distance of one and a half miles. . . . The
regular troops and Floridians were pushed forward as rapidly as possible to the
scene of the action, but meeting with an almost insurmountable obstacle in a
difficult miry swamp, half a mile in extent, and from two to three feet deep in
mud and water, were prevented from reaching it (Sprague 1848:164).
The ford reached on the Withlacoochee by the troops, and which was so
resolutely defended, was about three feet deep. The water was black and sluggish,
deceiving those who ventured to approach. Had the contemplated charge been
made, the river would have been crossed (Sprague 1848:166).
The nature of the country was such that soldiers could not even carry their
cartridge-boxes. They were compelled to deposit them, with their muskets, in
light boats, which they pushed before them through the mud for many miles to an
island, where they found the Indians (Sprague 1848:196).
The enemy was vigilant and independent; he lived upon the wild productions, and
knew the swamps and hammocks, while the soldier, as he waded them without
food or rest, looked upon these fastnesses as his sepulcher, more than as a field of
battle (Sprague 1848:166).

KOCOA Analysis Simplified
Because environmental knowledge of the soldiers in Florida was so limited, plotting out
all the strategic aspects of a landscape based on KOCOA may not provide much new meaningful
information. If the soldiers were unaware of the larger landscape, the decision-making process
would be limited to what they had personally experienced. Identifying each individual KOCOA
element could result in an analysis that contained more detailed information than the soldiers
really had access to. Therefore, I decided to collapse these KOCOA elements into areas deemed
safe versus dangerous. Again, these distinctions were made based on a close reading of primary
texts (Laumer 1998, Missal and Missal 2005, Sprague 1848). When classifying features based on
whether the military would have viewed them as safe or dangerous, it becomes evident that
dangerous areas were avoided (for example, roads go around swamps as much as possible). In
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the map below (Figure 44), forts, roads, and trails were considered safe because those were areas
the military either occupied or traveled through. Swamps and rivers were deemed dangerous
based on primary literature, which discussed their perils. When mapped, it is clear that the roads,
trails, and forts have avoided dangerous areas as much as possible. When dangerous areas were
not avoidable, the area was made safe. For example, where the Fort King Road crossed two
rivers, bridges and forts were built to secure these locations. Features were determined to be safe
or dangerous based on ideas of inherent military probability (i.e., common sense), accounts of
what happened, and soldiers’ descriptions of Seminole tactics and behaviors. Figure 36 shows
that the military controlled a very limited area—and even that is deceiving, because though the
roads were symbols of American military strength, they were also a weakness: The Seminoles
only had to wait alongside a road in ambush to attack.
The same approach can be used to view the Seminole landscape (Figure 45), which is the
exact opposite of the military’s. Road are now areas to avoid (unless planning an ambush),
because that is where soldiers would most likely be. In contrast, dense swamps and hammocks
are the areas of refuge in which they have a tactical advantage.
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FIGURE 31. Map showing areas classified as either safe or dangerous for the U.S. Military.
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`
FIGURE 32. Map showing areas classified as either safe or dangerous for the Seminoles.
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Assessing Training
The gap between training and application can be seen in the landscape features that the
military decided to fortify versus what the textbooks defined as features that should be fortified. I
analyzed the locations of four forts and their surrounding areas and compared features such as
elevation and soil type. Forts were classified as Key Terrain (because only important features
would be fortified) and Cover and Concealment (because they provided protection during an
attack), and they were placed along a road, which is an Avenue of Approach. Therefore, these
areas were deemed important enough to fortify and were highlighted in our KOCOA analysis.
But why? What was important about a given area? Traditional training emphasizes that key
elevations should be occupied and fortified. To determine whether forts in Florida were located
at the highest point in the immediate area, a digital elevation model (DEM) was obtained for
Florida. The location of each fort was plotted with a 500-foot-radius buffer. Four additional
buffers were then placed in the four cardinal directions surrounding the fort’s buffer. Elevations
for each buffer were averaged. These averages were plotted on a graph and compared to the
average elevation of the Fort King Road for reference (Sivilich 2012). GIS data of the forts and
surrounding areas show that none of the forts was located on the highest elevation (Figure 46).
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FIGURE 33. Actual vs. hypothetical elevations of fort locations.
The image on the left shows how the hypothetical fort locations were created using GIS. The
center circle is a 500 foot radius buffer placed around an actual fort location and the surrounding
circles are 500 foot buffers placed around proposed fort locations. The graph on the right shows
the elevation data for the locations of the forts, the proposed fort locations, and the mean elevation
of the road.

In Florida, which has elevation changes of only about 300 feet, occupying any sort of
height would be an advantage. Even Mahan’s treatise (Mahan 1836:139) states that “woods,
commanding heights, precipices, and villages, constitute the strong points of a position. They
serve as points of support against which the wings of the army rest; or else, by covering parts of
the front, they serve as the key points in the defense” [emphasis added]. This leaves the question
of why elevation was not taken advantage of in Florida.
One hypothesis is that these structures were related less to fortifying an area and more to
providing logistical support in the form of supply depots and way stations. In his letter to Major
General Jesup, Col. Foster states:
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It is my duty to express to you my settled opinion, confirmed by time and
experience that the system of Forts and Depots with light movable columns
between them, composed of part horse and part Infantry is the only certain way of
putting an end to this inglorious war without loss of many lives either of Horse or
Man, and of causing much fatigue and suffering to the Troops (Missal and Missal
2005:93).
The transportation of troops and supplies across the wilderness had been a constant
problem for the military. Supplies were stretched thin across the landscape, and complaints about
acquiring enough tools, food rations, and other necessities were a constant theme in official
dispatches. Maneuvering large baggage trains through the swamps on roads that were little more
than cleared trails was a chronic problem, and yet the army could not function without them.
Therefore, “forts” would have functioned primarily as storehouses located at conveniently
accessible locations and would only secondarily offered the fortified defense of Key Terrain
during an outbreak of hostilities. The following account summarizes the difficulties of being
undersupplied and understaffed:

THE SEMINOLE WAR
It seems to be the fate of this nation to meet with signal disasters at the
commencement of every war; they are the consequences which inevitably follow
from our parsimonious policy. It is quite clear that the destruction of property
effected by an enemy at the onset, together with the suspension of all ordinary
business, if converted into dollar and cents, would maintain many regiments of
disciplined troops who would be glad of the chance of flying to the rescue of our
defenceless citizens. Let us look at the condition of Florida: a few hundred
regulars were ordered there, by piecemeal, to drive off a powerful band of warlike
Indians, acquainted with every inch of ground and ready to fight with desperation.
Already the blood of many of our gallant fellow soldiers has covered the ground,
and their scalps are the trophies of savages. They have been fighting at fearful
odds, one to seven or eight. Dade, Frazer, Basinger, Gardiner, are massacred.
Clinch has fought nobly, but is now on the defensive; his communications are cut
off, and apprehensions are felt for his security. Even now his devoted band may
have shared the fate of their butchered comrades. Let it be understood that five
thousand men will be necessary to hunt down these nimble warriors before the
sickly season commences; they are supposed to number near 2,000, and must be
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surrounded. They have inexhaustible quantities of arrow root, and the rivers and
lakes abound with fish; these will furnish, it is thought, an ample subsistence for
them, though such diet would be meager for the whites. It is no longer prudent to
despise this band, but give us, in the words of Demosthenes, action, action, action.
SUBALTERN (Army and Navy Chronicle 1836:79).
This shows a departure from their training in regard to fortifying strategic areas and,
perhaps, an adaptation to the local environment despite the fact that these forts were often
attacked and harassed. It is interesting to note that the officers did not deviate from the European
fortification-centric approach; they simply altered the functions of those fortifications. Careful
attention must be paid to the wording of original sources, because confusion or ambiguity can
occur due to changes in the meanings of words across time—for instance, use of the word “fort”
when a more accurate description would be “supply depot.” Examples such as this demonstrate
the complexity of this war.
This hypothesis that the forts served more as supply depots would mean that for them to
be most efficiently used for that purpose, they should be easily reachable. Instead, they were
more than a day’s march from each other. Messengers on horseback could probably travel more
quickly between them, but moving soldiers and baggage trains would have been more difficult.
This would have required troops to bivouac overnight between forts, which would have been
dangerous.
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FIGURE 34. Map showing buffers with a 15-mile radius around the four forts.
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Figure 34 shows the four forts with a buffer of 15 miles around each. This distance was
estimated based on diary accounts of troops traveling about 15 miles a day on foot. To make
these forts easily accessible and highly connected, the 15-mile radius from one fort should reach
the neighboring fort location. Since each fort is more than 15 miles away from its neighbor, this
meant that the soldiers would have to quick march in the heat, facing the possibility of heat
exhaustion, or they would have had to camp overnight between forts, making the troops and
supplies vulnerable to attack.

The United States Military’s Way of War
As has been discussed above, military tactics are defined by doctrine, which, in turn, is
based on centuries of prior practices. Change in early colonial periods happened very slowly;
according to Ross (1979), “parade-ground drill and battlefield tactics were virtually identical” to
early military practices. In fact, when the 1791 French training manual was updated in 1831,
very little actually changed other than adding a section on how to fire from a two-rank line rather
than from a three-rank line (Ross 1979). Eventually, in the mid-19th century, American troops
were trained to advance openly, rather than always in strict lines, and to use aimed fire (Ross
1979). Smith (1836:71) documents the use of this newer method when he writes, “We
immediately extended as Light Infantry, covering ourselves by the trees, and opening a brisk fire
from cannon and musketry. The former I don’t think could have done much mischief, the Indians
were so scattered.”
However, the defining feature of the Seminole Wars, I argue, is the military’s lack of
adaptation to Florida’s environment. Numerous primary sources detail this steadfast reliance on
traditional methods. Below is a selection of those sources, organized thematically.
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Drill and Parade
Despite the harsh realities of frontier military service, an effort was made to maintain the
appearance of regular military life. Despite exhausting fatigue duties and with many on sick
leave, drills and dress parades were still held regularly.
February 22d.—We are still here, sedulously engaged in drills, and the thousand
other duties of a camp—distributing munition, clearing the ground, and pitching
tents out of the way of watch fires, aye, and of cooking fires too. For no where is
the definition of man, as the cooking animal, more correct than in an army, when
not on the march, (and he has any thing to cook.) The staff are often sent into the
city for supplies, and most catagmatic falls do our horses favour us with, as we
gallop over the broken bridge. We leave here to-morrow for Hernandez at least
some of us, for, by reason of the wretched transportation, we have to move in
detached bodies. The best friends must part. (Smith 1836:139)
But valor and patriotism alone, are not sufficient for that end. Some tactical
instruction and an exact obedience to commands, are also necessary. Instruction
can only be acquired by opportunity and labor. A firm resolution to obey,
accomplishes the other great requisite at once. Let the resolution be taken by all
who have nobly turned out to avenge their butchered countrymen.
But again;- to parade, to march, to mount guard and to fight, are not the only
duties of war. To handle and preserve the supplies of the army, and to construct
camp and other field defences, are equally required of every good soldier. A corps
of servants, for these purposes, would be too large and cumbrous. It would double
the army, and render one half too mean and the other too delicate, for the glory of
a well contested field. Fatigue parties must, therefore, when wanted, be furnished
by all the corps in their turns, and proportionally. —Winfield Scott. (Army and
Navy Chronicle 1836:167-168)

Transportation
Transportation and movement of troops was a constant difficulty in the dense Florida
swamps, and soldiers constantly complained about this. The terrain was even too difficult for
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horses of the mounted troops, and often these mounted troops had to abandon their mounts and
go it on foot.

February 28.—To-day we are out in the scrub and hammock land, up to our heads
in briars, and our knees in mud. I start on horseback, but finding it impossible (as
the guide foretold) to progress with my horse, I have him returned to camp, and
proceed a-foot (Smith 1836:147-148).
Volusia, on the St. John’s, March 11th.—We left Camp M’Crea on the morning of
the 15th, and though thence to this place is but thirty miles, we did not arrive here
‘till to. Day. Three days occupied in traversing such a distance; will sufficiently
attest the condition of the road, I should rather say, of the trail, for road we had
none, except of our own making. Great indeed have been the toil and fatigue
endured on this march, and nobly did our fine soldiers accomplish it. They were
often in water to their waists, more than half the way being through swamps.
After toiling for hours to cut away the dense growth of trees, the very stumps left
beneath the surface of the water, (and which therefore could not be trimmed
lower) were so numerous that it became impossible to guide the horses through
the tortuous clearing. They were accordingly taken out, and the men put in; or, to
express myself in other words, the teams were unhitched, and the soldiers drew
over the wagons by main strength, unassisted by horse power (Smith 1836:154).
Baggage trains were another huge logistical problem for the army and the quartermaster’s
unit. How to provision large companies of men in an environment where everything had to be
brought in, including forage for the animals, was a dilemma. Baggage trains were easy, slowmoving targets for attack, and required a huge number of men, draught animals, and wagons.

These three companies, with three pieces of Artillery, and a baggage train of 90
wagons, escorted by the First Regiment of U. S. Infantry (a part of whom where
mounted), left fort Brooke . . . (Coker and Schafer 1990:457).
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Fortifications
Fortifications were another enormous labor effort; troops were constantly working to
fortify their locations, whether they were constructing a permanent fort or a hasty breastwork
while bivouacking. However, even these “permanent” fortifications were only temporary: As
soon as the army abandoned one for any length of time, they burned it to the ground to prevent
the enemy from occupying it. When troops returned to that location, the fort would be rebuilt.
Many of these forts were burnt and rebuilt several times.
Camp M’Crea, March 6. . . . We have thrown up an extensive breast-work, (with
deep trenches around it) constructed a commissary store-house, and mounted a
small cannon a-top of it. This piece we named M’Duffie, to do honor to one who
honors Carolina and the country at large . . . We have also levelled the
embankments, burned the grass, cut the palmetto and scrub, and removed all
objects that were within rifle shot of our camp, behind which the enemy could
conceal himself. . . . Now that the stockade and other labours are completed, we
are absolutely idle, (except at drill) and frittering away that precious time which
might be employed in serving or in saving the country. They say we are waiting
on the Carolina horse—why were they not furnished with the means of
transportation, and all things needed to bring them here two weeks ago, as was
expected? (Smith 1836:148-149)
We have strengthened our work very much in the last two days, as we have made
a lunetto, which gives us a flank fire. A short time before Fraser left, the work put
up was called Fraser’s redoubt. (Army and Navy Chronicle 1836:56)
“Fort” Brooke, Tampa Bay, Jan. 9th, 1836.
Mr. Editor:- The attention of the public may in some degree, be attracted to this
point, and I therefore give the following information:
This place was never fortified; two block houses were indeed built at the end of a
street four or five barracks, and quarters on each side. The Secretary ordered
“Cantonments” to be called “Forts,” and to that rule this post conformed.
The existing defences are called the “Fraser redoubt” in compliment to the late
gallant officer of that name. It is a triangular stockade, with two block houses and
a battery of two 12 pounders looking upon a plain; and some 100 yards from the
barracks and a large grove of venerable live oaks, the gorge, or third side, was
open to the bay shore, and has since the battle of Withlacooche, been enclosed
with a 6 pound battery flanking it and making a cross fire upon the salients of the
gorge. All that is fort about the position, has proceeded from the thews and
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muscles of its garrison from about the 1st Dec. to the date of this missive, Of all
miserable contrivances in the paper way, paper forts are the most tormenting;
impending evils check stronger epithets. It is the lot of man to do, to bear and to
suffer; and here to do, or die (Army and Navy Chronicle 1836:79).

Adaptations
Some small concessions were eventually made by the military. For example, all brush
and trees were removed to have a clear field of fire to prevent the enemy from stealthily
approaching the forts, which created a liminal space around each fort. Also, much of the Florida
territory was abandoned during the sickly season. The war would then be resumed in the fall,
when disease seemed less prevalent.
It may be proper to remark, that the attack was not made from a hammock, but in
a thinly wooded country; the Indians being concealed by palmetto and grass,
which has since been burned (Smith 1836:75-76).
The Peninsula War. – The descriptions we have received of the fatigues of the
march, the difficulties of the country, and the mode of fighting adopted by the
Indians, give a discouraging account of the prospects of the final restoration of
peace to the Peninsula of Florida. The scene of operations is a mere jungle of
swamps and hammocks, which at this season begin to send out deadly, pestilential
vapors, under the influence of which the strongest constitution cannot long stand.
Disease has already disabled a large number of troops, and as the summer
advances, a great mortality must infallibly take place. Bad roads, a country
producing no supplies, toilsome marches, harassed perpetually by scattered
parties of an enemy, whom they never see, but who watch them in the morasses,
and, after firing a shot or two, disperse, and dive into the recesses, where they
cannot be found, and no prospect of action to bring this dispiriting and exhausting
struggle to a crisis, make this Florida war one of the most unpleasant that can well
be conceived. The patience and perseverance of the troops is deserving of the
highest praise. A simple zeal for the performance of duty sustained them through
the severest difficulties, without the excitement of anticipating an engagement and
a decisive victory. It is obviously impossible to continue them on such a service
through the hot months, in such a dreadful climate and country. The protection of
the few remaining settlements seems all that can be done, without a prodigious
waste of life – and the discharge of the volunteers, such being the determination,
should be given as soon as practicable. Their patient endurance, under these
circumstances, deserves and will receive the gratitude of the country. Mobile
Com. Register (Army and Navy Chronicle 1836:318).
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The Seminole Way of War
The military was not the only group slow to adapt. Native Americans could also be, but
this was less important for them, since their strategy was mostly successful. Eid’s discussion of
the Indian way of war, while set in the 1700s, seems consistent with what was happening with
the Seminoles in Florida (Eid 1988). As Butler (2001:74) points out, “Seminole combat behavior
augmented by patterned use of the cultural landscape and the prioritization of certain categories
of artifacts” would allow a predictive model of their behavior and tactics to be developed. The
Seminoles and the military remained stuck for years in a pattern that was difficult to end, and the
patterned responses of both sides may have contributed to this stagnation.
One such tactic that Eid points out that was successful for the Indians, and which they
employed for a long time, was the half-moon battle formation (Eid 1988). This tactic probably
began as a cooperative hunting strategy that became invaluable in times of war. As its name
implies, this was a system for flanking the enemy without surrounding it completely, which was
critical to its design. Also important for this maneuver was that it contained an avenue of retreat
for the Seminoles as well. This was an area in which the army and the natives differed
completely in their way of fighting: The Indians focused on maintaining an avenue of retreat,
while military doctrine placed emphasis on creating an avenue of approach for soldiers. Another
important feature for the Indians was a running and “skulking” method of constant movement,
which entailed more than simply staying hidden (Eid 1988, Ferling 1980).
Any one who has travelled, as we have done, the road from Tampa Bay to Camp
King, will perhaps wonder why the Indians selected an open pine barren for their
attack, in preference to the thick hammocks which skirt the Hillsborough and
Ouithlacoochee rivers. We think it can be easily explained. Powell, by his spies,
had perhaps been informed of the movement of Dade’s command, and sent a large
force to cut them off, before they could form a junction with Clinch. Had the
attack been made in the hammock, a number of the whites would have escaped
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under shelter of the woods. The object of the Seminoles was to destroy every
man. Possessing, as they did, an overwhelming force, they would neither attack in
these positions, nor attempt to surprise the camp at night, when the troops were
well protected, and might have held out against a thousand Indians, or destroyed a
large number of them. In the pine barren, the red men fought at equal and greater
advantage, whilst all chances of retreat for the pale faces was cut off (Smith 1836
p. 76-77).
The Seminoles also became savvy about obtaining supplies. Since they were kept on the
move by the advancing army, planting crops became more and more difficult. In several
instances, the Seminoles would agree to treaty terms, such as to emigrate to a reservation out
west, then settle around Fort Brooke, collecting subsistence and supplies as agreed. At the last
moment before their scheduled departure, however, they would disappear back into the
hammocks. Whether this was a conscious decision as a method for obtaining supplies or simply a
fortuitous set of circumstances is difficult to ascertain from the scant historical documents that
describe the war from the Seminoles’ perspective.
The lack of primary documentation about the Seminole’s perspective of this war makes
any analysis of it fairly one sided. Understanding the Seminole worldview and what strategies
and approaches they brought to the encounter may never fully be described because of this. Yet
evidence of their actions remains both archaeologically, and to some extent, in the historical
record of the military. From these bits and pieces, it is fair to say that the Seminoles were
approaching this conflict as an insurgency because they kept up a fast pace of engagements and
were highly adaptive to the changing conflict situation. However, developing a richer discussion
about how the Seminoles thought about the war and how they viewed it may be difficult.
This adds an important dimension to this use of KOCOA. Traditionally KOCOA has
been used for conflicts between two groups that had fairly similar cultural traditions. For
example, the American Civil War where both sides had the same mindset and framework for
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carrying out warfare. In the case if the Seminole Wars, KOCOA is being applied to two very
different groups, who would have had very different approaches and methods for carrying out
war. This means how they approach each other as an enemy and how they each interact with and
utilize the environment will be very different. KOCOA is still valuable for understanding this
conflict, it just needs to be applied differently in culturally appropriate ways to each side.

Conclusions
Layers of complexity must be critically assessed when analyzing and interpreting a
fortified landscape. The wars in Florida were especially complex, because this was the first time
the military had to operate in a semitropical environment and put their French-based military
knowledge to the test in such an unusual environmental setting. This caused enormous problems,
ranging from moving large baggage trains (getting stuck in the swamps, having inadequate roads
to travel on, and being a highly visible target on the landscape prone to attack) to learning how to
deal with malaria and the “sickly season.” Also, having the policy makers and those in charge of
military budgets so far from Florida—and possessing little or no knowledge of the realities of
Florida—was a huge obstacle for commanders trying to requisition supplies and money.
As Vencle points out (1984:118), “Changes and drifts in the spheres of power and
politics left their archaeological imprints only in an indirect and belated fashion. For this reason,
archaeology suffers from a general tendency to limit the consideration of war to the occurrence
of a few static attributes of them.” The goal of my research is to create a more dynamic model
for investigating conflict by moving away from single-site analyses. However, this type of
research means putting ourselves in the mindsets of those we are studying. Modern technologies
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and spatial information were not available to those soldiers until quite recently, so to understand
past events we must view them through contemporaneous eyes and not our own.
Familiarity with the types of knowledge available to those in the past can greatly enhance
our understanding of the wars’ outcomes. Historical maps provide information about key
features and also about the extent of environmental knowledge. Determining how these officers
were trained will allow us to look at these maps from their perspective and comprehend how
globalized classroom knowledge intersected with their environmental knowledge to produce an
outcome (whether success or failure). Using KOCOA to detect discrepancies between how the
landscape was used and how officers were taught to use it, based on French methods, allows for
a more critical assessment of the assumptions and alternative modes of conceptualizing the
landscape to be developed. KOCOA provides a method of defining the operational level of the
war, and GIS provides the tools for understanding it at the tactical level. Future research will
continue to investigate this intersection between landscape and education to more fully
understand the complexities of this largely forgotten war.
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CHAPTER 8:
EXCAVATIONS AT FORT KING AND FORT DADE
AS A CASE STUDY
The study and intricate knowledge of the terrain is the beginning and the end of
tactics. Everything to do with the ground, its shape, contours, texture, and even its
color at times of the day, affects everything both you and the enemy do or cannot
do. Both adversaries have the terrain of the battlefield in common. Other things
being equal, victory goes to the commander who best understands the terrain. By
Ralph Ingersoll, in The Battle is the Payoff (Caldwell et al. 2004:65).

Introduction
Much of the research on military theory has relied on documentary sources, such as
primary accounts and diaries of officers who were present. However, information can also be
gained by including archaeological evidence in the analysis. Fieldwork at forts Brooke, Foster,
Dade, and King have been very preliminary, focusing mostly on determining the extent of the
site boundaries and the intactness of the archaeological deposits. Several seasons of excavations
have taken place at Fort Dade since 2003, one was conducted more recently in 2008 at Fort
King, and at least one season occurred at Fort Foster in the 1970s. Fort Brooke, unfortunately,
has been mostly lost to construction in downtown Tampa. Even so, in between municipal
construction projects, many small CRM excavations have been conducted, and some evidence of
the fort has been located in and among the buildings. This chapter will provide a brief overview
of the archaeology done at Forts Brooke and Foster, as well as my own work at Forts Dade and
King. More detailed reports have been filed with the State of Florida and are available on
request. My goal in this discussion is to demonstrate the types of data that can be used for a
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KOCOA analysis, even when only preliminary archaeological investigations have been
undertaken.

Fort Brooke
Fort Brooke (originally Cantonment Brooke) officially came into existence through
orders from the Adjutant General’s Office to Colonel George M. Brooke on November 5, 1823.
In the following,
By the middle of this month, the men will be in their quarters which are the best
log buildings I have ever seen, both for health and duration. The rooms being
large, high, airy and as well put together as possible, the whole 260 feet in length
and 12 feet from floor to the loft. We have completed the Quarter Masters and
commissary’s store house, [and] bake house. The officers quarters have also been
finished (viz. two blocks of it) in ten days (Brooke and Covington 1953).
This was an unusual fortification for the region. The largest shipping port in Florida was
located on Tampa Bay, with Fort Brooke at its epicenter. This was a large, sprawling complex
that, for the most part, was not confined within walls and was often referred to as a military
reservation rather than a fort (Austin 1993). In the fort’s early years, it expanded to encompass
approximately 16 square miles in an attempt to prevent civilian settlements from encroaching on
government land, but to no avail (Austin 1993). Despite its large size, the fort was sparsely
garrisoned for most of its history, often with fewer than one hundred officers and men. The
situation was so desperate at Fort Brooke early in 1836 that General Gaines proposed burning the
buildings, putting all civilians aboard ships, and marching out in search of the enemy.
Fortunately, he soon realized that such action would be rash, as the location served an important
function as a shipping port.
Fort Brooke was not ready for an Indian war; one observer called it a paper fort, implying
that it was only a fort on paper and not in actuality. Eventually, after the outbreak of hostilities,
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more substantial fortifications were added, which included two blockhouses erected at the end of
a street with four or five barracks on each side, a triangular stockade, two twelve-pounder
cannons and a battery of six-pounders (Covington 1958:328). At the peak of the war, it was
estimated that as many as 4,800 troops were stationed there, in addition to the hundreds of
Seminoles that had arrived awaiting deportation (Austin 1993). There were also more than one
hundred structures within the confines of the fort.
Only limited archaeology has been done at this location, as much of the area has been
developed by downtown Tampa. A 1993 report by Janus Research/Piper Archaeology details the
results of several excavations that sought to identify intact fort remains in and among the
massive modern disturbances (Austin 1993). They found some intact deposits that contained
military-related items, which supported their conclusion that this was the location of the fort. But
due to the piecemeal approach to the archaeology of this fort, which was necessitated by various
construction projects, any comprehensive conclusions were difficult to arrive at; only a handful
of trash pits, a hospital building, and a few other miscellaneous features were located and used to
define the spatial layout of the fort.
Despite the limited archaeology done at Fort Brooke, there is still a rich documentary
history that can help elucidate some aspects of this fort’s history. Fort Brooke is unusual in
design; several hypotheses may explain that. The first is that because the fort was constructed in
1823—prior to the increased hostilities between the Seminoles and military this “fort” was not
intended to act as one but instead as more of a military outpost or town designed to meet the
needs of a major shipping port. If both goods and people were frequently passing through, this
could be one reason for the high number of buildings within the compound and the need for a
dedicated hospital building. Another possibility is that the fort was not built by an engineer from
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the Military Academy and was not constructed with formal fortification plans in mind. A third
possibility also has to do with the early construction date. It is possible that the fort’s layout was
not sufficiently functional or did not meet the military’s needs, and therefore the plan was
adapted for later fortifications.

Fort Foster
Order Number 18 was issued on November 28, 1836, and directed Lieutenant Colonel
Foster to reestablish the abandoned Fort Alabama (Schene 1976). Construction commenced in
December of that year and the fort was renamed Fort Foster, as shown in Figure 17. It was to
have two blockhouses and a strong picket work (Schene 1976). The tasks were divided up;
Captain Lyon was instructed to build blockhouse number one and Captain Allen blockhouse
number two. Lieutenant Henry Prince was project engineer and also tasked with erecting the
stockade pickets, and Lieutenant William Wall was to build the commissary store, magazine, and
bridge. Both Prince and Wall were Military Academy graduates (Cullum 1868).
The purpose of Fort Foster was to protect the Hillsborough River bridge from being
burned by the Seminoles. The original bridge at the Hillsborough River had been built in 1828
and burned in 1835. The new bridge may have been built about 700 feet downstream, if the
drawing by Colonel Foster is to scale (Schene 1976). Moving the bridge down river would have
placed it more securely under the protective fire of Fort Foster, which was designed to protect
the bridge at this point. It was also intended to serve as a depot for provisions and forage and a
hospital for the sick and wounded who had been brought in from the interior. The fort consisted
of stockade walls and had two blockhouses, the guns of which would have a interlocking fields
of fire centered on the bridge.
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In discharging the duties of Quartermaster, I have been engaged with about 20
soldiers ever since I came here in repairing the fort, building houses for the
comfort of the officers and men, and erecting store houses for the reception of
provisions and forage. We have completed in 14 days four large storehouses,
(each capable of containing 30,000 rations) built two sheds, one 90 and the other
50 feet long; one Hospital, and three houses, besides repairing three. They are
made after the Florida fashion, of course; more regard being paid to convenience
and comfort than to beauty. Major Belton says, however, that we have the
handsomest fort in Florida (Coker and Schafer 1990:457-458).
Diseases such as dysentery became widespread around April 1837 and Dr. Baldwin, the
assistant surgeon on post, began writing to request that the post be abandoned despite Jesup’s
efforts to increase the strength of this key facility (Schene 1976). Eventually, Dr. Baldwin was
allowed to remove the extra men, leaving only the seventy or so necessary to garrison the post,
and took them to Lake Thlonotosassa, which he had previously scouted and deemed a healthier
environment (Schene 1976). About a month later, Jesup agreed to finally abandon the post
entirely, and the campaign against the Seminole Indians was halted during the summer months to
avoid disease. It resumed in October.

Archaeology of Fort Foster
In the 1970s, extensive excavations were undertaken at the Fort Foster site to locate the
fort and determine its configuration (Baker 1996). Eventually, this work led to the fort’s being
reconstructed as a tourist destination. Excavations were conducted at both the earlier fort, Fort
Alabama, and its later iteration, Fort Foster. Sections of picket works for both forts were located,
including some intact remains of the pickets themselves at the bottom (Baker 1996).
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FIGURE 35. Map of Fort Foster. (Missal and Missal 2005)
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Despite extensive excavations, Baker (1996) provided only a limited report that focused mostly
on architectural remains such as the pickets and powder magazine, so few comparisons to other
forts can be made for the purposes of this study. Baker’s work did, however, discover the fort’s
exact location and layout and will be discussed further in the following chapter.

Fort Dade
Fort Dade is located on the south bank of the Southern Fork of the Withlacoochee River
(Figure 18) in the present-day town of Lacoochee. Construction, which was led by General
Jessup, began in the winter of 1836 and ended in early 1837; the fort’s function was to protect
the bridge across the river. It was named for Major Dade, whose ambush led to the start of the
Second Seminole War (Laumer 1966). Documentary evidence about the fort is not very
descriptive. Sources say that it was built on the location of Camp Birch, which was a breastwork
where General Eustis camped. Below are some of the only snippets of documentary evidence,
provided by General Foster, who oversaw the construction of the fortification, and Lieutenant
Prince, who had just completed Fort Foster. Lieutenant Prince was a Military Academy–trained
engineer, and supervised the day-to-day construction. Fort Dade became a crucial fort along the
chain of forts that extended into the interior of Florida; it was briefly the Headquarters of the
Army in 1837, and even saw the signing of the 1837 Acts of Capitulation (Mahon 1985:200).

The Bridge is fast going up, the ground designated for erecting the buildings
being thoroughly prepared, Maj. Birch of the 4th commenced throwing up a breast
to intersect the Block Houses & carry up the same at once. A Breastwork being
deemed sufficient together with the Block Houses, as we have no time to spare
farther than to render the place secure against an attack from Indians (Missal and
Missal 2005:61).
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A party detailed to clear off the ground intended for building on & staked, Lt.
Prince, Chief Engineer, superintending. It is about forty paces from the Bridge to
where the fort will be erected (Missal and Missal 2005:61).
The 6 Store Rooms built in such a manner as to form a part of two sides, 3 on the
East & 3 on the North sides are 20 feet each in the clear, making abundance of
room for large quantities of stores contemplated in being deposited at this post
(Missal and Missal 2005:62).

FIGURE 36. The Withlacoochee River at Fort Dade. (photo by author)
Archaeology of Fort Dade
Excavations at Fort Dade began in earnest in 2003 when the Seminole Wars Historic
Foundation, which owns the land that contains most of the fort’s location, partnered with the
University of South Florida to locate and assess the location of the fort (Figure 19). Christine
Bell, under the supervision of Dr. Brent Weisman, undertook this project as her master’s thesis
and conducted excavations from 2003-2004. I was employed by the Gulf Archaeology Research
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Institute (GARI) from 2006 to 2008, and we conducted additional work on both the Seminole
Wars Historic Foundation’s property and the neighboring property under private ownership
(Ellis et al. 2010).

FIGURE 37.View of Fort Dade as it is today (photo by author)
Discussions with local collectors indicated that there have been decades of looting. This was also
a problem during both the USF and GARI excavation seasons, with looters entering the site at
night and digging large pits in unfinished excavation units (Figure 20).
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FIGURE 38. Looting of an excavation unit. (photo by author)
During Bell’s archaeological investigation in 2003, 169 postholes, eight 5x5’ units, and
six 3.5x1.5’ units were excavated (Figure 21). The goal of that excavation was to determine
whether any possible fort-related artifacts were still present on the property. Testing was very
limited and exploratory in nature. Bell determined that artifacts of the correct time period were
present, and the discovery of four gunflints is suggestive of a military site. This work served as
the basis for a recommendation that additional subsurface testing be performed to determine
whether any intact fort structural remains were present.
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FIGURE 39. Map of Excavations in 2003. (Bell 2004)
Beginning in 2006, GARI conducted fourteen months of more extensive excavations.
During this excavation campaign, a total of 26 excavation units of varying sizes were excavated
(Table 2 and Figure 22).
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TABLE 3. Number of excavation units and their size
Excavation
Unit Size

Number
Excavated

2x2
5x5
2x5
3x3
3x4
3x7

14
8
1
1
1
1

FIGURE 40.Evidence of Burned Timbers in Excavation Unit N457-E490. (photo by author)
Despite looting, evidence of burned timbers (Figure 22) from what is believed to have
been the blockhouse is present, and the large number of nails and spikes recovered suggests that
the structure was substantial (Figure 23). The absence of impacted musket balls suggests that no
serious fighting took place at the site, but several dropped shot are compelling evidence of
military occupation (Sivilich 2009:89). One of the most striking features of the site is the higher
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than expected number of luxury items such as window glass fragments, lamp glass, and finely
decorated ceramics.

FIGURE 41. Map of excavation units
(Reproduced with permission from Gulf Archaeology Research Institute.)

Window glass is an unusual item when viewed in the context of a frontier outpost. Since
these forts were built knowing that they would be temporary structures, it is interesting that glass
windows would be added. While getting basic supplies for the military was difficult, it must have
been even more difficult to import such fragile material. Also, when the structures were
abandoned, why not salvage the glass for future structures? This is one of those behavioral
patterns that is seemingly out of place. So far, no documentary evidence discusses the use of
window glass. But it may have served an important function: In a climate where mosquito-borne
illness is common, glass was valued highly. One problem with that argument, however, is that
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the majority of personnel present at this fort would have camped outside the fort walls in tents.
Only officers would have occupied an interior building.

Fort King
The Treaty of Moultrie Creek in 1823 divided Florida in half, with the portion south of
present-day Ocala being a reservation for the Seminoles and the portion north of Ocala for white
settlers (Davis 1929). In 1826, Gad Humphries built an Indian Agency in present-day Ocala. Fort
King was constructed in 1827 and was located near the Indian Agency (Ocala Planning
Department 1995). Its placement on the landscape was quite significant: It was located on the
Fort King Road, and both the fort and road served as boundaries for the short-lived reservation
that was imposed on the Seminoles, restricting them to the interior of the territory. The fort had
an interesting history of occupation, which has been well documented in the 1995 and 1999 Fort
King archaeological reports and will only be briefly discussed here.
The fort is described as a large structure consisting of:
a space 162 by 152 feet (was cleared) to be enclosed by a barricade of split logs
upended in the ground to form walls or pickets. Gates of heavy timber were
placed on each of two sides, and on one corner of a blockhouse or watch tower,
fourteen feet square, was erected . . . for the enlisted men a large barracks
containing four compartments was raised. The rooms each about twenty-five feet
square were separated by wide hallways, and there were piazzas front and rear.
All was under one roof which provided not only protection from the sun, but also
overhead storage. For the officers two separate buildings, about twenty by fifty
feet, were planned, each with bedrooms and drawing rooms for two men. Extra
sleeping space was in a loft above. Mess halls, kitchens, and ammunition storage
almost filled the remaining area Ott 1967 cited in (Ellis et al. 2009:15).
The plan of this fort was unlike any others in the surrounding areas. It was built under the
direction of Captain James M. Glassell, who was not a Military Academy graduate. Historical
documentary evidence is intriguing for archaeology and for understanding the fort’s role in
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general. For example, similar to Fort Dade, the artifact assemblage of this fortification is slightly
unexpected. During the construction of Fort King, a letter by Lieutenant Francis D. Newcomb,
Acting Assistant Quartermaster to Brigadier General Thomas Jesup, Quatermaster General, dated
May 16, 1827 states:
The articles which will be most wanted at this post, and which will be absolutely
necessary, to render the Quarters comfortable in Winter, will be window-glass.
Bricks & Lime: —We will want also, plank for flooring &c, as we cannot saw by
hand, all that will be required; —together with nails, Iron and Steel.—Major
Glassell requested me to mention the above named articles, as those that would be
indispensably necessary— (Ocala Planning Department 1995:29).
This request for window glass seems ostentatious on a frontier fort. Apparently the commanding
officers at this time also thought this, and in a letter dated June 24, 1827, from Major T. Cross,
Acting Quatermaster General, to Lieutenant Francis D. Newcomb, this is made clear:

With the reduced garrison designed for this position, it is believed, the necessity
will not occur, for sending materials from Charleston or elsewhere, as requested
in one of Maj Glassel’s former letters – As the post is altogether ‘temporary,’ any
thing more than comfortable huts, for the company, would be improper. The
transportation of brick, such a distance, could not be justified by the
circumstances of the case. Suitable chimneys, can be readily constructed with logs
and clay. June 24, 1827 (Ocala Planning Department 1995:31).
This exchange highlights the disconnect between the officers in charge and the officers
on the ground. For instance, Major Cross denies the request for bricks for chimneys or stoves for
heating the cabins and says to use the “logs and clay” locally available. However, in Florida’s
coastal terrain the soil is so sandy that daub, chinking, or tabby could not be produced. Even
trying to make lime out of local sources had failed, and some cabins were damaged during these
experiments (Ocala Planning Department 1995). The officers on site usually tried to obtain
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locally sourced products to meet their needs. When they could not, requests would be sent to
their superiors, who often denied them because the items asked for were seen as unnecessary.
Had the commanding officers been on site, they might have had a different opinion. In the case
of building Fort King, many letters were exchanged explaining the local situation and trying to
convince those in Washington to send the supplies needed.
Another problem highlighted by the Fort King letters was one of labor. Often requests for
goods, such as lumber, were denied with the reasoning that soldiers on fatigue duty could
procure timber and mill the lumber themselves. However, at the same time the strength of the
garrison was slowly being reduced by those in Washington, while simultaneously disease was
incapacitating the troops, leaving barely enough men to finish the fort’s construction and
maintain guard duty. One example of how little distant commanders and officers on site agreed
can be shown in the following letters.
June 8, 1827, Colonel Duncan L. Clinch to Colonel R. Jones, Adjutant General:
I was under the impression that my letter to the General in chief . . . contained
sufficient information as to the distribution and location of the Troops in Florida –
but on referring to that letter, I find that I should have been more explicit as to the
location of the new temporary Military post, directed to be established pursuant to
Order 79, of 1826 – and I now have the honor to report that in Conformity to that
Order, I caused the post on the Suwannee river, to be abandoned, and a Site
Selected near the Florida Agency for the new post, which post is now Garrisoned
by two Companies of the 4th Infantry Commanded by Captain Glassell and to
which he has given the name Cant. King – From my knowledge of the Indian
Character, I consider this post of more importance, in Controuling the Indians,
and in giving protection and Security to the inhabitants of Florida, than any other
post in the Territory, as it is in the immediate vicinity of the largest number of the
Florida Indians, and between them and the white inhabitants -- & I am also of the
Opinion, that it is of the first importance that it Should be garrisoned by two
companies for altho’ much Credit is due to major Pierce and Capt. Glassell for
their commands, for the zeal and Activity in Carrying into Effect the instruction
given them, relative to the Indians, Still in a Country like the one assigned their
protection, but little can be effected with one company – with a knowledge of
these facts, & a full view of all the circumstances Connected with this Subject – I
have Considered it my duty to suspend the removal of One of the Companies,
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from the post near the Florida Agency until I receive further Orders on that
subject – and at the same time, beg leave to recommend in the Strongest terms, tat
the two Companies be continued at that post, until the Indians are quietly Settled
within their limits or some other disposition made of them (Piatek 1995:30-31).

FIGURE 42. Map of Fort King (Ellis, et al. 2009).
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FIGURE 43.Layout of Fort King (Ellis, et al. 2009).
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Almost a year later, this discussion is still continuing:

April 5, 1828, Major General Winfield Scott to Colonel R. Jones, Adjutant
General:
I deemed it expedient to break up the post, Camp King, occupied by a single
company. This was done under the general authority to send four companies of
the 4th Infantry from Florida to the vicinity of New Orleans without specification
of the posts from which they should be taken . . . from the conviction that the
importance of the post was by no means commensurate with the extra expense of
sending to it supplies, over land, from Tampa Bay, 120 miles. – The commanding
officer at Cantonment Brooke will be instructed, should he deem it necessary to
the protection of the Indian Agency & his authority, to send a detachment of fifty
men once or twice a year to the Agency, with orders to show themselves; --to
effect those purposes, & to return. (Piatek 1995:35)

Fort King was abandoned in May 1836, and in July the Seminoles burned it down (Ocala
Planning Department 1995). In 1837, a new fort was built on its location (Figures 24 and 25).
A tantalizing letter written after the abandonment of Fort King describes some of the
substantial efforts undertaken in building the fort, since many items are listed as being present
that would not be expected in a fortification, such as sash glass windows, window shutters, and
proper doors.
In a letter of November 4, 1846, Edmund D. Howse, sheriff of Marion County
and former custodian of the fort King property, urged the immediate sale of
materials from buildings to those, like himself, desiring to build in Ocala. The
lumber, though old was ‘worth considerable’, and ‘the floors,’ he wrote, ‘are
plank, the doors and window shutters plank and the windows are sash glass, all
very valuable in this country where we have no conveniences (mills) for making
plank.’ And so the physical remnants of Fort King, whose presence had opened
up the Ocala area to settlement, were utilized for more peaceful pursuits in the
construction of civilization (Ocala Planning Department 1995:157).
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Archaeology of Fort King
In 2008, over a four-month period, I participated in further excavation of Fort King with
GARI. We conducted 50 shovel tests and 150 small test units, which were excavated in the
vicinity of Fort King. This built on the work done by Piatek in 1991 and Ellis in 1994 and 1999.
The tract of land the fort was located on is currently owned by Marion County and was
previously owned by the McCall family (Figure 26 and 27).

FIGURE 44. Fort King as it appears today (photo by author).
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FIGURE 45. Transect of STPs at Fort King. (photo by author).
Ellis (1999) found the highest density of potentially fort-related artifacts in the center of the
parcel of land on an elevated landscape feature. Excavation has also shown extensive subsurface
disturbance, especially due to plowing and agricultural use of the property since the late 1800s.
Despite the disturbance, as a result of the archaeological data and archival information, (Figure
28) Fort King was approved as a National Historic Landmark in 2002.
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FIGURE 46. Distribution of all artifacts found at Fort King.
Reproduced with permission from GARI.

Fort Comparisons: Creating Comfort on the Frontier
Archaeology at these fortification sites has been very preliminary. Only two forts were
excavated very recently, while Fort Foster’s excavation took place in the 1970s and Fort Brooke
was sporadically excavated between the 1950s and 1980s. A comprehensive analysis of artifacts
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would be redundant, since many site reports have already been filed with the State of Florida.
Therefore, I will focus my discussion on the archaeology at Fort Dade and Fort King and will
highlight some of the unexpected artifact types present and their significance.
Both Fort Dade and Fort King contained the usual artifact classes that would be expected
at a military structure; architectural elements such as nails, gate hinges, spikes, etc. were
abundant. Also, the fact that many of these elements were of a heavy-duty nature also speaks to
their function for fastening large logs, such as for a palisade fence or a laid log blockhouse.
Unfired musket balls are also an indicator of an armed presence on site (Sivilich 2009:89). Large
quantities of flat metal container fragments that could be from either canteens, cartridge box
liners, or food rations were abundant.
Some of the unexpected items found were fragile goods (Table 3), including a large
variety of ceramics at each of the forts, which is unusual when viewed in the context of a remote
frontier location. South’s (1978b:47) study of archaeological patterns notes a lack of ceramics as
a key feature of his Frontier Pattern. One would expect to find pewter or enameled tin plates,
which would survive the trip to these remote locations. Instead, a variety of decorative styles
were found (Figure 29).
At both Fort Dade and Fort King, numerous types of refined earthenware have been
discovered, each with a different pattern and decoration technique that ranges from transfer
prints in all the colors (blue, black, pink, and brown) to hand-painted polychrome. The ceramic
assemblage consists of whiteware, pearlware, creamware, ironstone, stoneware, and tin enameled
earthenware.
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FIGURE 47. Example of ceramics decorations from Fort King.

Because many of them had been burned, making it difficult to determine whether these
were whiteware, pearlware, or creamware vessels. Yet their presence on site speaks volumes
about what the men found necessary for comfortable living. Whether they belonged to officers or
enlisted men is difficult to determine; as of yet, no documentary evidence has been found that
discusses the requisition or shipping of ceramics. Sutlers were common around and within the
forts, and could have been the source of these items.
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TABLE 4: List of Relevant Artifacts from Forts Dade and King.
Reproduced from GARI Reports

  
  
Aggregated  Sand/Fort  Earth/Limestone  
Charcoal  
Historic  Ceramic  
Historic  Ceramic  Pipe  
Historic  Glass  
Historic  Glass  Bottle  
Historic  Glass  Container  
Historic  Glass  Lamp  
Historic  Glass  Window  
Historic  Lithic,  Gunflint  
Historic  Metal  
Historic  Metal,  Armaments  
Historic  Metal  Container  
Historic  Metal  Furniture  
Historic  Metal  Livery  
Historic  Metal  Personal  
Historic  Metal  Shot  
Historic  Metal  Tool  
Historic  Metal  Nail  
Prehistoric  Ceramic  
Prehistoric  Lithic  
Other  
TOTAL  

Fort  King  
Fort  Dade  
Total  
%  
Total  
%  
1284  
5.86   2504   21.07  
3179   14.52   3543   29.81  
921  
4.21  
24   0.20  
335  
1.53  
44   0.37  
857  
3.91  
7   0.06  
2366   10.80  
842   7.08  
45  
0.21  
22   0.19  
133  
0.61  
77   0.65  
317  
1.45  
17   0.14  
22  
0.10  
10   0.08  
908  
4.15  
592   4.98  
15  
0.07  
8   0.07  
38  
0.17  
124   1.04  
41  
0.19  
4   0.03  
20  
0.09  
14   0.12  
76  
0.35  
21   0.18  
214  
0.98  
45   0.38  
8  
0.04  
16   0.13  
1  
0.00  
9   0.08  
123  
0.56  
16   0.13  
1055  
4.82  
170   1.43  
9942   45.40   3777   31.78  
21900       
11886       

The argument could be made that the archaeological record is biased in that only broken
items were discarded, and the only items prone to breakage were the fragile ones. It is possible
that more durable vessels such at tin, pewter, or wood may have been in use and not discarded.
Despite this potential bias, for the purpose of this analysis the fact that such a large quantity of
ceramics was found in the first place, speaks to the unusual nature of this assemblage. It seems
impracticable to be transporting any breakable ceramics throughout the interior of such a
wilderness as Florida.
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Conclusion
Using modern military perspectives such as KOCOA to investigate the archaeological
remains of conflict can provide interesting insights into the military mindset and behaviors. For
example, in a frontier setting, where access to supplies was limited and difficult, it is interesting
that more supplies were not salvaged before these forts were abandoned. For buildings that are
built to be temporary and tend to be burnt down when no longer useful, why not strip them of
window glass and other valuable construction materials prior to burning? This may speak more
to the army’s mindset than anything. The belief that the war was, at all times, only a few months
from ending seems to have been universal. Perhaps this abandonment of perfectly good supplies
is due to the assumption that they would not be needed for future fortifications. Or perhaps more
practically, the lack of available transport to move them to the next location precludes them from
being salvaged.
Another interesting fact about the Florida frontier, as opposed to the western frontier, is
that Florida was not as isolated. In the western regions, forts were often spaced very far apart,
whereas Florida had a high density of forts, making them relatively close to each other in
comparison. Yet this distance is confounded by the extremely difficult travel conditions (swamps
and dense vegetation) not experienced in the west. This also means that there was a fluidity to
the troop movement from one post to another. Perhaps this happened more in Florida than for
those troops stationed at western fortifications, who may have resided more permanently at a
single location. This may also explain why so many “unusual” artifact classes are found at these
forts: Troops are bringing with them goods obtained either from home or during their travels.
These luxury items may also speak to the stress troops or officers were under; they were bringing
the comforts of home in an attempt to “civilize” the wilderness and make it more familiar. West
204

Point graduate William Warren Chapman remarks that on one of his marches, they were camped
on the Little Hillsborough River and he “took an excellent cup of chocolate with Major Belton
and Dr. Henderson” (Coker and Schafer 1990). Even South notes that frontier and fortified
settings have a unique artifact signature that is different from more domestic settings (South
1978b).
Utilizing KOCOA to investigate the Second Seminole War has the ability to explain
troop behaviors beyond what they did during conflict. KOCOA suggests that the military relied
on the training received at the Military Academy to a large extent. I argue that because the texts
cadets read focused on traditional European style warfare, large scale fortifications, and
generally trained to operate in a more urban environment it, would not have occurred to the
officers to modify their domestic behaviors to fit a frontier setting in which they needed to be
highly mobile. It seems both in the archival and archaeological records, officers approached
Florida as if it were any other state with towns and cities when, in reality, the frontier nature (by
Western standards) was not conducive to the importation of fragile luxury items such as fine
glass and ceramics.
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CHAPTER 9:
CONCLUSIONS
We felt that the cause of Florida was a good cause, and that hers was no manly
enemy waging equal battle, in the broad face of day, in “behalf of violated rights;
but an ambushed foe, in mockery of the most solemn treaties, striking, like a
cowardly assassin, from behind—stealing, like Tarquin, with feline stride to the
couch of Lucretia. 1 should rather compare the Seminole to the ravenous beast of
prey, prowling, at the dark hour of midnight, when no shepherd is out on the hill,
and no whistle warns the devoted lambs that the wolf is on his walk (Smith
1836:106).
Obviously, written texts do not reflect past reality without gaps and on the
contrary, without undue stresses (introduced both by omissions and by the
character of origin and contextual biases of the documents in question), but their
image of past societies is, in any case, undoubtedly to be referred to the testimony
of archaeological sources (Vencl 1984:116).

Introduction
Where we find the remains of fortifications, physical barriers, and “lines of cleavage” in
settlement patterns, we should not simply assume that they delimit hardened spaces of political
domination, but attempt to clarify both the conditions under which these patterns emerged and
the effects they had on the people who lived among them (VanValkenburg and Osborne
2013:15). One method that has been demonstrated here is to broaden the traditional use of
KOCOA analysis for more appropriate application to a historical context as a tool for
understanding the process of war rather than simply its outcome.
Using both modern military theory and traditional archaeological theory to study the
Second Seminole War offers a much more comprehensive understanding of how it was
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conducted. Previous research on this war has taken only a site-specific approach, and very little
has been done to place these studies into a larger framework. As Gilchrist (2003:4) points out,
many studies of war “prioritize the experience of the soldier or warrior in battle, neglecting the
wider social and family networks and rendering the archaeology of warfare an exclusively male
perspective.” While I have not considered here the gender issues of war, Gilchrist highlights the
need to understand war in broader contexts. In the case of Florida forts, these “sites” did not exist
in isolation; they were manifestations of a decision-making process that would have been
influenced by the officers’ past experience and training. Yet formulating a comprehensive
method to incorporate these diverse ideas can be difficult, and any acknowledgement of outside
processes is a step in the right direction. This will open the door to the continuation of and
advancement in refining these methods.

19th-Century Military Culture in a Globalized Context
During the mid-19th century, the United States military was still finding its role in
society. The question of whether the country should have a standing army or rely on a citizen
militia was still being debated (McDonald 2004). The Military Academy at West Point started to
shape this debate. Thayer put his own mark on the military, however, when he instituted reforms
at West Point that ultimately shaped the military into what we have today. Relying on military
methods developed by other countries greatly impacted how the American military tradition
evolved. In the case of Florida, this globalized influence significantly affected the outcome of the
war through the use of tactics that were unsuitable for swampy terrain, and command of the
troops changed continuously throughout these seven long years. Yet despite new leadership, the
same strategies were employed time and again—strategies best suited to open, traditional, linear
207

warfare, not guerilla-style fighting. With the hundreds of officers that had been trained at West
Point and thousands of troops (both militia and regulars) having served in Florida, it is
improbable that the experiences in Florida would not have had an impact on the development of
the military culture. The training these troops received would have left an indelible mark on how
they operated, and this should be remembered when investigating historic military engagements
of any kind. Understanding the educational process allows archaeologists to approach the
mindset or worldview of military officers of that time, an approach that is sometime lacking in
historical archaeology.

Modern Military Science in Historic Contexts
The use of modern military theory in conflict archaeology can have advantages, but can
also have pitfalls. If applied incorrectly, it can oversimplify complex processes, which could
mean gaining no new insight into a conflict other than expanding its boundaries of what is
considered the core area of the battlefield to incorporate supporting features. While the use of
modern military theory is a crucial first step, much more information can be gleaned by adjusting
how these theories are applied.
The largest drawback of modern military theory is that it is premised on the fact that
troops are in constant communication with a command structure, that communication is instant,
and that the area of operation is highly mapped, with all troops having a thorough understanding
of the terrain they are occupying. The latter is typically attained by formal or informal briefing
sessions prior to entering a potential combat zone. This level of connectivity and real-time
information was not possible during early historical engagements; therefore, assuming that some
or all of the current methodologies are transferable can lead to false assumptions. As an example,
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the demise of General George Armstrong Custer has been romanticized in books and movies by
showing the valiant Seventh Cavalry fighting the Natives to the last man. In fact, Custer divided
his forces into three, with no modern means of communication. His last known communication
was a note he sent via a rider on horseback to Major Marcus Reno: “Benteen, Come on. Big
village, be quick, bring packs. P.S. Bing pacs [sic]” (Scott 2013:25-27).
According to Native American oral history, some of the soldiers threw away their guns
and ran. Many of them retreated to a dead-end ravine and were killed by Indians around the rim
(Fox 1997, Scott et al. 1989); this has been confirmed by archeological evidence. The
archaeology also shows that no line of defense was established on Last Stand Hill. Fox concludes
that the command structure broke down, and the lack of tactical organization led to chaos and the
eventual demise of the troops (Fox 1997).
Besides the lack of fast communications, the Florida wars were especially problematic
because there were no accurate maps of the entire territory at the time of the Second Seminole
War. Only a handful of key topographical feature locations were known, and errors in accuracy
of mapping them were widespread. Not only were the troops operating blind, but the landscape
was harsh and unfamiliar, which further hampered military progress.
This does not prevent the use of current military methodologies; rather, it simply requires
that concepts be altered to fit the time period and situation to which they are being applied.

The Military Mindset
To most accurately employ modern military science in a historic context, one first needs
to understand the environment in which the troops are operating. This can be done through a
variety of sources: culling documentary evidence from letters that explain why orders are being
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issued, locating maps and sketches to get a sense of how much collective landscape knowledge
the military, and incorporating archaeological evidence, since constructed features are physical
representations of thoughts and ideas. For example, the Fort King Road can be viewed as a
physical expression of the cognitive perceptions of what conflict entailed. The military built
roads because, in their mindset, roads are the proper way to move troops—and columns of troops
are how you properly carry out an attack on an enemy, despite the fact that the local landscape
made road building difficult and the enemy was too sparsely scattered across the landscape to
make the use of large numbers of troops in linear battle formations.

Psychology of Living in the Wilderness
Understanding the military mindset is crucial for the most productive use of modern
military theory, but grasping the psychology behind military decisions and actions also enhances
our understanding of these past events. Living in the remote wilderness, especially one as foreign
and unknown to the troops as Florida, would have severely strained the military’s operational
procedures. There are two basic options when dealing with an unknown environment. The first is
to adapt your situation to that of the environment. For example, the troops could have studied
how the Seminoles operated and adopted a similar methodology. The second is to make the
landscape conform to your expectations.
To a large degree, the military in Florida used this tactic: Vast amounts of time, effort,
and money were expended to create a built environment that was more comfortable for the
military. Leone argues that it is possible to reconstruct patterns of thought and ideology (Leone
1982), and the Second Seminole War is an ideal test case, since standardized education would
have influenced behaviors and reified certain ideologies. Forts were built; the comforts of home,
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such as ceramic dishes and window glass, were imported; and roads were built for ease of
transport—but, in reality, became easy points for ambush. In addition, large baggage trains often
accompanied the men on missions into the wilderness, but, again, were a hindrance rather than a
help.
Several themes emerge in the difficulties the military encountered due to their rigid
adherence to training and tradition. As mentioned previously, their use of roads became a
hindrance. Roads were labor-intensive to build, served as ideal ambush sites for the enemy, and
limited troop movements to certain locations that the enemy could easily avoid. The use of large
baggage trains also followed this pattern. The army never fully adapted to the climate, and with
disease being as prevalent as it was—and with more soldiers dying from disease than from
combat—very little was done to alter their behavior to remedy this. For instance, rather than
move forts away from swamps, which were disease vectors, senior officers would withdraw the
troops during the sickly summer season and then return in October and begin again. This
essentially meant that the war started over again from the beginning, literally rebuilding forts that
had been burnt down the previous season and searching for Seminoles all over again. In turn, this
withdrawal of troops allowed the Seminoles time to rest and resupply, having learned
generations ago how to deal with Florida summers.
Understanding fortifications and associated structures within the context of their
landscapes can provide interesting insights into the cultural and psychological motivations of the
inhabitants of these structures. Not only were forts constructed within the framework and rules
created by the military culture that officers and engineers were part of, but they were also created
to make the inhabitants feel safe. In this context, how the fort was constructed and what it was
furnished with also reveals what was considered necessary for defense: Thick palisade walls,
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two-story blockhouses, and perimeter defenses were built not only because the engineers were
trained to build them, but because they were perceived as providing protection and security.
Aside from these obvious parts of the fort, other, more subtle, comforts were brought in at what
was probably great cost and which could easily have been done without. For example, window
glass was not a necessity and must have been difficult to transport great distances to the frontier,
where getting basic necessities, such as food and forage, was a constant struggle. Yet
archaeology has discovered a significant amount of window glass at these forts. Ceramic dishes
would also have been difficult to transport across such harsh terrain, but numerous patterns have
been excavated at Fort King and Fort Dade. Perhaps this is suggestive of many men or officers
having their own ceramic dishes.
Perceived safety is another interesting phenomenon that must be addressed when thinking
about the psychology of living on the frontier. As previously mentioned, forts were built to
specifications that would allow the troops to feel as safe as possible. The fact that these forts
used two-story blockhouses and stout timber for palisades is testament to the uneasiness they felt
in the wilderness; it would have been labor-intensive to build such massive structures when
finding adequate lumber would have proven challenging. Also, a palisaded encampment might
have been just as secure without a two-story blockhouse and cannon. Roads fit into this idea of
perceived safety as well: The military preferred to travel on regular routes, despite knowing that
the Seminoles often ambushed troops using them.

Understanding Interactions
Aside from the tactical and operational difficulties faced during the Second Seminole
War, the intercultural interactions between the military and the Seminoles would have
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profoundly shaped both the physical and ideological landscapes of the war. The kinds of
interactions taking place would affect how the landscape was viewed, used, and modified. In the
case of the Seminole Wars, there was both hostile and non-hostile contact between these groups,
which changes how landscape use should be interpreted. For instance, fortifications play a
unique dual role. Their primary purpose is military in nature, as an aggressive display of strength
and ownership of the area through occupation. However, forts also served as sites for peaceful
negotiations and rallying points for the Seminoles to gather prior to deportation. Trade and
commerce between the Seminoles and the soldiers would also have taken place. In the analysis
of war, it is easy to overlook the non-conflict functions these structures would have served, but
which are equally important for deciphering the complex relationships between the groups.

Conclusions
The Second Seminole War serves as an ideal model for expanding how a small war can
be investigated by using modern military theory in conjunction with historical accounts to form a
more complete understanding of the complex nature of nontraditional warfare. I have attempted
to show how multifaceted war is, and that one cannot simply apply modern military theories to
past events without modification. The Seminole Wars were fraught with so many difficulties that
it would be impossible to incorporate them all into a single model. Problems ranged from a
Congress that declined to provide adequate money and supplies to a military complex that had
never fully grasped irregular warfare. My findings demonstrate that using KOCOA as a
predictive model provides a first step for more complex analyses of the war. KOCOA can be
enhance by incorporating more abstract concepts, such as how the military training of the time
affected the decision-making processes that led to the successes and failures of this lengthy
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engagement. Using these concepts, we can generally conclude that the U.S. was unsuccessful in
its military objective of eliminating or removing the Seminoles from the Florida territory because
of the officer training at West Point; its rigid European concepts had the following faults:
1. Followed linear warfare and failed to adapt to the local terrain.
2. Failed to adapt to guerrilla-type warfare.
3. Forts were supply depots and not tactical; they were designed for defense, not
offense.
4. Marches were encumbered by cannons and large baggage trains that hindered rapid
movement in the swamps. To compensate for this, roads had to be built, thus creating
points of ambush.
Despite not meeting this objective completely, there are plenty of small successes gained
by the military while in Florida. Some of the Seminoles were in fact relocated out west. Officers
did learn about diseases and moved some forts away from standing water, and then eventually
learned to withdraw troops during the sickly season. So while some officers saw Florida as a
failure and as damaging their reputation causing them to quit, often after barely a year in Florida,
there is in fact a spectrum of success and failure rather than definitive examples of failure. All
failures would have influenced the military in some way, it becomes a matter of teasing out what
those effects were if it was not success, remains to be determined.
Through the use of GIS modeling, I created a more comprehensive model of the Second
Seminole War that allowed for an interconnected analysis rather than one that was site-specific.
Conflict has been studied in isolation, but in reality it is a symptom of interactions between
people and places. Divorcing conflict from this network of causes and effects limits the depth of
research questions that can be asked. The use of modern military theories to investigate the
military’s past allows for that history to be read “with the grain” and archaeology provides a
method to “read against the grain”. This multivocal approach to the past allows for unique
questions about the role of education in the ability to adapt to an environment to be asked.
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Future Directions
This study provided a preliminary view of how KOCOA could be broadened to
investigate more complex research questions such as the role education plays. Future directions
for this research model include investigating how the experiences in Florida may have shaped
how officers responded in later conflicts. For example, several officers in Florida are sent to
Texas straight from Florida to assist in stopping the Texas Revolution. Perhaps the officers took
lessons learned in Florida to Texas. While it was difficult to show adaptation of military tactics
in Florida, perhaps evidence for this adaptation is available in how the conflict in Texas was
carried out. Another interesting area of research would be to incorporate more logistical data into
the model presented here. Detailed post returns are available for each fort and were submitted
every month. These returns list number of troops and rations available at each fort and how many
men were on sick roll. A model could be created showing troop numbers and movement through
time across the Florida landscape to determine if troops were placed as strategically as possible
or if there was some other driving force behind troop movements. Monthly weather reports are
also available for some of the forts and can be factored into this approach as well.

215

REFERENCES
Abbot, Henry L.
1878 Memoir of Dennis Hart Mahan 1802-1871.
Adams, Colin and Ray Laurence
2001 Travel and Geography in the Roman Empire. Routledge.
Adams, George, R.
1970 The Caloosahatchee Massacre: Its Significance in the Second Seminole War. Florida
Historical Quarterly 48(4): 368-380.
American Battlefield Protection Program
2014. http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/. Accessed March 3, 2014.
Army and Navy Chronicle
1836. Washington City.
1837. Washington City.
Ashmore, Wendy
2002 "Decisions and Dispositions": Socializing Spatial Archaeology. American Anthropologist
104(4): 1172-1183.
Austin, Robert J.
1993 Archaeological Investigations at the Site of the Tampa Convention Center, Tampa, Florida:
Volume 2: Historic Resources, Excavations at Fort Brooke, St. Petersburg.
Baker, Henry
1996 Fort Foster Revisited: Archaeological Excavations at 8hi112 1976-1977.
Barth, Fredrik
1969 Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference. Little
Brown, Boston.
216

Bell, Christine
2004 Investigating Second Seminole War Sites in Florida: Identification through Limited
Testing. Department of Anthropology University of South Florida, Tampa.
Bender, Barbara
2002 Time and Landscape. Current Anthropology 43(Supplement): S103-S112.
Betros, Lance
2004 West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond McWhiney Foundation Press Abilene.
Bittle, George C.
1966 The Florida Militia's Role in the Battle of Withlacoohee. Florida Historical Quarterly
44(4): 303-312.
Board of Visitors
1821 Annual Report of the Board of Visitors to the United States Military Academy Made to
Congress and the Secretary of War for the Year 1821.
1824 Annual Report of the Board of Visitors to the United States Military Academy Made to
Congress and the Secretary of War for the Year 1824.
Bogart, Dan
2004 Turnpike Trusts and the Transportation Revolution in 18th Century England. Explorations
in Economic History 24(2): 268-282.
Boynton, Edward C.
1871 History of West Point, and Its Military Importance During the American Revolution: And
the Origin and Progress of the United States Military Academy. D. Van Nostrand.
Bressy, C, et al.
2005 Cultural Interactions During the Ubaid and Halaf Periods: Tell Kurdu (Amuq Valley,
Turkey) Obsidian Sourcing. Journal or Archaeological Science 32: 1560-1565.
Brodersen, Kai
2001 The Presentation of Geographical Knowledge for Travel and Transport in the Roman
World: Itineraria Non Tantum Adnotata Sed Etiam Picta. Routledge.

217

Brooke, George M. and James W. Covington
1953 The Establishment of Fort Brooke: The Beginning of Tampa. The Florida Historical
Quarterly 31(4): 273-278.
Burghardt, Andrew F.
1969 The Origin and Development of the Road Network of the Niagara Peninsula, Ontario,
1770-1851. Annals of the Association of American Geographer 59(3): 417-440.
Butler, David Stewart
2001 An Archaeological Model of Seminole Combat Behavior. Applied Anthropology University
of South Florida, Tampa.
Byrne, Danis
2008 Counter-Mapping in the Archaeological Landscape. In Handbook of Landscape
Archaeology, David, Bruno and Jullian Thomas, eds. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
Caldwell, Douglas R., et al.
2004 Studies in Military Geography and Geology. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Cameron, Catherine
1998 Coursed Adobe Architecture, Style, and Social Boundaries in the American Southwest.
Smithsonian Institution Press.
Carrier, James G.
2012 Anthropology after the Crisis. Focaal-Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 64:
115-128.
Chevallier, Raymond
1976 Roman Roads. University of California Press.
Clayton, Sarah C.
2005 Interregional Relationships in Mesoamerica: Interpreting Maya Ceramics at Teotihuacan.
Cohen, Eliot and John Gooch
1991 Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. Vintage Books, New York.

218

Coker, E. C. and D. L. Schafer
1990 A West Point Graduate in the Second Seminole War: William Warren Chapman and the
View from Fort Foster. The Florida Historical Quarterly 68(4): 447-475.
Covington, James W.
1958 Life at Fort Brooke 1824-1836. The Florida Historical Quarterly 36(4): 319-330.
1961 The Armed Occupation Act of 1842. Florida Historical Quarterly 40(1): 41-52.
1981 The Billy Bowlegs War, 1855-1858; the Final Stand of the Seminoles against the Whites.
The Micker House Publishers, Chuluota.
Craig, Alan K. and Christopher Peebles
1974 Ethnoecologic Change among the Seminoles, 1740-1840. Geoscience and Man 5(83-96).
Cullum, George W.
1868 Biographical Register of the U.S. Military Academy, at West Point, N.Y., from Its
Establisment March 16, 1802 to the Army Re-Organization of 1866-1867. D. VanNostrand.
Cunningham, Kevin and Robert R. Tomes
2004 Space-Time Orientations and Contemporary Political-Military Thought. Armed Forces &
Society 31(1): 119-140.
Cusick, James
2003 The Other War of 1812. University Press of Florida, Tampa.
David, Bruno and Jullian Thomas
2008 Handbook of Landscape Archaeology. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
Davis, T. Frederick
1929 The Seiminole Council, October 23-25, 1834. The Florida Historical Quarterly 7(4): 330356.
Delle, James A.
1999 "A Good and Easy Speculation": Spatial Conflict, Collusion and Resistance in Late
Sixteenth-Century Munster Ireland Iiaemaiioml Journal of Historical Archaeology 3(1): 11-35.

219

Department of Defense
1990 FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis.
2001 FM 3-0, Operations.
2006 Joint Operations 3-0.
Dickens, Roy S.
1977 Discovery and Interpretation of the Indian Barricade at Horseshoe Bend National Military
Park, Alabama. The Conference on Historic Site Archaeology papers 11(1): 1-42.
Dobbert, Marion L.
1975 Another Route to a General Theory of Cultural Transmission: A Systems Model. Council
on Anthropology and Education Quarterly 6(2): 22-26.
Doyle, Peter and Matthew R. Bennett
2002 Terrain in Military History: An Introduction. In Fields of Battle: Terrain in Military
History, Vol. 64. Springer.
Drexler, Carl G.
2003 Identifying Culturally-Based Variability in Artillery Ammunition Fragments Recovered
from the Battlefield of Pea Ridge, Arkansas. Department of Anthropology and Geography
University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Duane, William
1810 Military Dictionary, or, Explanation of the Several Systems of Discipline of Different Kinds
of Troops, Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry; the Principles of Fortification, and All the Modern
Improvements in the Science of Tactics: Comprising the Pocket Gunner, or Little Bombardier;
the Military Regulations of the United States; the Weights, Measures, and Monies of All Nations;
the Technical Terms and Phrases of the Art of War in the French Language. Particularly
Adapted to the Use of the Military Insitituion of the United States., Philadelphia.
Duever, Linda Conway, et al.
1997 Old Bellamy Road Project Final Report Volume I: Technical Report.
Eid, Leroy V.
1988 'A Kind of Running Fight': Indian Battlefield Tactics in the Late Eighteenth Century. The
Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 71(2): 147-171.

220

Ellis, Gary L., et al.
2009 Fort King Park, Phase I Archaeological Study. Gulf Archaeology Research Institute Field
Study 08-2. Prepared for the City of Ocala., Ocala.
Fairbanks, Charles H.
1974 Florida Indians Iii: Ethnohistorical Report on the Florida Indians. Garland Publishing,
Inc.
Ferling, John E.
1980 A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America. Greenwood Press,
Westport.
Fitzpatrick, M. Scott
2008 Maritime Interregional Interaction in Micronesia: Deciphering Multi-Group Contacts and
Exchange Systems through Time. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 27: 131-147.
Fonzo, Stephen
2008 A Documentary and Landscape Analysis of the Buckland Mills Battlefield (Va042).
Buckland Preservation Society.
Key Terrain; Observation and Fields of Fire; Cover and Concealment; Obstacles; and Avenues
of Approach and Retreat at the Battle of Buckland Mills 19th October 1863.
http://www.fauquiercounty.gov/documents/committees/TranspComm/minutes/Battle_of_Buckla
nd_KOCOA_Analysis.pdf. Accessed March 21, 2014.
Forbes, Jack D.
1968 Frontiers in American History and the Role of the Frontier Historian. Ethnohistory 15(2):
203-235.
Fox, Richard A. Jr.
1993 Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle. University of Oklahoma Press.
1997 Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle: The Little Big Horn Re-Examined.
University of Oklahomoa Press, Norman.
Fox, Richard A. Jr. and Douglas D. Scott
1991 The Post-Civil War Battlefield Pattern: An Example from the Custer Battlefield. Historical
Archaeology 25(2): 92-103.

221

Geertz, Clifford
1973 The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. Basic Books, New York.
Gilchrist, Roberta
2003 Introduction: Towards a Social Archaeology of Warfare World Archaeology 35(1): 1-6.
Gonzalez, Roberto
2007 Towards Mercenary Anthropology? The New Us Army Counterinsurgency Manual Fm 324 and the Military-Anthropology Complex. Anthropology Today 23(3): 14-19.
Green, William and Roland L. Rodell
1994 The Mississippian Presence and Cahokia Interaction at Trempealeau, Wisconsin. American
Antiquity 59(2): 334-339.
Gulf Archaeology Research Institute
1999 Final Report: An Archaeological Study to Locate the Stockade Walls of Historic Fort King,
Ocala.
Hall, Thomas D., et al.
2011 World-Systems Analysis and Archaeology: Continuing the Dialogue. Journal of
Archaeological Research 19: 233-279.
Hammond, E.A.
1969 Bemrose's Medical Case Notes from the Second Seminole War. Florida Historical
Quarterly 47(4): 401-413.
Hayden, Brian and Rick Schulting
1997 The Plateau Interaction Sphere and Late Prehistoric Cultural Complexity. American
Antiquity 62(1): 51-85.
Heal, Sid
2005 An Illustrated Guide to Tactical Diagramming. Lantern Books, New York.
Hegmon, Michelle, et al.
1997 Production of San Juan Red Ware in the Northern Southwest: Insights into Regional
Interaction in Early Puebloan Prehistory. American Antiquity 62(3): 449-463.

222

Hirsch, Adam J.
1988 The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England The Journal of
American History 74(4): 1187-1212.
Hirth, Kenneth G.
1978 Interregional Trade and the Formation of Prehistoric Gateway Communities. American
Antiquity 43(1): 35-45.
Hitchcock, Robert K. and Laurence E. Bartram
1998 Social Boundaries, Technical Systems, and the Use of Space and Technology in the
Kalahari. In The Archaeology of Social Boundaries. Smithsonian Institution Press, City.
Hood, Washington
1838 Map of the Seat of War in Florida. In David Rumsey Historical Map Collection. U.S.
Topographical Engineers, City.
Hoskin, Richard H. and W. Keith
1988 The Genesis of Accountability: The West Point Connections. Accounting, Organizations
and Society 13(1): 37-73.
Howe, Daniel Walker
2007 What Hath God Wrought. Oxford University Press, New York.
Hudson, Mark J.
2006 Pots Not People Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Postwar Japanese Archaeology. Critique
of Anthropology 26(4): 411-434.
Jenkins, David
2001 A Network Analysis of Inka Roads, Administrative Centers, and Storage Facilities.
Ethnohistory 48(4): 655-687.
Johnson, Matthew H.
2012 Phenomenologial Appraoches in Landscape Archaeology. Annual Review of Anthropology
41: 269-284.
Kanter, John
2008 The Archaeology of Regions: From Discrete Analytical Toolkit to Ubiquitous
Spatial Perspective. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 16: 37-81.
223

Kelly, Kenneth G.
1997 The Archaeology of African-European Interaction: Investigating the Social Roles of Trade,
Traders, and the Use of Space in the Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Hueda Kingdom,
Republic of Benin. World Archaeology 28(3): 351-369.
Kenzle, Susan C.
1997 Enclosing Walls in the Northern San Juan: Sociophysical Boundaries and Defensive
Fortifications in the American Southwest. Journal of Field Archaeology 24(2): 195-210.
Kilcullen, David
2010 Counterinsurgency. Oxford, New York.
Knapp, Arthur Bernard and Wendy Ashmore
1999 Archaeological Landscapes: Constructed, Conceptualized, Ideational. In Archaeologies of
Landscape: Contemporary Perspectives, Ashmore, Wendy, editor editors. Wiley-Blackwell,
Malden.
Knetsch, Joe
2003 Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858. Arcadia Publishing.
Kohl, Philip L.
1987 The Use and Abuse of World Systems Theory: The Case of the Pristine West Asian State.
Advances in Archaeological Method and Theory 11: 1-35.
Kohn, Richard H.
1975 Eagle and Sword. The Free Press, New York.
Kooyman, Brian
2006 Boundary Theory as a Means to Understanding Social Space
in Archaeological Sites. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 25: 424-435.
Laumer, Frank
1966 This Was Fort Dade. The Florida Historical Quarterly 45(1): 1-11.
1968 Encounter by the River. The Florida Historical Quarterly 46(4): 322-339.
1995 Dade's Last Command University Press of Florida Tampa.
1998 Amidst a Storm of Bullets: The Diary of Lt. Henry Prince in Florida. University of Tampa
Press, Tampa.
224

Laurence, Ray
1999 The Roads of Roman Italy: Mobility and Cultural Change. Routledge, City.
Lawres, Nathan R.
2008 “You Have Guns and So Have We…” an Ethnohistoric Analysis of Creek and Seminole
Combat Behaviors. Department of Anthropology University of Central Florida, Orlando.
Leone, Mark P.
1982 Some Opinions About Recovering Mind. American Antiquity 47(4): 742-760.
2010 Critical Historical Archaeology. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
Lightfoot, Kent G. and Antoinette Martinez
1995 Frontiers and Boundaries in Archaeological Perspective. Annual Review of Anthropology
24: 471-492.
Lyons, Diane E.
2007 Building Power in Rural Hinterlands: An Ethnoarchaeological Study of Vernacular
Architecture in Tigray, Ethiopia. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 14(2): 179-207.
MacEachern, Scott
1998 Scale, Style and Cultural Variation: Technological Traditions in the Northern Mandara
Mountains. In The Archaeology of Social Boundaries, Stark, Miriam T, editor editors.
Smithsonian Institution Press.
Mahan, Dennis Hart
1836 A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification, with the General Outlines of the Principles
Regulating the Arrangement, the Attack, and the Defence of Permanent Works. Wiley and Long,
New York.

225

Mahon, John K.
1960 The Journal of A.B. Meek and the Second Seminole War, 1836. Florida Historical
Quarterly 38(4): 302-318.
1962a The Treaty of Moultrie Creek, 1823. Florida Historical Quarterly 40(4): 350-372.
1962b Two Seminole Treaties: Payne's Landing, 1832, and Ft. Gibson, 1833. Florida Historical
Quarterly 41(1): 1-21.
1967 History of the Second Seminole War 1835-1842. University of Florida Press, Gainsville.
1985 History of the Second Seminole War Revised Edition. University of Florida Press.
Maio, Christopher, et al.
2013 Application of Geographic Information Technologies to Historical Landscape
Reconstruction and Military Terrain Analysis of an American Revolution
Battlefield: Preservation Potential of Historic Lands in Urbanized Settings, Boston,
Massachusetts, USA. Journal of Cultural Heritage 14(4): 317-331.
Marine Corps Institute
1997 Military Operations in Urban Terrain. Mci 0366b.
Martin, Joseph Plumb
1988 Private Yankee Doodle. Eastern Acorn Press, New York, NY.
McCarthy, Mike
2008 Boundaries and the Archaeology of Frontier Zones. In Handbook of Landscape
Archaeology, David, Bruno and Jullian Thomas, editors. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
McDermott, R. P. and David R. Roth
1978 The Social Organization of Behavior: Interactional Approaches. Annual Reviews 7: 321345.
McDonald, Robert M. S.
2004 Thomas Jefferson's Military Academy University of Virginia Press Charlottesville.
McEwan, B.G.
1993 The Spanish Missions of La Florida. University Press of Florida.

226

McMasters, Kristen
2011 Using Kocoa for a Better Understanding of the Battlefield Landscape. American
Battlefield Protection Program, City.
Milanich, Jerald T.
1995 Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe. University Press of Florida, Tampa.
1998 Florida's Indians from Ancient Times to the Present. University Press of Florida, Tampa.
Missal, John and Mary Lou Missal
2005 This Miserable Pride of a Soldier. University of Tampa Press, Tampa.
Morris, Jerry C. and Jeffrey A. Hough
2009 The Fort King Road Then and Now, Dade City.
Motte, Jacob Rhett
1963 Journey into Wilderness: An Army Surgeon's Account of Life in Camp and Field During
the Creek and Seminole Wars, 1836-1838. University of Florida Press.
Nashville Banner & Nashville Whig
1836 Florida. Nashville, TN.
Nelson, Harold
1955 Military Roads for War and Peace~1791-1836. Military Affairs 19(1): 1-14.
Noel Hume, Ivor
1969 Historical Archaeology. Alfred Knopf.
Noronha, Valerian T. and Michael F. Goodchild
1992 Modeling Interregional Interaction: Implications for Defining Functional Regions. Annals
of the Association of American Geographers 82(1): 86-102.
O'Connor, Colin
1993 Roman Bridges. Cambridge University Press.
Ocala Planning Department
1995 The Fort King Site: Ocala, Marion County Florida, Report on Archaeology and History,
Ocala.
227

Odess, Daniel
1998 The Archaeology of Interaction: Views from Artifact Style and Material Exchange in
Dorset. American Antiquity 63(3): 417-435.
Oosterbeek, Luis
1997 War in the Chalcolithic? The Meaning of Western Mediterranean Chalcolthic Hillforts. . In
Material Harm: Archaeological Studies of War and Violence, Carman, J., editor editors.
Cruithne Press, Glasgow.
Ortner, Sherry B.
2006 Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power, and the Acting Subject. Duke University
Press, Durham.
Pappas, George S.
1993 To the Point: The United States Military Academy, 1802-1902. Praeger, Westport.
Parker, Geoffrey
1976 The "Military Revolution," 1556-1660--a Myth? The Journal of Modern History 48(2):
196-214.
Parkinson, William A.
2006 Tribal Boundaries: Stylistic Variability and Social Boundary Maintenance During the
Transition to the Copper Age on the Great Hungarian Plain. Journal of Anthropological
Archaeology 25: 33-58.
Parkinson, William A. and Paul R. Duffy
2007 Fortifications and Enclosures in European Prehistory: A Cross-Cultural Perspective.
Journal of Archaeological Research 15(97-141).
Pearson, Chris, et al.
2010 Introduction: Beneath the Camouflage: Revealing Militarized Landscapes. In Militarized
Landscapes from Gettysburg to Salisbury Plain, Pearson, Chris, et al., editors. Continuum, New
York.
Peterson, Andrew
1994 The Archaeology of the Syrian and Iraqi Hajj Routes. World Archaeology 26(1): 47-56.

228

Phillips, Thomas R., (editor)1985 Roots of Strategy. Stackpole Books, Harrisburg.
Piatek, Bruce
1995 The History of Fort King, 1827-1846. In, the Fort King Site, Part I: History of Fort King,
Ocala.
Porter, Kenneth W.
1967 Billy Bowlegs (Holata Micco) in the Seminole Wars: A Study in Relationships and
Identities. Florida Historical Quarterly 45(3): 219-242.
Porter, Patrick
2007 Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War. Parameters 37(2):
45-58.
Potter, Woodburne
1836 The War in Florida: Being an Exposition of Its Causes, and an Accurate History of the
Campaigns of Generals Clinch, Gaines, and Scott Lewis and Coleman.
Precourt, Walter E.
1980 Functions of Propertylike Information in Stateless Societies. Central Issues in
Anthropology 2(2): 23-36.
Pruitt, Sarah
2013 235 Years Ago, Washington’s Troops Made Camp at Valley Forge. A&E Television
Networks, LLC. Accessed June 7, 2013.
Rapoport, Amos
1982 The Meaning of the Built Environment: A Nonverbal Communication Approach. Sage
Publications.
Reeve, Mary-Elizabeth
1993 Regional Interaction in the Western Amazon: The Early Colonial Encounter and
the Jesuit. Ethnohistory 44: 106-138.
Richter, Daniel K.
1983 War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience. The William and Mary Quarterly 40(4): 528559.

229

Robb, John
2013 Material Culture, Landscapes of Action, and Emergent Causation: A New Model for the
Origins of the European Neolithic. Current Anthropology 54(6): 657-683.
Robbins, James S.
2006 Last in Their Class: Custer, Pickett and the Goats of West Point Encounter Books, New
York.
Rockman, Marcy and James Steele,
2003 The Colonization of Unfamiliar Landscapes: The Archaeology of Adaptation. Routledge,
New York.
Rogers, Robert
Roger's Rangers Rules or Plan of Discipline. Military/Info Publishing http://www.militaryinfo.com/freebies/roger.htm.
Ross, Steven
1979 From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866. Fairleigh Dickinson University
Press, Rutherford.
Schene, Michael
1976 Fort Foster: A Second Seminole War Fort. The Florida Historical Quarterly 54(3): 319339.
Schortman, Edward M.
1989 Interregional Interaction in Prehistory: The Need for a New Perspective. American
Antiquity 51(1): 52-65.
Schortman, Edward M. and Patricia A. Urban
1987 Modeling Interregional Interaction in Prehistory. Advances in Archaeological Method and
Theory 11: 37-95.
1998 Culture Contact Structure and Process Studies in Culture Contact: Interaction, Culture
Change, and Archaeology Occasional Paper No. 25.
Schortman, Edward M., et al.
1986 Interregional Interaction in the Se Maya Periphery: The Santa Barbara Archaeological
Project 1983-1984 Seasons. Journal of Field Archaeology 13(3): 259-272.

230

Scott, Douglas and Andrew McFeaters
2011 The Archaeology of Historic Battlefields: A History and Theoretical Development in
Conflict Archaeology. Journal of Archaeological Research 19: 103-132.
Scott, Douglas D.
2009 Studying the Archaeology of War: A Model Based on the Investigation of Frontier Military
Sties in the American Trans-Mississippi West. In International Handbook of Historical
Archaeology, Majewski, Teresita and David Gaimster, editors, pp. 299-317. Springer, New
York.
2013 Uncovering History: Archaeological Investigations at the Little Bighorn. University of
Oklahoma Press, Norman.
Scott, Douglas D. and Peter Bleed
2011 Contexts for Conflict: Conceptual Tools for Interpreting Archaeological Reflections of
Warfare. Journal of Conflict Archaeology 6(1): 42-64.
Scott, Douglas D., et al.
1989 Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn. University of Oklahoma
Press.
Shady, Ruth and Arturo Ruiz
1979 Evidence for Interregional Relationships During the Middle Horizon on the North-Central
Coast of Peru. American Antiquity 44(4): 676-684.
Sivilich, Daniel
2009 What the Musket Ball Can Tell You: Monmouth Battlefield State Park, New Jersey. In
Fields of Conflict, Battlefield Archaeology, from the Roman Empire to the Korean War, Scott,
Douglas, et al., editors, pp. 89. Potomac Books, Inc., Dulles.
Sivilich, Michelle
2012 A Proposed Model to Investigate the Role of Education in the Success of Military Strategy
in Florida During the Second Seminole War (1835-1842). Historical Archaeology 46(1): 62-73.
Skelton, William B.
2004 West Point and Officer Professionalism, 1817-1877. In West Point: Two Centruies and
Beyond, Betros, Lance, editor editors. McWhiney Foundations Press, Abilene.

231

Smith, Angele
2007 Mapped Landscapes: The Politics of Metaphor, Knowledge, and Representation on
Nineteenth-Century Irish Ordnance Survey Maps. Historical Archaeology 41(1): 81-91.
Smith, David
1999 Introduction: The Sharing and Dividing of Geographical Space. In Shared Space, Divided
Space: Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization, Chisholm, M. and David Smith, editors.
Unwin Hyman, London.
Smith, Samuel Stelle
1964 The Battle of Monmouth. Philip Freneu Press, Monmouth Beach, NJ.
Smith, William W.
1836 Sketch of the Seminole War and Sketches During a Campaign. Dan J. Dowling,
Charleston.
South, Stanley
1978a Pattern Recognition in Historical Archaeology. American Antiquity 43(2): 223-230.
1978b Research Strategies for Archaeological Pattern Recognition on Historic Sites. World
Archaeology 10(1): 36-50.
Spencer-Wood, Suzanne M. and Sherene Baugher
2010 Introduction to the Historical Archaeology of Powered Cultural Landscapes. International
Journal of Historical Archaeology 14: 463-474.
Sprague, John T.
1848 The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War University of Florida Press
Gainsville
Starbuck, David
2011 The Archaeology of Forts and Battlefields. University Press of Florida.
Stark, Miriam T.
1998 Technical Choices and Social Boundaries in Material Culture Patterning: An Introduction.
In The Archaeology of Social Boundaries. Smithsonian Institution Press.
Starkey, Armstrong
1998 European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815. University of Oklahoma Press.
232

Steadman, Sharon R.
1995 Prehistoric Interregional Interaction in Anatolia and the Balkans: An Overview. Bulletin of
the American Schools of Oriental Research (299/300): 13-39.
Stein, Gill J.
2002 From Passive Periphery to Active Agents: Emerging Perspectives in the Archaeology of
Interregional Interaction. American Anthropologist 104(3): 903-916.
Stojanowski, Christopher M.
2005 Biocultural Histories in La Florida: A Bioarchaeological Perspective. The University of
Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa.
Stoler, Ann Laura
2009 Along the Archival Grain. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Stoltman, James B.
1991 Ceramic Petrography as a Technique for Documenting Cultural Interaction: An Example
from the Upper Mississippi Valley. American Antiquity 56(1): 103-120.
Stone, Garry Wheeler, et al.
1996 A Deadly Minuet: The Advance of the New England “Picked Men” against the Royal
Highlanders at the Battle of Monmouth. The Brigade Dispatch 26(2): 2-18.
Stone, Tammy
2003 Social Identity and Ethnic Interaction in the Western Pueblos of the American Southwest. J
Archaeol Method Theory 10(1): 31-67.
Strang, Veronica
2008 Uncommon Ground: Landscape as Social Geography. In Handbook of Landscape
Archaeology, David, Bruno and Jullian Thomas, editors. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
Sturtevant, William C., (editor)1971 Creek into Seminole. Random House, New York.
Sutherland, Tim
2005 Battlefield Archaeology-A Guide Ot the Archaeology of Conflict. University of Bradford,
Bradford.

233

Swartz, David
1997 Culture & Power the Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. The University of Chicago.
The Farmers' Cabinet
1836 Washington, Jan. 27, 1836. In The Farmers' Cabinet, Vol. 34. City.
Thomas, Jullian and Bruno David
2008 Preface. In Handbook of Landscape Archaeology, David, Bruno and Jullian Thomas,
editors. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
Trigger, Bruce
1989 A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Utley, Robert M.
1984 The Indian Frontier of the American West 1846-1890. University of New Mexico Press.
Van Dyke, R. M.
1999 The Chaco Connection: Evaluating Bonito Style Architecture in Outlier Communities.
Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 18: 471-506.
VanValkenburg, Parker and James F. Osborne
2013 Home Turf: Archaeology, Territoriality, and Politics. Archaeological Papers of the
American Anthropological Association 22(1): 1-27.
Vauban, Sebastien Le Prestre de
1762 The New Method of Fortification, as Practiced by Monsieur De Vauban, Engineer-General
of France. Together with a New Treatise of Geometry. C. Hitch and L. Howes.
Vencl, SL.
1984 War and Warfare in Archaeology. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 3: 116-132.
von Steuben, Fredrick William
1985 Baron Von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual; a Facsimile Reprint of the 1794
Edition. Dover Publications, Mineola, NY.
Weisman, Brent
1989 Like Beads on a String: A Culture History of the Seminole Indians in Northern Peninsular
Florida. The University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa.
234

1999 Unconquered People: Florida's Seminole and Miccosukee Indians. University Press of
Florida.
2007 Nativism, Resistance, and Ethnogenesis of the Florida Seminole Indian Identity. Historical
Archaeology 41(4): 198-212.
Wells, Peter S.
1980 Culture Contact and Culture Change: Early Iron Age Central Europe and the
Mediterranean World. Cambridge Univ Press.
Welsch, Robert L. and John Edward Terrell
1998 Material Culture, Social Fields, and Social Boundaries on the Sepik Coast of New Guinea.
In The Archaeology of Social Boundaries. Smithsonian Institution Press.
West, Patsy
1998 The Enduring Seminoles from Alligator Wrestling to Ecotourism. University Press of
Florida, Gainsville.
Whitehorne, Joseph W. A.
2006 Blueprint for Nineteenth-Century Camps: Castramentation, 1778 - 1865. In Huts and
History: The Historical Archaeology of Military Encampment During the American Civil War,
Greer, Clarence R., et al., editors, pp. 28-50. University Press of Florida, Gainesville.
Wobst, Martin
1974 Boundary Conditions for Paleolithic Social Systems: A Simulation Approach. American
Antiquity 39(2): 147-178.
Wolf, Eric R.
1982 Europe and the People without History. University of California Press.
Zedeno, Maria Nieves
2008 The Archaeology of Territory and Territoriality. In Handbook of Landscape Archaeology,
David, Bruno and Jullian Thomas, editors. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
Zirker, Daniel, et al.
2008 The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-Ethnic Identity in Developing Countries. Armed
Forces & Society 34(2): 314-337.

235

Walker K. Armistead

3

2

1836-41

William Gates

11

2

Julius F. Heileman
Samuel Champlin
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1835-36
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1
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William J. Worth
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APPENDIX A: West Point graduates that fought in the Seminole Wars

Academic
Board
1803

1849

died

1806

1863

1806
1807

1836
1816

1807

1817

1817-1818
1815-19, 1718, 21-22
1837-42,
1856-57, 5758
1837

1808
1809

1823

retired

1811

1863

retired

1812

1837

died

1815-19, 1718, 19-20, 2022, 1835-39
1831-32, 35
1836, 37-38
1836-38, 3839
1836-37, 37,
38, 38-40, 4042, 52-52
1817-1818
1823-24

1812

1846

died

1814
1814
1814

1835
1863
1861

died
retired
died

1814

1853

died

1814

1863

retired
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taught, cadet of USMA from its
organization
retired
cadet of USMA from its
organization
died
June 27, died at Fort Drane
disbanded then joined McGregor's Expedition
against Florida as Colonel and Chief
of Artillery, as Colonel and Chief of
Artillery, and was engaged in the
Capture of Amelia Island, Fla, July
30, 1817
died
"Here he devoted his leisure hours
to the study of the early campaigns
of Napoleon, who was then the
military prodigy of the world; but
this fascinating occupation was soon
interrupted by his having to watch
smugglers on the Florida frontier,
and march from one unhealthy camp
to another in the Gulf States" met
Winfield Scott
served with Jackson on campaigns
in FL

killed battle of Okee-cho-bee, Dec.
25
also w/ Jackson in 1814, Provost
Marshal at the execution of
Arbuthnot and Ambrister
Killed at Dade's massacre

Oct. 8 at Fort Brooke, yellow fever

Commissioner for running
Boundary of Florida Indians'
reservations, 1823-24 ;

Cullum #

War

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class

End of
Service

Status

Class Rank

Name

Charles M. Thruston
Jabez Parkhurst

104
114

2
1

1835, 36,
1816-1818

1814
1814

1836
1821

retired
died

Bradley S. A. Lowe

118

1

1817-1818

1814

1819

retired

Thomas W. Lendrum
Thomas J. Leslie
William H. Chase

145
147
150

2

1835-36

1815
1815
1815

1852
1869
1856

died
retired
retired

William B. Davidson

152

2

1815

1840

died

Benj. L. E.
Bonneville
Samuel Cooper

155

2

1837-38, 3839, 40
1839-42, 43

1815

1861

retired

French Born

156

2

1841-42

1815

1861

retired

James M. Spencer

162

1

1817

1829

died

William M. Graham

164

2

1817

1847

died

James D. Graham

165

2

1817-18, 1820
1827-28,
1829-30, 3032, 32-35, 3536, 37-38, 40,
41-42
1831-32

"Compiler of 'A Concise System of
Instructions and Regulations for the
Militia and Volunteers of the United
States' 1836"
served with Jackson on campaigns
in FL
"superintending repairs of Military
Road from Ft. Brooke to the
Seminole Agency Fla."

1817

1865

died

Charles Despinville

166

1

1822-24, 2627

1817

1830

retired

John R. Vinton

168

2

1817

1847

died

Richard B. Lee
Frederick L. Griffith

169
170

2
1

1837-38, 3842
1836
1817-18

1817
1817

1861
1832

retired
died

Edward J. Lambert
William Gibbs
McNeill

171
172

1

1817-18
1834

1817
1817

Ethan A. Hitchcock

177

2

John M. Washington

178

Samuel Ringgold
Harvey Brown

184
185

5
6

Samuel Mackenzie
Giles Porter
John J. Jackson

187

8

190

11

1844-45

1836, 40, 42,
43
2
1836-38, 3839
2
1836-37
2, 3 1836-38, 3738, 52-53, 5456
2
1841
2
1836-38
1
1820-21

1817

1855

retired

1817

1853

died

1818
1818

1846
1863

died
retired

1818
1818
1818

1847

died

1823

retired
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Notes

served with Jackson on campaigns
in FL
served with Jackson on campaigns
in FL
paymaster in FL
on special Board of Engineers for
examination of Florida Reef, also
president of Alabama and Florida
Railroad Company 1856-61
Dec. 25, Indian Key

Asst. Top. Engineer on Railroad
Survey in... & Florida
on Topographical duty, in garrison
at St. Augustine, Survey of Indian
Reservation

served with Jackson on campaigns
in FL
Company's Chief Engineer, 183237, - of Railroads in Florida. And
Alabama, 1834
fought at Izard

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class

End of
Service

19
21
5

3
1

1845-47
1818-20
1845

1818
1818
1819

1862
1821
1867

Justin Dimick
Benjamin Walker
John L'Engle

213
215
236

11
13
18

2
2
2

1836, 1849-57
1840-42
1832-33, 3335, 35-36

1819
1819
1819

1863
1858
1838

William H. Swift

231

29

James A. Chambers
Daniel D. Tompkins
John H. Winder

239
254
242

8
10
11

2
2
1

Samuel B.
Dusenberry
Lewis N. Morris
George F. Lindsay
Thomas Noel
Edgar S. Hawkins
William W. Morris

244

13

2

248
250
254
258
261

17
19
23
27
30

2
2
2
2
2

Edward C. Ross
John B. Scott

268
274

7
13

Otis Wheeler

281

20

Henry Bainbridge

282

21

Julius A. d'Lagnel

285

24

George Dutton

286

1

3

Campbell Graham

294

9

2

1819

Status

Class Rank

198
200
207

War

Cullum #

Hartman Bache
Leonard O. Brooke
Henry Brewerton

Name

retired
Surveys for defences: Florida Reef
disbanded
retired
special Board of Engineers for
examination of Florida Reef for
locating defensive works,
superintendent of USMA 45-52
retired
died
retired
superintending repairs of road in
Florida
from 1826-28 had charge of the
various parties engaged in the
surveys of the Florida Isthmus
Canal, and of the Gulf Harbors from
Suwanee River to Pensacola
died
Aide-de-Camp to Jesup
died
retired

1836-38
1836-38
1820-22, 36,
36-38, 45-46,
46-47,
1836, 36-37

1820
1820
1820

1838
1863
1861

1820

1855

died

1840-42
1836-37
1837, 38-39
1839-42
1836-37, 3738, 48-49, 5657
2
1838-39
2, 3 1838-39, 4849, 56-57
2
1840-42, 4243
2
1840-42, 43,
49-50
2
1836-38

1820
1820
1820
1820
1820

1846
1857
1848
1861
1865

died
died
died
retired
died

1821
1821

1839
1860

retired
died

1821

1844

retired

1821

1857

died

1821

1840

died

1844-45, 4553

1822

1857

died

1834-35, 35,
35-36, 40-41,
45-46

1822

1861

retired
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Commissary of Marine Battalion

Major, Reg. Mounted Creek
Volunteers, Indian Agent

ordnance duty, commanding Garey's
ferry ordnance depot
member of special board of
engineers for examination of Florida
reef, for defensive works,
superintending engineer of the
construction of Ft. Taylor key west
Fla
wounded at Withlacoochee Dec. 31,
1835 moved to topographical duty,
examined fl reefs

Cullum #

Class Rank

War

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class

End of
Service

Status

Thompson B.
Wheelock
David H. Vinton

295

10

2

1836

1822

1836

died

299

14

2

1836-39

1822

1866

John Pickell
St. Clair Denny

301
306

16
21

2
2

1836-38
1841-42

1822
1822

1838
1858

retired
died

George Wright

309

24

2

1840-41, 4142, 43, 43-44

1822

1865

died

George A. McCall

311

26

1, 2

1822

1863

retired

Francis Lee
James R. Stephenson
Thompson Morris
John J. Abercrombie
David Moniac

313
314
316
322
324

28
29
31
37
39

2
2
2
2
2

1823-24, 2628, 29, 36, 3839, 41-42,
1840-42
1840
1837-40
1837-40
1836

1822
1822
1822
1822
1822

1859
1841
1861
1877
1836

died
died
retired
died
died

Lucien B. Webster
George Nauman
Frederic Searle

331
333
335

6
8
10

2
2
2

1836-38
1836-38
1836-39

1823
1823
1823

1853
1863
1853

died
died
died

John Parley

339

14

2

1835

1823

1836

retired

Lorenzo Thomas

342

17

2

1823

1869

retired

Julius J. B.
Kingsbury
George Andrews

343

18

2

1825, 26, 2728, 36-37, 3940
1838-40

1823

1853

dismissed

344

19

2

1823

1862

retired

George H. Crosman

355

30

2

1837-38, 3840, 40-42
1836-37, 4041

1823

1862

retired

Name
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Notes

at Ft. Micanopy
on quartermaster duty during Creek
and Florida War
resigned 1839, returned as
paymaster in FL
After the failure of the Armistead
campaign of 1840 against the
Seminole Indians, Colonel Worth
was assigned, with Wright as his
selected Adjutant-General, to
terminate this tedious and expensive
war amid the pestilential swamps of
Florida. The success of our arms
was in no small degree due to
Wright, whose efficiency won for
him the esteem and confidence of
the Army, and the brevet of Major
from the Government for his " zeal,
energy, and perseverance."

1841 on sick leave

Was a Creek Indian, Died at the
Battle of Wahoo Swamp, captain
reg. mounted creek volunteers Aug.
17, major Nov. 15
taught
wounded in ambush on road
between St. Augustine and Picolata,
on sick leave 1839-53
topographical duty 1823-28, Europe
1828-29, Engineer duty 1829-31 in
SC

Chief Quartermaster, then settled
military claims in FL

Egbert B. Birdsall

360

35

2

William P.
Bainbridge
Timothy Paige

371

11

2, 3

385

25

2

Dixon S. Miles

387

27

2

Electus Backus

388

28

2

Joseph Van
Swearingen
Raphael C. Smead

390

30

2

398

7

2

Francis Taylor

400

9

2

Abbott H. Brisbane
William A. Thornton

401
403

10
12

2
2

Robert Anderson

406

15

2

James R. Irwin
Washington Seawell

408
411

17
20

2
2

Joseph S. Worth

415

24

2

Osborne Cross

417

26

2

William R.
Montgomery
Gustavus Dorr

419

28

2

423

32

2

Status

2

End of
Service

War

34

Class

Class Rank

359

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Cullum #

Albert S. Miller

Name

1837-38, 3940, 40-41
1841

1823

1852

died

1823

1845

died

1836-38, 3839, 49-50
1836

1824

1850

died

1824

1836

retired

1839-42,
43045
1838-39, 3940
1837

1824

1862

died

1824

1862

died

1824

1837

died

died in the Battle of Okee-cho-be

1836-37, 3738, 38-39
1836-37, 4546
1835-36
1836-37

1825

1848

died

engineer on duty in fl 37-38

1825

1858

died

1825
1825

1836
1866

1837-36, 46,
46-47
1836, 37-38
1839, 41-42,
42-43,
1838, 40-41,
42-43, 43-45
1840-41

1825

1863

1825
1825

1848
1862

died
retired

1825

1846

died

1825

1866

retired

1840-42, 4345
1837-40, 4142,

1825

1855

dismissed

1825

1843

dropped
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on sick leave 1841-45, died St.
Augustine

engaged in skirmishes at camp Izard
Fe. 27, 28, 29, and March 5, 1836,
resigned March 16, 1836

disbanded
died
taught, Civil History. - Translator,
front the French, of "Instructions for
Field Artillery --- Horse and Foot,"
for the service of the United
States,1840 ; and of “Evolutions of
Field Batteries," 1860.
retired

on sick leave 1839-41
died St. Augustine
with 2nd dragoons moving from
Florida to West of Mississippi

insanity

Class

End of
Service

36

1

1827, 27-28,
28-29, 29-30

1825

1832

John McClellan 434

6

2

1826

1854

Francis L. Dancy 438

10

2

1839-40-4142
1833-34, 3435, 35, 3536, 36,

1826

1841

Joseph D. Searight 439

11

1

1826

1845

Daniel S. Herring 441

13

2

1826-27, 36,
36-38, 41-42
1836

1826

1836

died

Michael M. Clark 443
Maskell C. Ewing 444

15
16

2
2

1835-38
1836

1826
1826

1861
1836

died
retired

Samuel P. 445
Heintzelman

17

2

1835-37, 3841, 41-42

1826

1869

retired

Danforth H. Tufts 447

19

2

1826

1840

died

John B. Grayson 450
Edwin B. Babbitt 456

22
28

2
2

1836-38, 3839
1835-36
1837-38, 4042,

1826
1826

1861
1866

retired
retired

Francis J. Brooke 460

32

2

1837

1826

1837

died

Amos B. Eaton 464

36

2

1826

1862

retired

Silas Casey 467

39

2

1826

1868

retired

Ebenezer S. Sibley 470
William Maynadier 472

1
3

2

1827, 27-28,
37-41
1837-41, 4142
1836, 40-42

1827
1827

1864

retired

Gabriel J. Rains 482

13

2, 3

1827

1861

retired

Joseph H. La Motte 495

26

3

1827

1856

retired

Isaac P. Simonton 498
Jefferson Van Horne 499

29
30

2
2

1827
1827

1842
1857

died
died

1839-40, 4142, 49-50
1837-38, 3940, 41
1836, 36-39
1840-41, 4142, 42-43
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Joseph Clay 427

Name

Notes

ROADS in garrison at
Cantonment Clinch, Fla., 1827 ;
in opening road from the garrison
at Cantonment Clinch, Fla., 1827
; in opening road from the
Georgia State Line to Smyrna,
Fla., 1827-28 ; in garrison at
Cantonment Brooke, Fin., 182829, 1829-30; in opening road
from Cantonment Brooke to the
Seminole. Agency, Fla., 1830; in
the Cherokee Nation, 1830; and in
garrison at Ft. Mitchell, Ala.,
1830-32.
died
disbanded repaired Military Road, engineer
duty July - Sept. 1836, State
Engineer and Geologist of Florida
53-57
retired
died at St. Augustine, FLA, age
28
Topographical Duty, Went to
Europe
41-42 settling Florida militia
claims, also served on
Quartermaster duty in fl

topographical duty
pending "disputed territory'
controversy - settling claims in
Florida and Georgia
killed in the Battle of Okee-chobee

obituary lists he served in early
part of Florida War

36-39 on commissary duty

Cullum #

Class Rank

War

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class

End of
Service

Status

Stephen M. Westmore 503
Abraham Van Buren 506
Robert E. Temple 511

34
37
4

2
2
2

1839-40
1836
1836

1827
1827
1828

1846
1837
1839

retired
retired
retired

Joseph L. Locke 515

8

2

1828

1836

retired

Thomas B. Adams 519

12

2

1834, 34-35,
36
1836-37

1828

1837

died

Robert E. Clary 520
Robert Sevier 521
Enos G. Mitchell 523

13
14
16

2
2
2

1840-41
1837
1838-39

1828
1828
1828

1869
1837
1839

retired
retired
died

James F. Izard 524

17

2

1835-36

1828

1836

died

James W. Penrose 539

32

2

1828

1849

died

J. Allen Smith Izard 544
John Mackay 548

4
8

2
2

1838-40, 4142,
1836-37
1837-39, 3943

1829
1829

1837
1848

retired
died

John C. Casey 551

11

2

1829

1856

died

Joseph E. Johnston 553
John F. Kennedy 554

13
14

2
2

1835-39, 4849, 49-56
1836-38
1836-37

1829
1829

1837
1837

retired
died

Sidney Burbank 556
William Hoffman 558

16
18

2
2

1829
1829

1870
1870

retired
retired

Franklin E. Hunt 560

20

2

1829

1879

retired

Seth Eastman 562

22

2

1840-41
1837-40, 4042
1836-38, 3839,
1840-41

1829

1875

died

Albemarle Cady 564
Edwin R. Long 579

24
39

2
2

1829
1829

1864
1846

retired
died

Benjamin W. Brice 580
Theophilus H. Holmes 584

40
44

3
3

1838-42
1839-41, 4142
1859
1839-40, 4041, 41-42,
49-50

1829
1829

1872
1861

retired
retired

Name
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Notes

leave of absence 1836-37
reappointed 1847-48 then
disbanded

died at Fort Dade Dec. 14, took
part at skirmish at Camp Izard

died June 10, Ft. Roger Jones age
32
mortally wounded at camp Izard
while commanding the advance
guard, and directing his men "to
keep their positions and lie close"

taught
Superintending Top. Engineer of
the construction of harbors in
Georgia, and roads in Florida,
survey of Choctawhatchie and
Holmes Rivers, FLA
died at Fort Brooke
topographical
on Ordnance and commissary
duty, died SC

in the Bureau of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Feb. 27, 1850, to May 10,1855,
illustrating the national work on
the "History, Condition, and
Future Prospects of the Indian
Tribes of the United States,"
published ~by order of Congress,
1850-57;

2
9

2
2

Benjamin Poole 596

10

2

Simon H. Drum 597

11

2

James H. Prentiss 598

12

Robert H. K. Whitely 599
Edwin Rose 600

Status

William E. Basinger 588
Thomas B. Linnard 595

End of
Service

War
2

Class

Class Rank
46

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Cullum #

Richard B. Screven 586

1829

1851

died

1830
1830

1835
1851

died
died

1830

1839

died

died with Dade
in charge of construction of Iron
Light houses on Carysfort Reef
and Sand Key Fl 1849-51
died Nov. 9 St. Augustine

1830

1847

died

taught

2

1836-37, 3738, 40-42,
42-44, 44,
44-45
1835
1834, 34-35,
35-36, 36-38,
37-38, 49-51
1836-38, 3839
1836-38, 3839
1836

1830

1848

died

leave of absence to Europe 183638

13
14

2
2

1836, 37-38
1836-37

1830
1830

1875
1837

retired
retired

John B. Magruder 601
James M. Hill 606

15
20

2
2

1830
1830

1861
1849

retired
died

Lloyd J. Beall 611

25

2

1837-18
1837-38, 4243. 43, 4344, 44, 4445, 45, 46-47
1837-38

1830

1861

retired

Robert C. Buchanan 617

31

2

1830

1870

retired

George W. Patten 622

36

2

1836, 37-38,
41-42
1837, 38, 3942

1830

1864

retired

Richard H. Ross 626

40

2, 3

1830

1851

died

John M. Clendenin 627
Richard H. Peyton 634

41
6

2
2

1840-42, 45,
49-50
1838-40
1837-38

1830
1831

1842
1839

died
died

George W. Turner
George H. Talcott
Andrew A.
Humphreys
William Chapman
Charles H. Larnard
Thomas J. McKean

636
639
641

8
11
13

2
2
2

1836
1835-36
1836, 42

1831
1831
1831

1836
1854
1879

retired
died
retired

643
644
647

15
16
19

3
2
2

1831
1831
1831

1863
1854
1864

retired
died
retired

Edmund A. Ogden 649

21

2

1857
1841-42
1837-38, 6465
1837-38, 4042, 43, 4344, 44-45

1831

1855

died

Name
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Notes

on topographical duty 1834-36,
retired after FL

Cavalry School of Saumnr,
France, 1840-42, to learn the
French system of Dragoon
exercise ; at Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
(Cavalry School for Practice),

degree of A.M. conferred 1830 by
Brown University of which he
was a graduate in 1825, author of
numerous poetical effusions,
1830-80

died Nov. 11 Tampa Bay, taught
before FL
resigned after FL
resigned 1836, reappointed 1838
to Topographical Engineers
taught before FL
civil engineer 1834-37
constructing barracks in Key
West 1843-45

17

2

James H. Simpson 679

18

2

Richard G. Pain 681

20

Status

Ward B. Burnett 678

End of
Service

War
2
2
2
2
2

Class

Class
Rank
33
1
9
10
13

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Cullum #
661
662
670
671
674

1837-38
1836
1836-38
1842, 61
1836-38, 4142, 42-43, 43
1836

1831
1832
1832
1832
1832

1836
1836
1838
1864
1847

died
retired
retired
retired
died

Died Aug 10, James Island Fla
resigned after FL

1832

1836

retired

1832

1880

retired

2

1835, 37, 3738, 39-40
1836

1832

1832

retired

taught before FL, resigned after
FL
in the construction of Roads in
Florida, 1839-40,
after resigning, raised and
commanded a company of
Tennessee Volunteers for Florida
but on the march to the seat of
War, his regiment, ...was
disbanded, not being required for
service

Daniel P. Whiting
Randolph B. Marcy
Richard C. Gatlin
William H. Storer
Henry Swartwout
Roswell W. Lee
Erastus A. Capron
David E. Hale
Benjamin Alvord

3
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2

1849-50
1857
1849-50
1837-38
1850, 52
1836-37
1835-38
1836-37
1841-42

1832
1832
1832
1832
1832
1833
1833
1833
1833

John L. Hooper
John P. Center

2
2

1836-38
1837

1833
1833

George H. Pegram
Abraham C. Myers

2
2

1833
1833

Henry L. Scott
Nathaniel W. Hunter
Robert T. P. Allen
James Duncan
John F. Lee
Charles A. Fuller
John E. Henderson
William G. Freeman
Gabriel R. Paul

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Seneca G. Simmons
John Graham
Charles J. Whiting
Alfred Herbert
Arnoldus V. Brumby
Joseph Roberts
Horace Brooks

3
2
2
2
2
3
2

1837-42
1836-38, 4042
1836-37
1837-42
1834-1836
1835-36,38
1836-37
1836
1836
1836-39
1839, 184243
1849-50
1835-38
1836
1836-37
1836
1849-50
1835-36

Name

John Conrad
George W. Ward
George Watson
Erasmus D. Keyes
William Wall

1833
1833
1834
1834
1834
1834
1834
1834
1834
1834
1834
1835
1835
1835
1835
1835
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Notes

taught before FL

interesting footnote in
biographical sketch -lack of
environmental knowledge
Killed at the Battle of Okee-chobee

topographical duty
wounded at Camp Izard

topographical duty

Class
1835
1835
1835

2

1835

George G. Meade

2

William H. Betts
Weightman K. Hanson

2
2

Henry Prince

2

Alexander M. Mitchell
S. Theodore Tibbatts
James M. Wells
Isaac V. D. Reeve

2
2
2
2

Thomas L. Brent
Agustus P. Allen
James Lowry
Donaldson

2
2
2

1836-38, 4041
1835-36,
1849-50
1836
1839, 184041
1836-37,
1838, 41-42
1836
1836-37
1839
1836-37, 4042
1836-39
1837-40
1836-37

John P. J. O'Brien
Roland A. Luther
John F. Roland

2
3
2

1836
1836
1836

Charles B. Sing
John W. Phelps
Muscoe L.
Shackleford
Christopher Q.
Tompkins
Martin J. Burke
Wiliam B. Arvin
John S. Hatheway
William Frazer

2
2
2

1836-39
1852
1836-38, 4950
1836-37
1836-38
1836-38

2

1836-40

1836

2
2
2
2

1836
1836
1836
1836

George C. Thomas
William Mock
Collinson R. Gates
William Mackrall
Lewis G. Arnold
Israel Vogdes

2
2
2
2
3
3

Robert T. Jones
Francis Woodbridge
A. Park Gregory
William T. Martin
Jubal A. Early

2
2
2
2
2

1836-37
1836
1836-37
1836-39, 4142
1836-39
1836-38
1840-42
1837-39
1853-57
1849-50, 5056
1837-38
1838, 49-50
1837-38
1837-38
1837-38

1835

Status

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles
1835-38
1835
1835

End of
Service

War

Class Rank

2
2
2

Cullum #

James M. Morgan
Richard Henderson
John L. Keais (or
Keats?)
James H. Stokes

Name

Notes

Died in Dade's desperate Battle
Died in Dade's desperate Battle

1847-49 mapping surveys of
Florida Reefs

1835
1835
1835
1835
1835
1835
1835
1835
1836
1836

1836
1836
1836

1836
1836
1836
1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
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Author of "Sergeant Atkins," - a
Tale of Adventure, founded on
facts during the Florida War
against the Seminole Indians,
1871

Henry C. Pratt
Bennett H. Hill
William H. French

3
3
2

John Sedgwick
John C. Pemberton

2
2

Charles P. Wooster

2

Arthur M. Rutledge
Arnold Elzey

2
2

William H. Fowler

2

Samuel Woods
Walter Sherwood

2
2

Randolph Ridgley
Francis O. Wyse

2
2

William G. Grandin
Nevil Hopson
William H. T. Walker

2
2
2

William Hardia
Franklin Saunders
Jeremiah M. Scarritt
Buckner Board
William F. Barry
William Austine
Charles J. Huges

2
2
2
2
3
3
2

Carter L. Stevenson
Henry D. Grafton

3
3

James B. Ricketts
Edward O.C. Ord
Joseph B. Boyd
Samuel K. Dawson

1001
1002
1003
1007

16
17
18
22

3
2
2
3

William H. Korn
Edward R. S. Canby
John H. Hill
William Gilham
William T. Sherman
Job R. H. Lancaster
William H. Churchill
Stewart Van Vliet

1014
1015
1016
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025

29
30
31
5
6
7
8
9

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

John P. McCown 1026
Francis N. Clarke 1027

10
11

3
3

1853-55,56
1854-56
1837-38,
1850-52
1837-38
1837-38, 4950
1838-39,
1850
1837-38
1837-38,
1856
1837-38, 4951
1837
1840

1837
1837
1837

1837-41
1838-42,
1849-50
1837-38
1839-40
1837-38, 4042
1837-39
1837-38
1838-39
1838-39
1852-53
1849-50
1838-39

1837
1837

1856-57
1845-47, 5153
1852
1839-42
1839-41
1851-53, 5456
1839-40
1839-42
1839-40
1840-41
1840-42
1840-41
1840-42
1840-41, 4142
1856-57
1856-57,66

1838
1839

Status

End of
Service

Class

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

War

Class Rank

Cullum #

Name

Notes

1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
1837

killed - hand-to-hand combat near
Ft. Micanopy

1837
1837
1837
1837
1837
1838
1838
1838
1838
1838

chief engineer in Florida war

died Aug. 22, 1839 at Ft. Frank
Brooke, Fla.
Author of " The Camp and
March," 1851.

1839
1839
1839
1839

1867
1880
1841
1870

retired
retired
retired
retired

1839
1839
1839
1840
1840
1840
1840
1840

1840
1873
1847
1872
1853
1841
1847
1881

retired
died
died
died
retired
died
died
retired

1840
1840

1861
1866

retired
died
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Quartermaster 1840-31

End of
Service

Status

2

Class

12

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

War

George H. Thomas 1028

Class Rank

Cullum #

Name

1840

1870

died

1840
1840
1840
1840

1883
1853
1875
1848

retired
died
died
retired

1840
1840
1840
1840
1840
1840
1840
1840

1855
1847
1858
1863
1861
1882
1841
1843

died
retired
died
retired
retired
retired
died
retired

George W. Getty
Horace B. Field
William Hays
Bryant P. Tilden

1031
1032
1034
1036

15
16
18
20

3
2
3
2

Oscar F. Winship
Bushrod R. Johnson
Charles H. Humber
James N. Caldwell
Reuben P. Campbell
Pinckney Lugenbeel
Henry Wardwell
William Robertson

1038
1039
1040
1041
1043
1044
1045
1046

22
23
24
25
27
28
29
30

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

1840-42, 4950
1849-50
1840-42
1853-54, 55
1840-41, 4142
1840-42
1840-42
1840-42
1840-41
1840-42
1840-41
1840-41
1841-42

William Steele 1047

31

2

1841-42

1840

1861

retired

1048
1050
1051
1052
1053

32
34
35
36
37

2
2
2
2
2

1840-42
1840-42
1840-41
1840-41
1841

1840
1840
1840
1840
1840

1860
1871
1862
1855
1840

retired
retired
died
died
dropped

Daniel G. Rogers 1054
William B. Johns 1055

38
39

2
2

1840-41
1840-42, 43

1840
1840

1848
1861

died
dropped

Douglass S. Irwin 1056

40

2

1840

1846

died

Thomas Jordan 1057
John D. Bacon 1058
Horatio G. Wright 1060

41
42
2

2
2
3

1841-42, 4243
1841-42
1840-42
1852-53, 5455

1840
1840
1841

1861
1847
1884

retired
died
retired

1068
1069
1075
1076

10
11
17
18

2
2
2
3

1841
1841
1841
1841

1847
1861
1854
1861

died
died
retired
retired

Simon S. Fahnestock 1078
Richard P. Hammond 1079

20
21

2
2

1841
1841

1850
1851

retired
retired

John M. Brannan 1081
James Totten 1083

23
25

3
3

1841-42
1841-42
1841-42
1849-50, 5455
1849-50
1843-44, 4445
1856-57,58
1849-50

1841
1841

1882
1870

retired
dismissed

Robert P. Maclay
Henry D. Wallen
Stephen D. Carpenter
Joseph L. Folsom
William G. Torrey

George W. Ayers
Nathaniel Lyon
Sewall L. Fremont
Samuel S. Anderson
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Notes

at Ft. Dallas, FL
Served: at the Cavalry School for
Practice, Carlisle, Pa., 1840-41;
Served: at the Cavalry School for
Practice, Carlisle, Pa., 1840-41;
joined the Rebellion

after failing to report from leave
of absence
for "having declined the
command of his company, when
ordered on a particular service"
(to proceed to Ft. Pickens, Fla.

light-house engineer in fl, on
commission for improvement of
St. John's river, superintending
engineers of the building of Ft.
Taylor and Navy Coal Depot at
Key West

Alfred Sully 1092

34

2

Franklin F. Flint 1093
John Beardsley 1094

35
36

2
2

Israel B. Richardson 1096
Andrew W. Bowman 1098

38
40

2
2

Edward Murray 1099
Francis N. Page 1100

41
42

2
2

1101
1102
1103

43
44
45

2
2
2

1104
1106

46
48

2
2

Rudolph F. Ernst 1108
Charles F. Morris 1110

50
52

2
2

John Newton 1112

2

George W. Rains 1113
Martin L. Smith 1126
John Pope 1127

Abner Doubleday
George Sykes
Charles T. Baker
Earl Van Dorn

Anderson D. Nelson
Benjamin A. Berry
Alexander C. H.
Darne
William T. H. Brooks
Levi Gantt

1134
1149
1160
1162

Status

3
2
2
2
2
2
2

End of
Service

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Robert S. Garnett
Robert B. Parker
Richard B. Garnett
Richard H. Bacot
Claudius W. Sears
Don Carlos Buell
John G. Burbank

Class

War

1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091

John F. Reynolds 1084

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class Rank

2

Cullum #

26

Name

1842, 42, 4243
1850
1841-42
1841-42
1841-42, 42
1841-42
1841-42, 43
1841-42, 4344, 45
1841-42

1841

1863

killed

1841
1841
1841
1841
1841
1841
1841

1861
1842
1861
1843
1842
1864
1847

died
died
retired
retired
retired
retired
died

1841

1866

retired

1841-42
1841-42, 4345
1841-42, 42
1842, 42-44,
45
1841-42
1841-42, 4243, 56-58
1841-42
1841-42
1841-42, 4245 51
1841-42, 43
1841-42, 4243
1841-42
1842-43, 43,
44-45

1841
1841

1882
1853

retired
retired

1841
1841

1855
1869

retired
died

1841
1841

1855
1860

retired
died

1841
1841
1841

1879
1845
1845

retired
died
retired

1841
1841

1864
1847

retired
died

1841
1841

1847
1847

died
died

3

1853-54

1842

1866

retired

3
16
17

3
3
2

1849-50
1859-61
1842-44

1842
1842
1842

1856
1861
1866

retired
retired

24
39
50
52

3
2
2
3

1856-58
1842, 42-43
1842, 32-43
1849-50

1842
1842
1842
1842

1873
1880
1851
1861

retired
died
retired
retired

248

Notes

on sick leave

continued on in various
administrative roles

stationed at: Ft Brook, Ft
Shannon, Ft Marion, Fr King, Ft
Marion
taught for many years,
supervising engineer of
improvement of St. Johns River,
of Haul-over canal, and repairs of
St. Augustine Sea-wall;
fortifications and light houses
Pensacola harbor Fla, 55-58,
examine Pensacola dock
corps. of engineers
Asst. Top. Engineer on the Survey
of the Northeast Boundary Line
between the United States and the
British Provinces - is this FL?

taught

War

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class

End of
Service

Status

3

1856-57

1842

1864

retired

Roswell S. Ripley 1173
Henry F. Clarke 1178

7
12

3
3

1843
1843

1853
1884

retired
retired

Franklin Gardner 1183

17

3

1849-50
1841-42, 5355, 61
1849-50

1843

1861

dropped

1193

27

3

1843

1861

other

1197
1199
1212
1223
1234
1239

31
33
7
18
4
9

3
3
3
3
3
3

1849-50, 5758
1856-57
1850-51
1856-57
1856-57
1853
1849-50

1843
1843
1844
1844
1845
1845

1865
1883
1868
1886
1867
1863

died
retired
retired
died
retired
retired

George Edwards 1240
Francis Collins 1242
Francis T. Bryan 1277

10
12
6

3
3
n/a

1848-50
1849-50
1853-54

1845
1845
1846

1851
1850
1861

retired
retired
retired

Edmund Hayes 1282
Edward C. Boynton 1283

11
12

3
3

1849-50
1855-56

1846
1846

1853
1856

died
retired

Darius N. Couch 1284
John A. Brown 1287

13
16

3
3

1846
1846

1855
1861

retired
retired

Thomas J. Jackson 1288

17

3

1849-50
1848--49,
49-50, 56-57
1851

1846

1852

retired

Albert L. Magilton 1289

18

3

1846

1857

retired

Truman Seymour 1290
Cadmus M. Wilcox 1325

19
54

3
3

1849-50, 5657
1856-58
1849-50

1846
1846

1876
1861

retired
retired

George W. Hazzard
Sameul F. Chalfin
Orlando B. Willcox
George Patten
John H. Dickerson

1335
1337
1338
1340
1341

5
7
8
10
11

3
3
3
3
3

1847
1847
1847
1847
1847

1862
1869
1887
1851
1864

died
retired
retired
retired
retired

Otis H. Tillinghast 1343
Ambrose P. Hill 1345

13
15

3
3

1847
1847

1861
1861

died
retired

Anson J. Cook 1346

16

3

1847

1853

died

John Gibbon 1350

20

3

1856-57
1849-52, 61
1856-57
1849-50
1850-51, 5253
1853, 56-57
1849-50, 50,
52-53
1849-50, 52,
52-53
1849-50

1847

1866

retired

Clermont L. Best 1351

21

3

1850, 56-57

1847

1888

retired

William K. Van
Bokkelen
Henry R. Selden
Fredrick T. Dent
Alfred Pleasonton
Winfield S. Hancock
William F. Smith
Josiah H. Carlisle
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Served in
FL

Class Rank
55

Cullum #

James W. Abert 1165

Name

Notes

Top. Engineers (transferred
1843)

for abandoning command,
joined rebellion
cashiered for misapplication of
$225 of Public funds

Quartermaster Ft. Myers
taught
from disease contracted in the
line of duty

Top. Engineer in charge of
survey for Ship Canal across
the Isthmus of Florida
Taught French & chemistry,
mineralogy, and geology 184855

1851-61 taught at Virginia
Military Institute - aka
"Stonewall Jackson"

compiled books and
translations
taught

at Ft. Brooke
mustered out of volunteers but
continued

War

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class

End of
Service

Status

3

1849-50,

1847

1865

retired

William W. Burns 1358
John C. Tidball 1379

28
11

3
3

1856-57
1849-50, 61

1847
1848

1889
1865

retired

1380
1382
1385

12
14
17

3
3
3

1848
1848
1848

1861
1855
1856

retired
retired
died

1392
1402
1410
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415

24
34
4
5
6
7
8
9

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

1848
1848
1849
1849
1849
1849
1849
1849

1856
1853
1883
1855
1875

retired
died
died
retired
retired

1865
1866

died

William A. Nimmo 1416
Edward D. Stockton 1418
Edward R. Platt 1419

10
12
13

3
3
3

1856
1857
1884

died
died
died

1420
1423
1424
1425
1428

14
17
18
19
22

3
3
3
3
3

1849-50
1853-54
1848-49, 49,
49-51
1849-50
1849-50
1853-55
1849-50
1849-50
1849-50
1856-57
1850-51. 5253
1850
1849-50
1849-50, 5455, 1861
1849-50
1849-50
1849-50
1849-50
1849-50

1849
1849
1849
1849
1849

yes

yes

1855
1888
1857
1870

retired
retired
died
retired

1454

5

3

1850, 56-57

1850

yes

1860

retired

Joseph H. Wheelock 1455

6

3

1850, 56-57

1850

yes

1857

retired

1457
1461
1465
1470

8
12
16
21

3
3
3
3

1850
1850
1850
1850

yes
yes
yes

1876
1868
1854
1889

died
died
died
retired

Frederick M. Follett 1492
Edward H. Day 1503
Alvan C. Gillem 1504

43
10
11

3
3
3

1850
1851
1851

yes
yes

1869
1860
1866

died
died
retired

Alexander J. Perry 1506
Albert J. S. Molinard 1509

13
16

3
3

1863

retired

John Mendenhall 1513

20

3

1856-57
1850-51
1851
1850-53, 5658, 58-59
1856-57
1851-52
1851-52,
1860-61
1852
1853, 53-54,
55-57
1857

William G. Gill
Thomas S. Rhett
Truman K.
Walbridge
John C. Booth
George C. Barber
Thomas J. Haines
Johnson K. Duncan
William Silvey
Beekman Du Barry
Delavan D. Perkins
Absalom Baird

Chauncey McKeever
John C. Moore
Rufus Saxton
Thomas Wright
Edward McK.
Hudson
Powell T. Wyman

Oscar A. Mack
Adam J. Slemmer
John A. Mebbane
Amos Beckwith

1849
1849
1849

1851
1851
1851
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Served in
FL

Class Rank
24

Cullum #

Henry M. Black 1354

Name

yes

making payment, 1852-54, to
Seminole Warriors for services
in Florida 1835-36, mustered
out of volunteers but continued
mustered out of volunteers but
continued

yes

yes

Notes

taught
taught
taught
taught, mustered out of
volunteers but continued
on sick leave
taught
taught
taught

returned during civil war,
killed 1862
sick leave after FL, taught,
returned during civil war
taught,
taught

mustered out of volunteers but
continued
taught

Class

1542
1548
1550
1553

7
13
15
18

3
3
3
3

1852
1852
1852
1852

George L. Hartsuff 1554

19

3

1852-53
1854-55
1855
1852-54, 5556
1854-56,

John M. Schofield 1585
Mathew M. Blunt 1586

7
8

3
3

1853
1853

yes

Thomas M. Vincent 1589

11

3

1854-55
1852-1855,
1861
1853-55, 55

1853

yes

1592
1594
1595
1596
1598

14
16
17
18
20

3
3
3
3
3

1853
1853
1853
1853
1853

James L. White 1603

25

3

1856
1856-57
1856-1857
1857-58
1856, 56-58,
58
1853-54

Henry W. Slocum
James W. Robinson
John Mullan
Robert B. Thomas

George Bell
William R. Terrill
Louis H. Pelouze
Owen F. Solomon
Richard C. Duryea

1861

yes
yes
yes

1852

1853

Thomas Wilson
William A. Webb
Alexander Chambers
Lucius L. Rich
Oliver O. Howard

1607
1613
1621
1628
1634

29
35
43
50
4

3
3
3
3
3

1856-57
1856-57
1856-57
1856-57
1857

1853
1853
1853
1853
1854

Henry W. Closson
Stephen D. Lee
William D. Pender
Loomis L. Langdon
John T. Greble
Stephen H. Weed
Alfred B. Chapman
David H. Brotherton
Samuel Breck
Frederick L. Childs
Michael P. Small

1638
1647
1649
1650
1651
1657
1659
1674
1683
1685
1687

8
17
19
20
21
27
29
44
7
9
44

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

1857
1856-57, 57
1854-55
1854-56
1854-55
1856-57
1854-55
1856-57
1855-56
1856-55
1856-57

1854
1854
1854
1854
1854
1854
1854
1854
1855
1855
1855
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1856
1861
1853
1856

Status

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

1852

End of
Service

War

1856

Joseph C. Ives 1540

Served in
FL

Class Rank

3

Cullum #

5

Name

dismissed compiling a map of the
Peninsula of Florida, dismissed
by the President for "having
tendered his resignation under
circumstances showing him to
be disloyal to the Government"
retired
retired
retired
retired

1871

yes

yes
yes
yes
yes

Notes

served during civil war

topographical duty in FL Dec
1854, skirmish near Ft. Drane
severely wounded, taught at
WP after
taught
taught
artillery, employed in
compiling a sketch of South
Florida, Aug. 22 to Oct. 22,
1855; on various Staff duties in
Florida, Oct. 23, 1855, to
March. 15, 1856; Taught,
wrote several books/reports

1862
1878
1859

died
died
died

1861

retired

1861
1888
1861
1861

died
died
retired
retired

1861
1861

retired
retired

1861
1863
1861
1884

died
died
retired
retired

taught

1861

retired

joined the Rebellion

Surveyor and Civil Engineer,
Orange Spring, Marion
County, Fla., 1875 to 18-

joined the Rebellion
taught after FL, returned for
civil war

joined the Rebellion

yes

Cullum #

Class Rank

War

Years
Fighting
the
Seminoles

Class

Served in
FL

End of
Service

Status

Francis R. T.
Nicholls
Alexander S. Webb
John W. Turner
Francis A. Shoup

1688

12

3

1855

1855

yes

1856

retired

1689
1690
1691

13
14
15

3
3
3

1855
1855
1855

yes
yes
yes

1870
1871
1860

retired
retired
retired

joined the Rebellion

Alfred T. A. Torbert
Robert C. Hill
Herbert A. Hascall
Hylan B. Lyon
Edmund C.
Bainbridge
Richard Lodor

1697
1709
1718
1729
1730

21
33
8
19
20

3
3
3
3
3

1856
1857, 57-58
1855-6, 5658
1856-57
1856-57
1856-57
1856-57
1857

1866
1861
1874
1861

retired
retired
retired
retired

joined the Rebellion
taught
joined the Rebellion

1732

22

3

1856-57

1856

Thomas E. Miller 1735
John F. Ritter 1742

25
32

3
3

1857, 1861
1856-57

1856
1856

Name

1855
1855
1856
1856
1856
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yes
yes

Notes

served during rebellion of the
seceding states
1862
1872

retired
died

served during rebellion of the
seceding states, died on leave
of absence

